Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 13, 2015, at 9:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 10, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 13, 2015, and March 10, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case so far includes approximately 125 pages of investigative reports and 4 CDs of recorded meetings and has provided discovery to the defense.
b. Counsel for all of the defendants desires additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
DAVID D. FISCHER, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID D. FISCHER, APC, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant MICHAEL WRIGHT.
JENNIFER NOBLE, Attorney for Defendant, LEONARD WALTER.
DANNY D. BRACE, JR., Attorney for Defendant, JAMES CLINE.
JASON HITT, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 15, 2015, and March 10, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.