Opinion
TASHA PARIS CHALFANT (SBN 207055) THE LAW OFFICES OF TASHA PARIS CHALFANT Attorney for Defendant LETICIA A. ROQUE
U.S. ATTORNEY MATTHEW MORRIS Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff
TASHA PARIS CHALFANT Attorney for Defendant LETICIA A. ROQUE
BEN D. GALLOWAY Attorney for Defendant TIANA E. NAPLES
CANDICE L. FIELDS Attorney for Defendant MARCUS A. COOPER
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
HON. JOHN A. MENDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 20, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 24, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 20, 2015, and March 24, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 400 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. We have also been advised there is a substantial amount of additional discovery for which a protective order was just submitted. We anticipate after said order is signed, all discovery will have been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b. Counsel for each defendant desires additional time to obtain and review the new discovery which will be provided after the protective order is signed, confer with his/her client to discuss the status of the case, conduct investigation and review the sentencing guidelines. c. Counsel for each defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 20, 2015 to March 24, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.