Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 19, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 28, 2015, and to exclude time between February 19, 2015, and May 28, 2015, under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, HEIKO P. COPPOLA, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ROBERT M. WILSON, Counsel for Defendant AHMED CHARTAEV.
DAVID D. FISCHER, Counsel for Defendant NICHOLAS VOTAW.
ALAN EISNER, Counsel for Defendant HAKOB SERGOYAN.
PETER KMETO, Counsel for Defendant STANSLAV SARBER.
DANNY BRACE, JR., Counsel for Defendant SERGEY SHCHIRSKEY.
EDWARD W. SWANSON, Counsel for Defendant ANTON TKACHEV.
VICTOR HALTOM, Counsel for Defendant MAGOMED ABDUHKSLIKOV.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes in excess of 4483 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. The government has notified all defense counsel that it intends to make available for inspection and copying approximately 8000 additional pages of discovery from the case of United States v. Kuzmenko, et.al.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their respective clients, review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions and to otherwise prepare for trial. All counsel will need additional time to review the additional 8000 pages of discovery that will be made available.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 19, 2015 to May 28, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.