Opinion
22-03151-01-CR-S-BCW
12-15-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SHAWN O. BELL, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
DAVID P. RUSH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence on the Basis of an Unlawful Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 24.) This action has been referred to the undersigned for the purpose of submitting a report on any pretrial motions to suppress evidence. As follows, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion be DENIED.
I. Background
Defendant has been charged by indictment with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute, 40 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). (Doc. 10.)
In his Motion, Defendant asks the Court “to quash the state search warrants in this matter and suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result thereof, including any statements made subsequent to and in connection with said state search warrants” including the “search warrant that occurred at 1644West Lynn, Springfield, Missouri and the Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) warrants.” (Doc. 24 at 1.) In support, Defendant claims that the probable cause statements in the affidavit in all warrants are “Constitutionally deficient.” Id.
Defense counsel mistakenly refers to the address as 1644 throughout the Motion. (Doc. 24.) The Court assumes this to be a mistake, as Defendant does not raise issue to the address.
The Government filed Suggestions in Opposition to the Motion and Defendant filed Reply Suggestions in support. (Docs. 30, 33.) A suppression hearing was held on July 31, 2023. (Doc. 35.) Defendant appeared in person with his attorney, Abram McGull, and the Government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Cameron Beaver. Id. Springfield Police Department Officer Brandon Thompson appeared and testified. Id. Both parties filed supplemental briefing post-hearing, as ordered by the Court. (Docs. 46, 47.)
The Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the issue raised by Defendant regarding the “premises” language in the CSLI warrants as well as the attenuation doctrine. (Doc. 37 at 59-60.) The undersigned did not find that either supplemental briefing added any additional information.
The facts set forth herein are taken from the testimony adduced at the hearing on the instant Motion and the exhibits admitted during the hearing. (Docs. 36, 37.
A. CSLI-1 Search Warrant
On November 15, 2022, Officer Thompson applied for the first search warrant [hereinafter “CSLI-1”] directed to AT&T for the phone number 217-971-4966. The application requested the following information: subscriber and billing information, phone and messaging records, stored communication, the global positioning System (GPS) location, and the Cell Site Location Information (CSLI). (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, Affidavit at 1.) Officer Thompson provided an Affidavit in support, wherein he stated:
I, Brandon Thompson, have been a law enforcement officer with the City of Springfield Police Department for over 5 years. I have attended schools and seminars related to the field of crime scene investigation and the investigation of the crime(s) of Chapter 579, RSMo. I have received specialized training into the recognition of controlled substances, and the detection/interdiction/manufacturing of such controlled substances. I have conducted several investigations and assisted in the issuance and execution of search warrants related to those crimes and I have arrested in the issuance and execution of search warrants related to those crimes and I have arrested suspects because of those investigations. I have
participated in the planning and execution of several search warrants. Upon information and belief based upon the following, I believe the above described items will be found at the above described location to be searched.
Upon information and belief, the AT&T brand cellular telephone bearing number (217) 971-4966 (hereinafter the “TARGET TELEPHONE”) which is being utilized by Shawn Bell (DOB 05/28/1983) is presently being used in connections with the commission of ongoing drug distribution and drug trafficking, by BELL, and others, known and unknown, in Greene County, Missouri.
I submit this Affidavit in support of the attached application for an order authorizing the tracking of the TARGET TELEPHONE, to include GPS location, cell-site location information, triangulation, and the disclosure of location-based data. I set forth the following facts showing that there are sufficient grounds to believe that the GPS location, cell-site and other subscriber records, and information pertaining to the TARGET TELEPHONE will likely be relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
This information contained in this affidavit is based on my personal knowledge and investigation, surveillance, as well as information from reliable confidential informants and other reliable sources. Not all of the facts known to me about this investigation have been included, however this affidavit contains the facts necessary to establish probable cause to track telephone number (217) 971-4966. For the purpose of this affidavit, heroin and fentanyl are used in conjunction while referring to said narcotics, due to often time fentanyl and fentanyl analogs are sold to customers who believe they are purchasing heroin. Based on my training and experience, I know that often times fentanyl distributors often times refer to their products as heroin, when in fact they are distributing fentanyl or fentanyl analogs.
