Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, KIRK E. SHERRIFF, HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III, MEGAN A. S. RICHARDS, Assistant United States Attorneys, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, Law Offices of Anthony P. Capozzi, Attorney for defendants LUCIA YOLANDA, CHAVEZ and JOSEPH SHAWN CHAVEZ.
STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff the United States of America ("government") and defendants LUCIA YOLANDA CHAVEZ and JOSEPH SHAWN CHAVEZ, by and through their respective counsel of record, jointly stipulate as follows:
1. The Court previously set the trial date in the above-captioned case for April 28, 2015.
2. The defendants and the government are currently negotiating a resolution of the case, and the parties are likely to reach respective plea agreements shortly that will obviate the need for a trial. To afford time to continue these efforts, and to allow adequate time for defense trial preparation and investigation should these negotiation efforts fail, the parties request a continuance of the trial date.
3. Thus, the government and defendants LUCIA CHAVEZ and JOSEPH CHAVEZ stipulate and jointly request that the Court order that the trial date be continued to June 23, 2015, and that the trial confirmation hearing be continued to June 1, 2015.
4. The government and defendants LUCIA CHAVEZ and JOSEPH CHAVEZ stipulate and jointly request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The government has produced over 125, 000 bates numbered pages of discovery to the defense in this case, including reports of interviews of numerous witnesses. Given the volume of discovery and defense counsel's scheduling constraints, and notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, the defense would require additional time for effective preparation in the event that the parties do not reach a resolution of this matter.
b. The government does not object to the continuance.
c. Based on the above-stated grounds, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the present date through June 23, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), & B(ii), (iv), because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
e. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
5. The government's current motion to disqualify counsel is set for hearing on March 23, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe.
6. In conjunction with the parties' stipulation to a continuance of the trial date, the parties also agree and stipulate to a continuance of the hearing on the motion to disqualify counsel to April 13, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
Good cause appearing, IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED. The trial in this case is continued from April 28, 2015 to June 23, 2015. The trial confirmation hearing is continued from April 6, 2015 to June 1, 2015. The hearing on the motion to disqualify counsel is continued from March 23, 2015 to April 13, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe. The time period of the present date through June 23, 2015, inclusive, is excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), & B(ii), (iv), because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request and the ends of justice served by the time exclusion outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.