Opinion
SCOTT N. CAMERON, Attorney at Law, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for MARCUS BUCKLEY.
CLYDE BLACKMON, Counsel for KIMBERLY JONES.
AMENDED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, defendant MARCUS BUCKLEY, by and through his counsel of record, Scott N. Cameron, and KIMBERLY JONES, by and through her counsel of record, Clyde Blackmon, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on August 27, 2015, at 9:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference to October 1, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between August 27, 2015, and October 1, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced discovery to the defense in this case which consists of over 8, 000 pages of documents.
b. The government has recently provided each defendant with a written plea offer in the form of a plea agreement. Counsel for each defendant requires additional time for preparation including conducting investigation and research to confirm that the proposed plea agreements are consistent with the facts and discovery. Moreover, counsel for each defendant requires additional time to review the plea agreement with their respective client. Lastly, each defendant resides out-of-state and the defendants are coordinating travel plans in contemplation of a change of plea at the next court appearance.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 27, 2015, to October 1, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. (This Space Intentionally Left Blank)
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.