Over the last two months, I have been investigating Shawn Bell due to information gathered that he was distributing large quantities of fentanyl in the Springfield area.
Within the last thirty days, I received information from a reliable confidential informant, hereafter referred to as CI that Shawn Bell was making trips on a routine basis to Memphis along with St. Louis and picking up large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine and also cocaine and bringing back and distributing in the Springfield area. The CI must remain confidential to protect his/her safety and ongoing investigations. The CI is familiar with methamphetamine from past use and association with the drug culture. The CI has provided information I have verified through surveillance and follow-up investigations.
The CI provided me with Bell's address of 1641 W. Lynn. I was able to verify through surveillance that Bell was in fact living at the address and that Utilities are in Bell's name for that residence.
I have conducted numerous hours of surveillance on Bell's address that the CI provided on multiple different occasions. I have observed Bell meet up with several targets of past narcotic investigations at his residence. Through surveillance, I have observed multiple instances where individuals would pull up to Bell's residence, meet with him in the driveway and leave shortly after which based on my training and experience is indicative of narcotic related exchanges. However, when trying to follow Bell to conduct surveillance, he will drive erratically then slow way down and make passes through neighborhoods to ensure he is not being followed. Bell almost never drives a direct route to his destination and drives through areas and neighborhoods with very little traffic which in turn makes it very difficult to conduct surveillance without his knowing.
Within the last ten days, I was contacted by the CI who advised Bell had contacted him/her about wanting him/her to sell a pound of methamphetamine for him. The CI was contacted by Bell through the target phone number (217) 9714966.
Within the last five days, I was contacted by reliable source (SI) who must remain confidential to protect his/her safety and ongoing investigations and advised that Bell had just made a trip to “reup” and was back in town with a large quantity of fentanyl. The reliable source observed Bell with approximately an ounce of fentanyl on his person within the last five days. The SI is familiar with methamphetamine and fentanyl from past use and association with the drug culture. The SI has provided information I have verified through surveillance and follow-up investigations.
I have also verified through FLOCK safety cameras, and information from other agencies that Bell's vehicle, a 2014 red Toyota Camry bearing IL License DN35870 has been in Memphis along with East St. Louis on several occasions which is where the CI advised he purchases his narcotics.
Bell has limited history in Springfield, however, in his short time in Springfield he was contacted and arrested by Detectives in Special Investigation Unit (SIU) for distribution on 12/17/2020 where he was in possession of heroin and cocaine.
Bell's cell phone (217) 971-4966 was provided to me from a reliable confidential informant (CI)that has contacted Bell from that number with the last seven days.Id. at 2-4. On November 22, 2022, a Judge of the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri verified the application and affidavit and issued the search warrant. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, Affidavit at 5; Search Warrant at 1-2.)
B. CSLI-2 Search Warrant
On November 25, 2022, Officer Thompson applied for a second search warrant [hereinafter “CSLI-2”] directed to AT&T for the phone number 217-971-4966. The application requested the following information: subscriber and billing information, phone and messaging records, stored communication, GPS location, and the CSLI. (Doc. 36, Exh. 2, Affidavit at 1.) Officer Thompson provided an Affidavit in support, wherein he repeated all paragraphs stated above in the affidavit for the CSLI-1 and the following additional paragraphs:
On 11/16/2022, I executed a search warrant on Bell's residence at 1641 W. Lynn which resulted in the seizure of approximately 75 grams of suspected fentanyl and three firearms. Bell was not present during the execution of the search warrant.
A second reliable, CI hereafter referred to as CI 2 stated that he/she has spoken with Bell in the last three days on the target phone number (217) 971-4966 who is in Illinois and will be bringing back large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine within a few days. The CI must remain confidential to protect his/her safety and ongoing investigations. The CI is familiar with fentanyl and methamphetamine from past use and association with the drug culture. The CI has been proven reliable and provided information I have verified through surveillance and follow-up investigations.Id. at 2-5. On November 25, 2022, a Judge of the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri verified the application and affidavit and issued the search warrant. (Doc. 36, Exh. 2, Affidavit at 5; Search Warrant at 1-2.)
