Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Svetlana Dubinsky, Serge Doubinski, and Zinayda Chekayda, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 6, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 5, 2013 and to exclude time between May 6, 2013 and August 5, 2013, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form, including approximately 40, 000 pages of discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with each of their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with each of their clients, to prepare pretrial motions and otherwise prepare for trial.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, LEE S. BICKLEY, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
PATRICK HANLY, ESQ., For defendant SVETLANA DUBINSKY.
SUGARMAN & CANNON, CHRISTOPHER CANNON, ESQ., For defendant SERGE DOUBINSKI.
SCOTT CAMERON, ESQ., For defendant ZINAYDA CHEKAYDA.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The United States does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 6, 2013 to August 5, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.