United Sttaes v. Cortés–Cabán

70 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Fernández-Santos

    856 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2017)   Cited 33 times
    Stating that "the presence of firearms" is a relevant factor in "determining whether a defendant had an intent to distribute" (quoting United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 36 (1st Cir. 2012) )

    We have explained that the amount of drugs is only one factor relevant to determining whether a defendant had an intent to distribute. United States v. Cortés-Cabán , 691 F.3d 1, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2012). Other relevant factors include "the purity of the drugs at issue, [ ] the quantity of cash on a defendant, [ ] the manner in which the drugs were packaged, [ ] the presence of drug paraphernalia, [ ] the lack of any evidence showing a defendant used or consumed the type of drug seized, [and] the presence of firearms."

  2. United States v. Figueroa

    729 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2013)   Cited 14 times
    In Figueroa, the indictment charged Figueroa and Bayard, both police officers, with five substantive civil rights violations under 18 U.S.C. § 242.

    The other underlying offenses and offense levels proposed in the presentence report were: (1) illegal searches (offense level 18); (2) false reports (offense level 8); larceny (offense level 6); and perjury (offense level 17).In using U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to determine Figueroa's base offense level, the District Court relied heavily on a recent case, United States v. Cortes–Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.2012), in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that police officers who conspired to plant drugs on individuals to fabricate criminal offenses were properly convicted of conspiracy to possess controlled substances with an intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. The court reasoned that the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), which deems it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ...”, encompassed the police officers' conduct. Cortes–Caban, 691 F.3d at 16 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)).

  3. People v. Crouse

    412 P.3d 599 (Colo. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    Even so, 21 U.S.C. § 885(d)"carve[s] out a specific exemption for distribution of controlled substances by law enforcement officers." United States v. Cortes–Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir.2012). The purpose of section 885(d) is to "protect[ ] accepted law enforcement tactics ... in which officers handle and transfer drugs."

  4. United States v. Wallace

    51 F.4th 177 (6th Cir. 2022)   Cited 9 times

    Nor does he challenge the jury instruction that "possession of controlled substances by a law enforcement officer for the purpose of planting those substances on others is possession with intent to distribute." R.216 at 94; see United States v. Cortes-Caban , 691 F.3d 1, 17–23 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that planting drugs constitutes distribution); United States v. Figueroa , 729 F.3d 267, 273–75 (3d Cir. 2013) (same). The only pertinent question under Wallace's framing of the appeal is whether a rational jury could find that he possessed this methamphetamine for the purpose of planting it.

  5. United States v. Bobadilla-Pagán

    747 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2014)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that it "was up to the jury to weigh the government's and [the defendant's] versions of facts" regarding the "in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime" element in a section 924(c) prosecution

    Our role at the stage is “quite limited.” United States v. Cortés–Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir.2000)). It is not our job to re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the jury's credibility determinations.

  6. United States v. Semler

    No. 19-2319 (3d Cir. Jun. 1, 2021)   Cited 9 times

    In Figueroa, we favorably cited a case from the First Circuit describing "distribution" as a "transfer of possession of a controlled substance." Id. (quoting United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2012)). We then held that the defendant, a police officer whose offense involved planting controlled substances on individuals to facilitate false arrests, engaged in distribution.

  7. United States v. Fígaro-Benjamín

    100 F.4th 294 (1st Cir. 2024)

    Id. (quoting United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also id. at 108-09 (observing that U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)'s analogous enhancement based on "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" will apply when "the defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control over, organized, or was otherwise responsible for superintending the activities of, at least one of those other persons" (quoting United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997))). Now some parameters for what it means to have authority or control over another criminal actor.

  8. United States v. Velazquez-Fontanez

    6 F.4th 205 (1st Cir. 2021)   Cited 31 times
    In Velazquez-Fontanez, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting in the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

    But even the uncorroborated testimony of a single cooperating witness may be sufficient to support a conviction, so long as the testimony is not facially incredible. See United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). Here, multiple witnesses described Velazquez-Fontanez's participation in La Rompe's criminal activities; it matters not for purposes of our sufficiency review that others did not do so.

  9. United States v. McKinney

    5 F.4th 104 (1st Cir. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    Although the guidelines do not define the term "supervisor" or "manager," "we have held that ‘[e]vidence of the defendant's role in the conspiracy "may be wholly circumstantial," and need only show that he exercised authority or control over another participant on one occasion.’ " United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Flores–de–Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) ); see also Cruz, 120 F.3d at 3 (noting that the analogous enhancement based on "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" status in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) applies if "the defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control over, organized, or was otherwise responsible for superintending the activities of, at least one of those other persons"). With respect to exhibiting control as a manager or supervisor, the defendant's conduct must satisfy two conditions.

  10. United States v. Grullon

    996 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2021)   Cited 18 times
    Deferring to the sentencing judge's findings of fact

    To earn the enhancement, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did more than participate in shared criminal activity; he must have led or facilitated that criminal activity. See Al-Rikabi, 606 F.3d at 14-15 ; United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2012). One way to demonstrate leadership is by "the degree of control and authority exercised over" at least one other person.