C. The Residential Search Warrant
On November 16, 2022, Officer Thompson applied for a search warrant for Defendant's residence at 1641 W. Lynn Street, Springfield, Greene County, Missouri. The application listed the following property, articles, materials, or substances to be searched for: Controlled Substances, fentanyl- a white powdery substance, documents of drug activity, documents of employment or lack of employment, drug paraphernalia, drug proceeds, items of identification, firearms and other deadly weapons, digital records of drug activity, cell phones used to make drug transactions, and surveillance equipment. (Doc. 36, Exh. 3, Affidavit at 1-2.) Officer Thompson provided an Affidavit in support, wherein he stated:
I, Brandon Thompson, have been a law enforcement officer with the City of Springfield Police Department for over 5 years. I have attended schools and seminars related to the field of crime scene investigation and the investigation of the crime(s) of Chapter 579, RSMo. I have received specialized training into the recognition of controlled substances, and the detection/interdiction/manufacturing of such controlled substances. I have conducted several investigations and assisted in the issuance and execution of search warrants related to those crimes and I have arrested in the issuance and execution of search warrants related to those crimes and I have arrested suspects because of those investigations. I have participated in the planning and execution of several search warrants. Upon information and belief based upon the following, I believe the above described items will be found at the above described location to be searched.
Over the last two months, I have been investigating Shawn Bell due to information being gathered that he was distributing large quantities of fentanyl in the Springfield area.
Within the last thirty days, I received information from a reliable confidential informant, hereafter referred to as CI that Shawn Bell was making trips on a routine basis to Memphis along with St. Louis and picking up large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine and also cocaine and bringing back and distributing in the Springfield area. The CI must remain confidential to protect his/her safety and ongoing investigations. The CI is familiar with methamphetamine from past use and association with the drug culture. The CI has provided information I have verified through surveillance and follow-up investigations.
The CI provided me with Bell's address of 1641 W. Lynn. I was able to verify through surveillance that Bell was in fact living at the address and that Utilities are in Bell's name for that residence.
Within the last 10 days, I have conducted numerous hours of surveillance on Bell's address that the CI provided on multiple different occasions. I have observed Bell meet up with several targets on pact narcotic investigations at his residence. Through surveillance, I have observed multiple instances where individuals would pull up to Bell's residence, meet with him in the driveway and leave shortly after which based on my training and experience is indicative of
narcotic related exchanges. The CI must remain confidential to protect his/her safety and ongoing investigations. The CI is familiar with the methamphetamine from past use and association with drug culture.
On 11/15/2022, while conducting surveillance on Bell's residence at 1641 W. Lynn, I observed a green Chevrolet Tahoe bearing MO license 5MFU64 pull into the driveway. I was familiar with the vehicle and had observed known Police character Charlie Berry in the vehicle on several occasions. I was able to verify the male driver was in fact Berry. Berry met with Bell in the driveway of 1641 W. Lynn and a short time left the residence. I contacted Officer Couch, who conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle near the area of Atlantic and Campbell. Officer Couch located suspected methamphetamine in the driver's door compartment where he observed Berry reaching while speaking with him. Officer Couch also located a blue powdery substance in the passenger, Shannon Mitchell's, right coin pocket.
Is should be noted that the CI advised that the fentanyl Bell was selling in the Springfield area had a blue tint to it and that was his “signature” which matched what was found on Mitchell's person after leaving Bell's address.
A check of Bell's criminal history shows she has arrests for weapons violations and distribution of a controlled substance.Id. at 2-4. On November 16, 2022, a Judge of the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri verified the application and affidavit and issued the search warrant. (Doc. 36, Exh. 3, Affidavit at 4; Search Warrant at 1-2.)
The search warrant was executed later the same day on November 16, 2022, at the W. Lynn residence. (Doc. 37 at 28.) During the search, Officers located approximately 75 grams of suspected fentanyl, three firearms, and Defendant's lease agreement for the residence. Id. On December 7, 2022, a grand jury charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute, 40 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). (Doc. 10.)
III. Conclusions of Law
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 907 (8th Cir. 2022). Generally, evidence found because of an unlawful search or seizure, and the fruits therefrom, cannot be used against a defendant and must be suppressed. United States v. Miller, 11 F.4th 944, 954 (8th Cir. 2021). Defendant moves to suppress evidence seized following the execution of the search warrant, arguing that all three warrants lacked probable cause. (Docs 24, 33, 47.) The Government responds that the warrant was supported by probable cause, and alternatively, that the Leon good-faith exception would preclude suppression of the evidence. (Doc. 57.) The Court addresses the parties' arguments below.
Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Knutson, 967 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Humphrey, 140 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The source and credibility of evidence in support of a warrant request is considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis, and a warrant is proper so long as the evidence as a whole creates a reasonable probability that the search will lead to the discovery of evidence.”). A court determines whether probable cause exists by looking at the totality of the circumstances, and “[j]udges may draw reasonable inferences . . . in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant.” United States. v. Wallace, 550 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 2008). “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the [issuing judge] had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
“When the issuing judge relied solely upon a supporting affidavit to issue the search warrant,” as in this case, “only that information which is found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.” United States v. Roberts, 975 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Furthermore, when probable cause is based on information supplied by an informant, the core question is whether the information is reliable. United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Courts examine affidavits “with a common sense approach and not in a hypertechnical fashion.” United States v. O'Dell, 766 F.3d 870, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2014). A reviewing court should pay “great deference” to an issuing judge's probable cause determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 238-39.
A. The CSLI-1 and CSLI-2 Warrants Were Supported by Probable Cause
It is well established that law enforcement needs a search warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring a CSLI from a wireless carrier. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2221, (2018); see also United States v. Thompson, 976 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 2020). Defendant contends that both CSLI warrants are not sufficiently supported by probable cause.
Specifically, Defendant seems to argue that the affidavit for both CSLI warrants did not provide sufficient corroborative information to permit the issuing judge to find the informants were reliable nor sufficient information outlining the informants' bases of knowledge in support of probable cause. (Doc. 24 at 9-15). Officers may rely on an informant's tip to support a probable cause determination “if the informant has provided reliable information in the past or if his tip is independently corroborated.” United States v. Rowe, 878 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). It is well established that “[t]he lack of specific details regarding basis of knowledge is not fatal in the probable cause analysis.” Knutson, 967 F.3d at 758 (cleaned up). Additionally, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[i]f, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. “Where a previously unknown informant provides information, the informant's lack of a track record requires some independent verification to establish the reliability of the information.” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).
As best as the Court can determine, Defendant's argument seems to be that the affidavits lacked probable cause. However, Defendant brings up multiple sub arguments not supported by law. As such, it is difficult for the Court to address all of Defendant's sub arguments, and the Court instead addresses the greater argument that the affidavits lack probable cause.
Importantly, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that “some independent verification to establish the reliability of the [informant's] information” is sufficient to establish probable cause, including “the corroboration of minor, innocent details.” Knutson, 967 F.3d at 759 (cleaned up). As such, the undersigned finds that the affidavits for both CSLI warrants provided sufficient corroborative information to permit the issuing judge to find probable cause. The undersigned will address both CSLI affidavits concurrently, as the CSLI-2 warrant contains all the information contained in the CSLI-1 warrant with additional information.
The reliable confidential informant (CI) who reported that Defendant's address was 1641 W. Lynn. Officer Thompson verified Defendant's address with a check of City Utilities showing an account at 1641 W. Lynn in Defendant's name, and surveillance of the residence showing Defendant living at the residence. Additionally, the CI reported that Defendant was distributing illegal drugs, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, in the Springfield area. Corroborating this information, Officer Thompson observed what he believed to be drug transactions, based on his training and experience, occurring in the driveway of the residence between Defendant and several targets of past narcotic investigations. Furthermore, the CI had been contacted by Defendant, from the target phone number, wanting the CI to sell a pound of methamphetamine for him.
Moreover, the CI reported that Defendant was making routine trips to Memphis and St. Louis to pick up large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine and bringing back them back to distribute in the Springfield area. Officer Thompson corroborated this tip by verifying that Defendant's vehicle has been in Memphis as well as East St. Louis on several occasions. Additionally, Officer Thompson was contacted by a reliable source (SI) who reported that Defendant had just made a trip to restock on drugs and was back in Springfield with a large amount of fentanyl. The SI had also observed Defendant with an ounce of fentanyl on his person within five days of the affidavit, confirming that Defendant was in possession of illegal substances, including fentanyl.
