Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
CANDACE A. FRY, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for TINA MARIE BINI, Defendant.
JAMES R. GREINER, Attorney for MATTHEW LEE BOYLE, Defendant.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 27, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 17, 2015, and to exclude time between February 27, 2015, and April 17, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate and request that the Court find the following:
a. The Government has represented that discovery associated with this case consists of 25 DVD/CD's containing Bates Nos. 0001-04115, and Nos. BB0001-00197. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review discovery, consult with their clients, continue to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, discuss potential resolutions with the Government and with their clients and to otherwise prepare the case. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 27, 2015, to April 17, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) (Local Code T4) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.