Opinion
JOHN R. MANNING, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, JOHN DAVIS.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Christiaan Highsmith, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant John Davis, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on April 24, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 12, 2015 and to exclude time between April 24, 2015 and June 12, 2015 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and continue negotiations with prosecution in an effort to reach a resolution.
b. Currently the discovery in this case includes 450 pages of written discovery; four CD's of audio recordings containing several hours of recorded conversations; dozens of photographs; and the content of several cell phones.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of April 24, 2015 to June 12, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.