The CSLI-2 affidavit included additional information not included in the CLSI-1 affidavit. Officer Thompson included information that he had executed a search warrant at Defendant's residence and seized approximately 75 grams of suspected fentanyl and three firearms. Furthermore, Officer Thompson included information that a second CI reported speaking to Defendant on the target phone number within three days of the warrant application. The second CI also reported that Defendant was in Illinois at the time and would be bringing back large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine within a few days, further corroborating the information gained from the other two informants.
As such, the undersigned finds that the information provided by all three informants was consistent. For the reasons stated above, the undersigned concludes that both CSLI affidavits provides a substantial basis for finding a fair probability that evidence of drug activity would be found in the target phone number records and data.
B. The Search Warrant for the Residence was Supported by Probable Cause
Defendant argues that the affidavit for the residential search warrant did not provide sufficient information to determine the informants' reliability to support a finding of probable cause. “An informant's reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge are relevant considerations-but not independent, essential elements-in finding probable cause.” Knutson, 967 F.3d at 758 (cleaned up). A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis prohibits an “excessively technical dissection of informants' tips” that views “bits and pieces of information in isolation.” United States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 562 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35.
As already stated above, officers may rely on an informant's tip to support a probable cause determination “if the informant has provided reliable information in the past or if his tip is independently corroborated.” Rowe, 878 F.3d at 628 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit has held that “some independent verification to establish the reliability of the [informant's] information” is sufficient to establish probable cause, including “the corroboration of minor, innocent details.” Knutson, 967 F.3d at 759 (cleaned up). The undersigned finds that the affidavit for the residential search warrant provided sufficient corroborative information to permit the issuing judge to find probable cause.
The CI reported, within thirty days of the affidavit, that Defendant was making routine trips to Memphis and St. Louis to pick up large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine and bringing back them back to distribute in the Springfield area. Officer Thompson corroborated this tip by verifying that Defendant's vehicle has been in Memphis as well as East St. Louis on several occasions. Further, the CI informed Officer Thompson that the fentanyl Defendant was selling in Springfield had a blue tint and that was his “signature.” The affidavit also included that the CI reported Defendant's address was 1641 W. Lynn. Included in the affidavit is that Officer Thompson verified Defendant's address with a check of City Utilities showing an account at 1641 W. Lynn in Defendant's name, and surveillance of the residence showing Defendant living at the residence.
Officer Thompson observed a known Police character pull into the driveway of Defendant's driveway, meet with Defendant, and leave a short time later. Officer Thompson contacted Officer Couch, who then conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle that had been in Defendant's driveway. Officer Couch located suspected methamphetamine in the driver's door compartment where he observed the driver reaching while speaking with him. Officer Couch also located a blue powdery substance in the passenger right coin pocket, corroborating information about the blue tint being Defendant's “signature.” Given the totality of the circumstances, the undersigned concludes that there was enough corroborating information for a finding of probable cause.
Additionally, Defendant argues that a nexus did not exist between the contraband and the place to be searched prior to the issuance of the warrant. The Eighth Circuit has determined that “[f]actors to consider in determining if a nexus exists include ‘the nature of the crime and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.” United States v. Jones, 74 F.4th 941, 948 (8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Within ten days of the warrant application, Officer Thompson observed multiple instances where individuals would pull up to Defendant's residence, meet with him in the driveway and leave shortly after, which based on his training and experience is indicative of drug transactions. Moreover, Officer Thompson observed Defendant meet up with several targets of past narcotics transactions at his residence. Based on these facts, the undersigned finds that there was reasonable likelihood of finding controlled substances at Defendant's residence.
C. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Defendant argues that the affidavits of all three search warrants lacked probable cause, and as such “any evidence subsequently based upon these warrants should be excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine.” (Doc. 24 at 1.) Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained directly or indirectly through the exploitation of police illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). As discussed, the search supporting affidavits were sufficiently supported by probable cause. As such, the undersigned also finds that Defendant's “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument is not implicated. Further, Defendant argues that any statements made should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” which the undersigned also concludes fails for the same reasons.
