Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION FILE NUMBER 1:16-cr-00281-TCB
07-28-2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. LARRY GRANT COBB, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard's Final Report and Recommendation (the "R&R") [115], which recommends that Aaron Isaiah Walton, Seymour Wright, and Jerrald Devonta Cook's motions to dismiss certain counts, [51 & 65], and Cook and Larry Grant Cobb's motions to suppress, [66, 67 & 72], be denied. Cook, Wright, and Walton each filed objections [119, 120 & 121] to the R&R.
A district judge has a duty to conduct a "careful and complete" review of a magistrate judge's R&R. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1982)). This review may take different forms, however, depending on whether there are objections to the R&R. The district judge must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made need only be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006).
"Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court." Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. "This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act." Id. at 410.
The district judge also has discretion to decline to consider arguments that were not raised before the magistrate judge. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). Indeed, a contrary rule "would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and would not help to relieve the workload of the district court." Id. (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).
After conducting a complete and careful review of the R&R, the district judge may accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Williams, 681 F.2d at 732. The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Vineyard made two separate recommendations: that the Court deny Walton, Wright and Cook's motions to dismiss and that the Court deny Cook and Cobb's motions to suppress. The Court has carefully reviewed the portion of the R&R recommending that the Court deny Defendant's motions to dismiss and finds that Magistrate Judge Vineyard's factual and legal conclusions were correct. The Court also reviewed Walton, Cook, and Wright's objections to the R&R's recommendation and notes that the Defendants provided conclusory objections and did not specifically specify the findings of the R&R that they object to. The Court is not required to consider these objections. Nevertheless, the Court has carefully reviewed the portion of the R&R recommending that the Court deny Defendants' motions to dismiss and finds no error.
The Court has also conducted a careful, de novo review of the portion of the R&R recommending denying Cook's motion to suppress statements and his objections thereto. Having done so, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Vineyard's factual and legal conclusions were correct and that Cook's objections have no merit.
Cook argues that the R&R recommendation is incorrect because Magistrate Judge Vineyard failed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" when ruling that his statements were voluntarily made. More specifically, Cook contends that his admissions were involuntary because "(1) his interrogators gave him false and misleading advice when answering his questions regarding counsel (2) the erroneous advice provided served to confuse Jerrald Cook and, (3) as a result of the confusion generated by the false and misleading advice Mr. Cook was unable to intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda warnings and the statements made must be suppressed." [119] at 2. The false and misleading advice or promise of immunity referred to by Cook was Agent Winn's statement that the interview "would be between [Cook], [Agent Winn], and Detective Williams[.]" [44-1] at 1-2.
Cook is correct that the focus of the voluntariness inquiry is whether the defendant was coerced by the government into making a statement. Further, "[t]he kinds of deception that are generally deemed to trigger suppression are lies about a defendant's legal rights (i.e., 'you must answer our questions'), false promises (i.e., 'whatever you say will be just between us'), or threats (i.e., 'if you don't talk, you won't see your family for a very long time')." United States v. La Forgia, Criminal No. 12-0057-WS-C, 2012 WL 1869035, at *4 (S.D. Ala. May 22, 2012) (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Degaule, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2011); see also Aleman, 662 F.3d at 906 ("The confession must be excluded only if the government feeds the defendant false information that seriously distorts his choice, [for example] by promising him that if he confesses he will be set free—in other words, only if the false statement destroyed the information that he required for a rational choice."). However, the law in the Eleventh Circuit "is clear, that the police's use of a trick alone will not render a confession involuntary" unless there are "other aggravating circumstances" beyond the mere use of deceptive tactics. United States v. Castaneda-Castaneda, 729 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739 (observing that misrepresentations by the police are "insufficient [by themselves] to make [an] otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible").
In light of the foregoing authority, the totality of the circumstances do not warrant a finding that Cook's statements were obtained as a result of coercion and were made involuntarily. Agent Winn was responding in the context of Cook's question about his right to an attorney and was "informing Cook, consistent with Miranda, that he had a right to a lawyer, that he would get one later, and that if he chose to talk at that moment, that it would be just between Cook and the agents (because no lawyer was present)." [108] at 3. Agent Winn was simply clarifying to Cook that if he did not talk to the agents at that time, the interview would take place at a later time with his attorney present. This is further supported by the fact that Agent Winn told Cook that his acceptance of responsibility and cooperation would be communicated to the prosecutor and the Court. Thus, Cook's statements were not made as a result of coercion, but instead were voluntary and in conformity with the dictates of Miranda.
Accordingly, the Court adopts as its order the R&R [115], denies Walton and Wright's motion to dismiss counts, [51 & 65], and denies Cook and Cobb's motions to suppress their statements [66, 67, & 72].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2017.
/s/_________
Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
United States District Judge