Accordingly, the Court must address two central questions: (1) at what point was the defendant seized, i.e., stopped, and (2) whether, at the point of the seizure, the officers were justified in executing it. See United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The Court will address each of these questions in turn.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2020), is particularly instructive here, as it involves very similar facts. In Delaney, two MPD officers were patrolling a "residential area" on New Year's Eve 2017 "in uniform and in a marked police cruiser."
To determine whether a challenged stop was unconstitutional, the Court's “first task is to pinpoint the time of the stop.” United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer's show of authority.
When the District Court "denies a defendant's suppression motion, we review de novo 'claims regarding whether and when a seizure occurred' as well as the 'district court's ultimate determination of whether a police officer had the reasonable, articulable suspicion ... necessary to legally effectuate' the stop." United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's ultimate determination that the officer who stopped Jones had reasonable suspicion, United States v. Delaney , 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020), but we review "findings of historical fact only for clear error and ... give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by [district court] judges," id. at 1082 (internal quotation marks omitted). ANALYSIS
Where a district court denies a defendant's motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the court's factual findings for clear error and the legal question "whether and when a seizure occurred" de novo. United States v. Delaney , 955 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 2020). "A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer's show of authority."
1. Timing of the Seizure A “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs “when physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer's ‘show of authority.'” United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A “show of authority” is sufficient to constitute a seizure when “the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business, ” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), or, in other words, where “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave, ” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
"A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer's show of authority." United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, officers did not use physical force against Gamble before he fled, so the questions in assessing if (and when) Gamble was seized are: (i) whether officers made a "show of authority"; and (ii) if so, whether Gamble submitted to the show of authority.
And when the use of takedown lights is accompanied by other coercive behavior—such as blocking a car in its parking space or issuing verbal commands—a detention is more likely to have occurred. See United States v. Delaney , 955 F.3d 1077, 1082–84 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding show of authority when officers used takedown lights; encounter occurred in a dimly lit and narrow parking lot; gunshots were sounding all around; and, "most importantly," officers parked their cruiser in a way that impeded the defendant's movement); United States v. Packer , 15 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1994) (seizure found when officers’ vehicles were in front of and behind the defendant's vehicle and had their takedown lights shining, and one officer approached with a flashlight shining and told the vehicle's occupants to put their hands in the air). But unlike those cases on which Defendant relies, no other coercive behavior or circumstances accompanied Officer Nelson's use of his vehicle's takedown lights.
The defendant bears the threshold "burden of proving whether and when the Fourth Amendment was implicated." United States v. Carhee , 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994) ; see alsoUnited States v. Delaney , 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ("The person challenging the seizure bears the burden of demonstrating that he was seized." (quotations omitted)). If a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred without a warrant, "the burden is on the government to demonstrate that its conduct was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."