Opinion
1:11-cr-297-LJO
05-18-2016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DENARD DARNELL OF THE FAMILY NEAL, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE PETITIONER'S § 2255 MOTION (Doc. 113), MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 117), AND MOTION FOR RECUSAL (Doc. 118)
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Denard Darnell of the Family Neal ("Petitioner"), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, moves (1) for the undersigned to be recused from this case (Doc. 118); (2) to dismiss this case and his resultant sentence for lack of jurisdiction (Doc. 117); and (3) to vacate, set aside, or reduce his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("§ 2255") (Doc. 119). The Government opposes the motions in their entirety. See Docs. 119, 120. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motions.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts of Petitioner's case from the Ninth Circuit's opinion affirming his conviction and sentence:
In 2010, Neal was serving a sentence for armed robbery in the United States Penitentiary, Atwater ("USP-Atwater") in Merced County. While processing another prisoner for release from the penitentiary, USP-Atwater guards discovered a package that Neal had given the prisoner to mail for Neal once released. Upon inspecting Neal's package, the guards discovered various handwritten documents. Four of the documents were titled "Security Agreement Commercial Lien," identifying Neal as the secured party and fourteen USP-Atwater employees as debtors. Each Security Agreement was accompanied by a standardized Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Financing Statement ("UCC-1"). The Security Agreements and UCC-1 Financing Statements ("Lien Documents") indicated that the identified USP-Atwater employees owed Neal
amounts ranging from five thousand to forty-five million dollars, arising from their alleged criminal activities that caused Neal harm. Each Lien Document listed collateral for the lien as the employee's "oath of offices and all collateral related to the bonds that support, endorse the oath of offices." According to the Lien Documents, the "liens were to remain in place for 100 years," or until Neal was paid in full.United States, 776 F.3d 645, 649-51 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects. Id. at 662.
Included with the Lien Documents was a cover letter from Neal to his mother. In the letter, Neal asked his mother to type the documents. Neal also gave his mother step-by-step instructions for correctly filing the documents with the California Secretary of State and the County Recorder in Merced County on his behalf. Neal advised his mother that the "value of each oath of office [could] be found in the Security Agreement and matching UCC-1." Neal wanted his mother to act quickly. Once the documents were filed, Neal wanted to "present the documents to the Department of Justice and get [the USP-Atwater employees] fired."
Lastly, a letter addressed to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Daniel Koffsky was included in the packet. The letter claimed to provide "Actual and Constructive Notice" that Neal had "filed and registered the enclosed government officials['] Oath of Offices with the [California] Secretary of State."
After discovering Neal's Lien Documents, the FBI interviewed Neal about his attempt to file liens against the USP-Atwater employees. In the interview, Neal affirmed he wrote the documents. Neal told the agent the fourteen USP-Atwater employees had committed crimes against him. Because of their crimes, Neal concluded the employees should be fired and should also monetarily compensate him. As a result of the information obtained in the interview and in Neal's packet, Neal was charged with fourteen counts of attempting to file false liens and encumbrances against the real or personal property of fourteen officers and employees of USP-Atwater, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521 . . . .
After [a] two-day jury trial, Neal was convicted on all fourteen counts. The district court sentenced Neal to 87-months' imprisonment on each of the fourteen counts, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to any prior, undischarged term of imprisonment.
Petitioner now requests that the undersigned be recused and that his sentence be vacated. The thrust of Petitioner's recusal motion is his claim that the undersigned conspired with the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Department of Justice, and the "United States as a whole" to violate Petitioner's rights and, in so doing, did violate Petitioner's rights. See Doc. 118 at 2-3. As a result, Petitioner asserts the proceedings in this case have been unfair, a sham, and otherwise illegal. Id. Petitioner also contends the undersigned has "a financial interest in this case and has "refus[e]d to be honest, professional, [and] neutral." Id. at 4. Further, Petitioner argues the Court has become a "Trustee" with fiduciary duties for the entity "Denard Darnell Neal." Id. at 2. For these reasons, Petitioner argues the undersigned should be recused. Id. at 4.