D. The Leon Good Faith Exception Applies
The Government argues, and the undersigned agrees, that even assuming probable cause was lacking based on the three affidavits, the Leon good-faith exception would apply to preclude suppression of the evidence. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-23 (1984). “Under the Leon good-faith exception, disputed evidence will be admitted if it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing a search warrant to have relied in good faith on the judge's determination that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.” United States v. Norey, 31 F.4th 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Evidence seized as a result of good-faith reliance will thus be admitted unless:
(1) the supporting affidavit or testimony includes a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth to mislead the issuing judge; (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant; (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.United States v. Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d 695, 702-03 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
“The good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the issuing judge's authorization.” Norey, 31 F.4th at 635 (cleaned up). “To determine whether an officer had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause, this Court assesses the totality of the circumstances, including information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing judge.” Id.
Here, the undersigned concludes that none of the four exceptions to good-faith reliance are applicable, as applied to all three affidavits, and that Officer Thompson acted in good faith. Defendant does not argue, nor does the undersigned find, that Officer Thompson knowingly and intentionally misled the issuing judge with a false statement. As such, the affidavits were an accurate retelling of the investigation and there is no evidence that Officer Thompson intentionally misled the issuing judge.
Second, the undersigned does not find that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his or her judicial role as a neutral party. “A judge abandons his or her judicial role when he or she does not serve as a neutral and detached actor, but rather as a rubber stamp for the police and an adjunct law enforcement officer.” Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d at 703 (cleaned up). “A judge abandons her judicial role by not reading the warrant or failing to recognize the warrant was unsigned or failed to identify the property to be searched.” Id.; United States v. Dickerman, 954 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 2020). Further, a judge violates her obligation to be neutral if they have a “pecuniary interest in issuing the warrant” or they have “actively participated in the police investigation.” Dickerman, 954 F.3d at 1067-68.
In this case, there is no evidence that the issuing judge abandoned his or her role as a neutral and detached actor. The affidavits and the warrants were signed and there is no evidence that the issuing judge had a conflict of interest inhibiting their neutrality or that they actively participated in the investigation. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1-3.) Accordingly, the issuing judge properly performed his or her judicial role in reviewing and validating the warrant application and issuing the warrant.
Third, the undersigned cannot conclude that the supporting affidavits were “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that the reliance on the search warrant was “entirely unreasonable.” Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d at 703 (cleaned up). As discussed in the previous sections, the undersigned finds that Officer Thompson's affidavits detail sufficient reasons that evidence of illegal drugs would be found in the target phone number records and data and at Defendant's residence to support probable cause. Moreover, the affidavits here were also reviewed and approved by a prosecuting attorney and then reviewed and approved by the issuing judge. See United States v. Clay, 646 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that an officer may reasonably defer to the judgment of the prosecutors and the issuing judge that the affidavit provided probable cause). Officer Thompson had no reason to question the issuing judge's probable cause determination, reviewed also by the prosecuting attorney. As such, the officer's belief that probable cause existed cannot be “entirely unreasonable.”
Fourth, the warrants were not so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid. See United States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that a warrant is facially deficient when it “fail[s] to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized” (cleaned up)). Here, the two CSLI warrants properly and unambiguously identifies the target phone as (217) 971-4966 and the residential search warrant properly and unambiguously identified the place to be searched as 1641 W. Lynn, Springfield, Greene Country, Missouri. As already discussed, Officer Thompson thoroughly described his independent investigation to establish probable cause. The undersigned, thus, concludes that the warrants were not facially deficient.
Furthermore, with respect to Defendant's argument that a nexus did not exist between the contraband and the residence to be searched prior to the issuance of the warrant, even if the affidavit was lacking in sufficient detail to establish a nexus for probable cause purposes, the Leon good-faith exception would apply to preclude suppression of the evidence. The Eighth Circuit has held that “the good-faith exception applies even if there is no direct nexus between a defendant's continuous course of drug trafficking and his residence because an officer and an issuing judge may logically infer that a drug dealer would store contraband at his residence.” United States v. Norey, 31 F.4th 631 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Pruett, 501 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant's drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant's residence.”).
Therefore, even if the warrants lacked probable cause, Officer Thompson objectively and reasonably relied on the search warrants, and as such the evidence obtained from the search should not be suppressed in accordance with the Leon good faith exception.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence on the Basis of an Unlawful Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution be DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.