Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MATTHEW G. MORRIS, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
TONI WHITE, Counsel for Defendant JUSTIN LEE CANNON.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status and possible change of plea on June 11, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 25, 2015, and to exclude time between June 11, 2015, and June 25, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has turned over discovery and/or made it available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to obtain records from the Sutter County Courts related to state charges against the defendant that might be related to the charges in this case. The materials in those files would have a potential bearing on defense strategy related to resolution and would be necessary to review before the parties can enter a potential plea agreement.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 11, 2015 to June 25, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.