All of the bases for Petitioner's 11-page dismissal motion is not entirely clear. But Petitioner clearly maintains and states his view that this Court has lacked and continues to lack jurisdiction over him. See Doc. 117 at 4. He therefore "seek[s] the [e]xpungement of [his] conviction, trial, and indictment from the record" for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 9.
Petitioner's § 2255 motion and reply total more than 100 pages and assert numerous arguments, almost all of which are unclear, unintelligible, or wholly lacking factual or legal support. Petitioner frames his motion in fourteen "Questions," which constitute the primary arguments in support of the motion. The Court agrees with the Government's observation that Petitioner's § 2255 motion, including his reply, "essentially raises six types of errors," which are:
1. A group of claims based on "Sovereign Citizen" ideology (Questions One through Four, Six, Nine, Eleven, and Thirteen);Doc. 119 at 2 (footnote omitted).
2. The Court improperly prevented discovery, argument, and evidence regarding misconduct of USP-Atwater Officials (Questions Four, Eight, and Ten);
3. Government agents stole the Petitioner's "legal materials" (Question Five);
4. An April 2012 habeas application was wrongly filed and adjudicated (Question Seven);
5. The Ninth Circuit violated the "right" to self-representation on appeal (Question Twelve); and
6. Appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective (Question Fourteen).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner's Recusal Motion.
Petitioner claims the undersigned should be recused from this case. "Typically, the Supreme Court has only mandated recusal when a judge has a direct, personal, or substantial connection to the outcome of a case or to its parties." In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 816 F.3d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir. 2016). The undersigned has not at any time had a connection to the parties in this case or its outcome. Petitioner has not provided any reason, let alone a valid or substantiated reason, for the undersigned's recusal. Accordingly, Petitioner's recusal motion (Doc. 118) is DENIED.
B. Petitioner's Dismissal Motion.
In his dismissal motion, Petitioner essentially argues that all of this case's proceedings are invalid because the Court has never had jurisdiction. See Doc. 117 at 2-3. This Court has "original jurisdiction . . . [over] all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This includes jurisdiction over Petitioner's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. Accordingly, Petitioner's dismissal motion (Doc. 117) is DENIED.
C. Petitioner's § 2255 Motion.
1. Legal Standard
A federal prisoner making a collateral attack against the validity of his or her conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed in the court which imposed sentence. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). Under § 2255, the federal sentencing court may grant relief if it concludes that a prisoner in custody was sentenced in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). To warrant relief, a movant must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude that had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Relief is warranted only where a movant has shown "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).
2. Analysis
As noted, Petitioner's 75-page § 2255 motion contains numerous arguments organized in fourteen "Questions."
Petitioner's reply simply re-hashes and repeats the arguments contained in his § 2255 motion.
Distilled, Questions One, Two, Three, Six, Nine, Eleven, and Thirteen concern Petitioner's position that the Court has never had jurisdiction over Petitioner and therefore the proceedings in this case have been illegal and unauthorized. The Court disagrees; the Court has had appropriate jurisdiction at all relevant times. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Petitioner has provided no authority or argument that suggests otherwise.
