Opinion
No. CR-S-09-121 JAM
01-30-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT CAVELL, Defendants.
JOHN R. MANNING Attorney for Defendant Scott Cavell Benjamin B. Wagner United States Attorney PAUL A. HEMESATH Assistant U.S. Attorney
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Attorney for Defendant
SCOTT CAVELL
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS
UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Date: April 9, 2013
Judge: Honorable John A. Mendez
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on February 5, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 9, 2013 at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between February 5, 2013 and April 9, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 12,000 pages of discovery.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of February 5, 2013 to April 9, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
________
JOHN R. MANNING
Attorney for Defendant
Scott Cavell
Benjamin B. Wagner
United States Attorney
by: ________
PAUL A. HEMESATH
Assistant U.S. Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 2013.
________
HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE