Opinion
JAN DAVID KAROWSKY, Attorney at Law, California State Bar Number 53854, BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, Robert Tice-Raskin Jan David Karowsky Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant Trent Davis.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through [his/her] counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status and/or sentencing on April 11, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the date for sentencing until May 16, 2013 and to exclude time between April 11, 2013 and May 16, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendant was asked to substitute in for defendant's prior attorney on or about November 27, 2013. Based on what appeared to current counsel to be a good deal of confusion and disagreement over the mechanism of the loss and the amounts of loss involved in the totality of this case, it took longer than current counsel expected to "get up to speed" on the facts of the case; consult with the defendant (who is out of state); and come to a resolution with Mr. Davis.
b. This will be the last time the case is continued. However, counsel for defendant needs this one last continuance prior to sentencing to allow the client to obtain a reasonable air fare to fly to Sacramento for sentencing. Because of the high air fares from New Orleans to Sacramento, Mr. Davis has not been able to afford a ticket until now. The fares are now at a level he can afford to purchase a ticket and in fact is doing so today for an appearance on May 16, 2013. Therefore, we request a final continuance for sentencing to the date of May 16, 2013.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 11, 2013 to May 16, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
Pursuant to the Stipulation filed in this matter, the Court finds that a continuance for sentencing is appropriate in order to allow the defendant to obtain a reasonable air fare which he can afford to fly to Sacramento for sentencing; and that the government does not oppose a final continuance. The date for sentencing is re-set to May 16, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.