Id. Courts are generally in agreement that the Act only imposes liability for material misstatements, and that "[t]he test of the materiality of a statement is whether a statement has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made." United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 118 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Deep, 497 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1974) (explaining that the materiality test asks whether the false statement "could affect or influence the exercise of governmental functions, — does it have a natural tendency to influence or is it capable of influencing agency decision" (citing United States v. East, 416 F.2d 351, 353 (9th Cir. 1969)); Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963); Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960)). This authority suggests that efforts to defraud the government that are or may be successful are particularly culpable.

See Appellant's Br. at 25; 18 U.S.C. § 1001. However, as this court held in United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980), section 1001's "jurisdiction" requirement is satisfied when there is "a sufficient nexus between the subject matter of the [agency] investigation which led to defendant's submission of false documents to the [agency] and the [agency's] . . . authority." 603 F.2d at 1264.

In pleading guilty, a defendant admits all of the factual allegations made in the indictment. United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980); see Parrott v. Brewer, 421 F.2d 1386, 1388 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). A defendant pleading guilty also waives all challenges that do not relate to jurisdiction.

Further, the test for materiality is whether the false statement has a tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a federal agency. United States v. Difonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980). The indictment clearly met this test by alleging that the false statements of May 30 and July 30 were used to conceal the fraudulent nature of the contract, thereby inducing payments to which defendant was not entitled.

"In determining whether an indictment charges a cognizable offense, [the court is] bound by the four corners of the indictment, must accept the truth of the allegations in the indictment, and cannot consider evidence that does not appear on the face of the indictment." United States v. Kelly, 874 F.3d 1037, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2017); accord United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a defendant moving to dismiss an indictment for failure to state an offense may not invoke facts that "transcend the four-corners of" the indictment). Thus, if a Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v) motion is "substantially intertwined with the evidence concerning the alleged offense, the motion ... falls within the province of the ultimate finder of fact" and must be denied.

"[A] plea of guilty admits all of the elements of a criminal charge, and waives all challenges to the prosecution either by direct appeal or by collateral attack, except challenges to the court's jurisdiction." Mack v. United States, 853 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879, 881 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 109 S.Ct. at 762 (noting that guilty pleas are more than confessions to certain acts, they are admissions that the defendant committed the substantive crime charged) (citations omitted); United States v. Jackson, 659 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 102 S.Ct. 1637, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982); O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with the rule that "[i]n pleading guilty, a defendant admits all of the factual allegations in the indictment.") (citing United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 44 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980); Parrott v. Brewer, 421 F.2d 1386, 1388 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)); Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561, 567 (5th Cir. 1967) (confirming the accepted notion that "[a] plea of guilty is not a mere admission or extrajudicial confession of guilt, but it is a conviction, and is as conclusive as the verdict of a jury."). The circuits are in general agreement that "jurisdictional" claims — claims questioning the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court, see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2103, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) — are the only bases for appeal not waived by a guilty plea.

The materiality requirement, however, has been read into all aspects of the statute. See United States v. Bailey, 734 F.2d 296, 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 327, 83 L.Ed.2d 263 (1984); United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 672, 62 L.Ed.2d 648 (1980); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822, 105 S.Ct. 97, 83 L.Ed.2d 43 (1984).

The true test for materiality under § 1001 is whether the statement in question had a "natural tendency to influence, or [was] ... capable of influencing" the federal agency. United States v. Dick , 744 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1984) ; United States v. DiFonzo , 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979). Mr. Wilson's statements to Government agents clearly had a "natural tendency" to influence their investigation of Imperial.

Specifically, Christopher argues that the government did not prove that his statements were material "as a matter of law." As he explains, the government needed to show at trial that his statements to Freeman were material, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1); United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2006), meaning that the statements had the tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, the FBI's investigation of the price-fixing conspiracy, see United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979); cf. United States v. Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining materiality in context of federal mail-fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346). According to Christopher, his false statements could not have influenced the FBI's investigation because his attorney, Sheeks, contacted the Department of Justice to correct the statements before they could lead the FBI astray.

s were convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, was "preempted" by the criminal false statement provision of the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I)); United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1993) (permitting a defendant who pleaded guilty to possession of a counterfeit passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) to argue on appeal that § 1546(a) does not apply to possession of a counterfeit passport issued by a foreign government and that the indictment therefore fails to state an offense); United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant who pleaded guilty to charges related to the manufacture, distribution, and possession of a controlled substance may challenge the sufficiency of the indictment on the ground that the particular substance involved in the case — methamphetamine — had been approved by the FDA for use in non-prescription drugs and therefore was not a controlled substance); see also United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from arguing that "the indictment contradicts itself, and, more importantly, that the preliminary factual allegations of the indictment negate one of the elements of the offense charged"). We note that the Fourth Circuit reached a different conclusion in United States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058 (4th Cir. 1993), which held that as long as a charging document recites in general terms all the elements of the relevant offense, a defendant who pleads guilty is barred from arguing on appeal that the specific facts alleged fail to establish a predicate offense.