Question Four concerns Petitioner's argument that the Court conspired with the U.S. Attorney's Office to violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights by granting the Government's motion to preclude Petitioner from arguing and presenting evidence about "the Sovereignty concept as a defense." Doc. 113 at 23. Because the "Sovereign Citizen" defense is invalid and inadmissible, precluding Petitioner from asserting it did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
"Adherents to the 'sovereign citizen' philosophy," such as Petitioner, "typically 'believe that they are not subject to government authority." Vazquez v. Calif. Highway Patrol, No. 2:15-cv-756-JAM-EFB PS, 2016 WL 232332, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016). Courts have uniformly rejected any and all arguments premised on the philosophy. See, e.g., United States v. Alexio, No. 13-01017 JMS, 2015 WL 40691690, at *2-4 (collecting cases rejecting the "sovereign citizen" philosophy as frivolous, irrational, or unintelligible). This Court also rejects any "sovereign citizen" arguments or theories. --------
In Question Five, Petitioner argues that the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Bureau of Prisons, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Court worked in conjunction to prevent Petitioner's access to various legal materials. Doc. 113 at 30. Petitioner claims this alleged misconduct "violates every Article and Bill of Rights embodied within the United States Constitution." Id. at 31. The only viable argument in Question Five is that the Government's allegedly seizing Petitioner's legal materials violated the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 1989). Even assuming the Government seized or withheld Petitioner's legal materials as he contends, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, Petitioner must prove that he was denied access to legal materials and that denial prevented him from meaningfully representing himself. See Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Farias, 618 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner does not explain what these allegedly seized legal materials were, what his defense was, how the materials were relevant to his defense, or how his inability to access them affected his defense.
Petitioner asserts in Question Seven that the Court's denial of his habeas petition, challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, was invalid. The Court disagrees. On appeal from the Court's denial of the petition, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause the appeal is so insubstantial as to not warrant further review, it shall not be permitted to proceed." Neal v. United States, 1:12-cv-708-LJO-JLT, Doc. 9 at 1.
Questions Eight and Ten, though relatively unclear, appear to suggest that the Court's denying Petitioner's discovery requests and precluding Petitioner from presenting evidence concerning misconduct of USP-Atwater employees violating his constitutional rights or was otherwise illegal. See Doc. 113 at 40; Doc. 27. Petitioner has provided no meaningful argument in support, and the Court cannot conceive of one. As the Government correctly observes, any such evidence would not have established a defense; it most likely would have provided more proof of Petitioner's motive for committing the crimes of which he was committed. See Neal, 776 F.3d at 650 ("Neal did not dispute that he created and attempted to file the Lien Documents. Instead, Neal argued his liens were not criminal, because USP-Atwater employees had engaged in various criminal activities causing him personal harm and losses.").
Petitioner argues in Question Twelve that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in appointing counsel for Petitioner on appeal. Doc. 113 at 50. The Court will not consider this argument because the Court has no authority to question the Ninth Circuit's decisions.
Finally, in Question Fourteen, Petitioner contends that his court-appointed appellate counsel, John Balazs, was ineffective because he refused to present certain arguments on appeal. Specifically, Mr. Balazs apparently refused to argue Petitioner's contention that this Court lacked jurisdiction and is not an Article III court. Even if this occurred, it does not demonstrate that Mr. Balazs's representation of Petitioner was objectively unreasonable or that the outcome of Petitioner's appeal would have been different had he made Petitioner's requested arguments. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). There is no indication that Mr. Balazs's representation of Petitioner was deficient in any respect.
The Court has attempted to decipher and understand Petitioner's dozens of arguments. Almost all of them are unintelligible, irrational, or wholly baseless. None of them, however, has any merit. Simply put, Petitioner has failed to provide any meaningful argument that suggests he was sentenced in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Nor has Petitioner established that the Court lacked jurisdiction at any time. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner's § 2255 motion.
C. Certificate of Appealability
Petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of his § 2255 motion unless he has first obtained a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability will issue only when a Petitioner has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the Court has denied a § 2255 motion on the merits, a Petitioner must show that reasonable jurists would find the Court's decision on the merits to be debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's assessment of Petitioner's claims debatable or wrong. Id. at 483. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES:
1. Petitioner's § 2255 motion (Doc. 113);
2. Petitioner's dismissal motion (Doc. 117);
3. Petitioner's recusal motion (Doc. 118).
The Court also DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability for Petitioner's § 2255 motion. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 18 , 2016
/s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill
UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE