We recognize that aiding and abetting a drug offense may encompass activities, intended to ensure the success of the underlying crime, that take place after delivery and after the principal no longer possesses the narcotics. In United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 1987), a defendant who made assurances to the purchasers of narcotics concerning the quality of drugs previously delivered was convicted of aiding and abetting an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), because his declarations were intended to secure payment for the drugs and to facilitate "the financial climax of the deal." In United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1080 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed.2d 92 (1984), a defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to distribute cocaine because he laundered proceeds from drug sales, thus furthering the distribution of the narcotics.

The defense of entrapment has two elements: (1) government inducement of the accused to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) the accused's lack of predisposition to engage in such conduct. Mathews v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 415-16 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987). In Mathews, the Court reminded us that predisposition is "the principal element in the defense of entrapment," Mathews, 108 S.Ct. at 886 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)), and that it "focuses upon whether the defendant was an 'unwary innocent' or instead, an 'unwary criminal'. . . ."

It is, of course, settled that such a defense comprises two interrelated elements: (1) government inducement of an accused's criminal conduct, coupled with (2) the lack of predisposition on the person's part to engage in such skulduggery. Mathews v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987). Although "[t]he question of entrapment is generally one for the jury," Mathews, 108 S.Ct. at 886, that is not universally so.

Encouragement or solicitation of the commission of a crime by one who is willing and predisposed to commit the crime does not constitute entrapment. See United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1986). The fact that McMillian, acting as an agent for the police, may have encouraged or suggested to his friend that he purchase cocaine simply provided McCoy, who was predisposed to the crime, an opportunity to do so.

Rule 30 is not satisfied by counsel's pre-charge colloquy with the court or written explanation of grounds alone, nor even by a post-charge attempt to incorporate by reference earlier arguments. See United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66 nn. 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1995); Wilkinson, 926 F.3d at 26-27; United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1987) ("That counsel may have discoursed upon the nature of his theory at some time prior to the giving of the charge will not excuse noncompliance with the express mandates of Rule 30."). Strict compliance with the rule "enables the trial judge intelligently to appraise the soundness of the position asserted, and if need be, correct the charge to avoid injustice."

But it is the defendant who has the burden of proving that entrapment occurred. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 812; United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987). In meeting that burden, the defendant must make a showing "that a government agent turned him from a righteous path to an iniquitous one . . ." United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d at 122.

Mathews v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (holding that a defendant may simultaneously deny the offense charged and rely on the affirmative defense of entrapment). See also United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 596 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2951, 64 L.Ed.2d 830 (1980); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1967). The defendant has the initial burden to show some evidence that he was unready to commit the crime or, in other words, that "a government agent turned him from a righteous path to an iniquitous one."

Id. at 814 (quoting United Statesv. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 1987)). In other words, the record must contain evidence that makes the entrapment theory "plausible" or "superficially reasonable."

An entrapment instruction is required if the evidence, viewed in this charitable fashion, "furnishes an arguable basis for application of the proposed rule of law." Id. at 814 (quoting United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 1987) ). In other words, the record must contain evidence that makes the entrapment theory "plausible" or "superficially reasonable."

If—and only if—the defendant makes this required "prima facie showing," id. the issue of entrapment is teed up to go to the jury. SeeUnited States v. Ramos–Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987). Once that prima facie showing has satisfied the defendant's entry-level burden of production, the government must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur.