Opinion
Case No. 3:98-CR-81
08-05-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. KEITH W. DEWITT, SR., Defendant.
JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
DECISION AND ENTRY RULING ON APPRENDI ISSUE AS RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S JANUARY 15, 2013, LETTER TO COURT (DOC. #481); SAID LETTER CONSTRUED AS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
On July 11, 2000, Defendant Keith DeWitt, Sr., filed a pro se motion to vacate his guilty plea. Doc. #247. On November 7, 2000, he filed another pro se "motion" entitled "Additional Reasons for Withdrawal of Plea." Doc. #268. In that filing, he argued that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and have a jury decide sentencing enhancement issues, including drug quantity, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court subsequently overruled his motion to vacate his guilty plea, Doc. #321, and sentenced him to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated that sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In July of 2006, Defendant was resentenced to life in prison, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
On January 15, 2013, the Court received a letter from Defendant, Keith DeWitt, Sr. Doc. #481. He questions whether the Court ever ruled on his pro se motion entitled "Additional Reasons for Withdrawal of Plea," Doc. #268, raising the Apprendi issue.
Since the amended judgment was issued seven years ago, it is doubtful that the Court has jurisdiction to revisit this issue at this juncture. In any event, it does not appear that Defendant's pro se Apprendi argument was ever adopted by defense counsel. Accordingly, it was not raised at the evidentiary hearing held on July 23 and 24, 2001, or in the parties' post-hearing briefs. Nor was it addressed in the Court's Decision and Entry overruling Defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea, Doc. #321.
Moreover, even if the argument had been adopted by defense counsel, it would have lacked merit. Several circuit courts have held that the Apprendi decision did not provide a fair and just reason for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea, particularly where, as here, Apprendi was not implicated because the defendant was not sentenced above the statutory maximum. See United States v. Fimbres-Martinez, 35 F. App'x 448, 449-50 (9th Cir. May 2, 2002) ("While it is true that, had Fimbres gone to trial, Apprendi might have required the government to prove the drug quantity to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, this undermines neither the voluntariness of Fimbres' guilty plea nor the factual basis for that plea as admitted by Fimbres."); United States v. Parker, 245 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that defendant may have pled differently if he had known that the government had to prove the drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Ford, 38 F. App'x 794, 795-96 (3d Cir. 2002) ("assuming arguendo that Apprendi applied in Ford's situation, he is nevertheless not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea merely because intervening circumstances have made the government's proof more difficult.").
The Court acknowledges that the Supreme Court recently extended Apprendi by holding that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is also an element of the crime that must be submitted to the jury. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
For all of these reasons, the issues raised in Defendant's January 15, 2013, letter to the Court lack merit. The Court construes that letter as a supplemental motion for a new trial.
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WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE