" And in Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198, the Court recognized that the holding or restraint could be achieved by mental as well as by physical means. See also Sanford v. United States, 8 Cir., 169 F.2d 71, and United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878. It would serve no useful purpose to recite in detail the evidence which plaintiff adduced to prove the allegations of the indictment.

See to same effect Robinson v. United States, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 4, 9, 10, wherein it was pointed out that nothing in the Sealfon case applies to verdicts which are all received at the same time in a single trial. See also Pilgreen v. United States, 8 Cir., 157 F.2d 427, 428. Cf. Young v. United States, 10 Cir., 168 F.2d 242, 246; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878, 884. In Coplin v. United States, 9 Cir., 88 F.2d 652, 661, it was held that, inasmuch as verdicts on different counts in an indictment need not be consistent, acquittal on a count charging conspiracy did not have the effect of preventing the acts of each defendant from being admissible against others under a substantive count not charging conspiracy.

* * *" The lower federal courts have held that interstate transportation of a kidnapped person for the following purposes is punishable under the act, viz.: The extortion of a confession to enhance the reputation of the kidnapper as a detective, United States v. Parker, 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 857; securing the services of the kidnapped person by the kidnappers, Miller v. United States, 8 Cir., 123 F.2d 715; robbery and the prevention of reporting of the crime, Langston v. United States, 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 840; securing transportation in the victim's automobile, Wheatley v. United States, 4 Cir., 159 F.2d 599, 600; the transportation of the kidnappers to aid his escape from penal confinement, United States v. McGrady, 7 Cir., 191 F.2d 829; the placing of the victim in a house of prostitution, United States v. Bazell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878; the rape of the victim, Poindexter v. United States, 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 158. It is argued that no conspiracy to violate the statute was shown because it is not alleged or proven that there was an intent to cross the state line.

The trial court instructed the jury that if appellant aided or abetted in the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2, he should be found guilty as a principal; yet the jury, by finding the appellant not guilty on Counts 1 and 2, concluded that appellant neither posted the extortion letters nor aided or abetted Foley in so doing. We recognize that the general rule is that the verdict of a jury need not be consistent as between different counts, United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878, 884, yet the situation at bar is closely analagous to that which gave this court considerable concern in United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321. There Chief Judge Major stated, in 176 F.2d at page 330: "Any difference between concerted action to commit an act and participation in a joint enterprise to commit the same act is not discernible to me." Count 1 charged that appellant and Foley deposited an extortion letter in the United States mails on June 22, 1951; Count 2 charged that they deposited a second extortion letter in the United States mails on June 25, 1951. Thus the conspiracy charged was that they unlawfully schemed, planned, confederated and combined together to deposit in the United States mails two extortion letters, one on June 22 and one on June 25, 1951. Hence, if they conspired, the conspiracy was complete on June 25 at the time the second letter was deposited in the United States mails.

A prosecution for conspiracy may be maintained in any federal district where an overt act was committed in furtherance thereof. Hyde v. United States, 1912, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114; United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 1952, 197 F.2d 26; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878, 884, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641; Davis v. United States, 5 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d 203, certiorari denied 325 U.S. 888, 65 S.Ct. 1570, 89 L.Ed. 2001. On each of the interstate journeys the Voelkers set out from Louisville in the Western District of Kentucky. The district court therefore had jurisdiction and the venue was proper.

When a single conspiracy is charged, the trial court has jurisdiction if any overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy is done within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, even though other overt acts be alleged and proved to have occurred elsewhere. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114; United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 197 F.2d 26; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878; Ladner v. United States, 5 Cir., 168 F.2d 771; Kott v. United States, 5 Cir., 163 F.2d 984. Hence, there is no merit in appellants' attack on the jurisdiction of the trial court. Since the indictment alleged one grand conspiracy, with many overt acts occurring in the Northern District of Alabama, we think the trial court did not err in admitting the Government's evidence concerning the conditions and events in Tennessee.

Smith v. United States, 9 Cir., 173 F.2d 181. See also Benson v. United States. 5 Cir., 112 F.2d 422, certiorari denied 311 U.S. 644, 61 S.Ct. 43, 85 L.Ed. 411. Thus, in United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878, we refused, in our discretion, to find that plain error had occurred. See also United States v. Sferas, 7 Cir., 210 F.2d 69, certiorari denied, Skally v. United States, 347 U.S. 935, 74 S.Ct. 630, 98 L.Ed. 1086; Apodaca v. United States, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 932. And in United States v. Jones, 7 Cir., 204 F.2d 745, at page 749, certiorari denied 346 U.S. 854, 74 S.Ct. 67, 98 L.Ed. 368 we said, citing United States v. Jonikas, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 240: "In view of the failure of defendant's counsel to advance the explicit contention here asserted, but `consciously failed to save the point' in the court below, we can not say that the error was obvious.

Whatever intimations defendant envisages this Court as having made in United States v. Moloney, 7 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 344, 346, the case is unavailing here on Morris' contention that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts. We recognized the value of United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878, in our Moloney opinion and apply it here. Careful consideration of those remarks, challenged here by defendant, made to jurors by the district judge during the voir dire examinations has shown us there is absent any sound reason for overturning the jury's verdict.

There is no merit to this contention. It is well settled that when a conspiracy is charged, the trial court has jurisdiction if any overt act in furtherance thereof is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, even though other overt acts be alleged to have occurred elsewhere. Moomaw v. United States, 5 Cir., 220 F.2d 589; United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 197 F.2d 26; Kott v. United States, 5 Cir., 163 F.2d 984; Ladner v. United States, 5 Cir., 168 F.2d 771; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878. Count one of the indictment specifically alleged overt acts committed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and the appellant was therefore properly indicted and tried in that jurisdiction. It is contended that the indictment is fatally defective because (1) it does not set forth the method, manner and means by which the conspiracy was formed and accomplished; and (2) it is duplicitous for the reason that the substantive counts charged more than one offense, that is, that he "did transport, bring and import" constituted one crime; "caused to be transported" charged a second crime, and "aided, abetted and assisted in the transportation" charged a third crime.

The indictment follows the language of the statute and certainly is not vulnerable to attack in a collateral proceeding. Miller v. United States, 8 Cir., 123 F.2d 715; Langston v. United States, 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 840; United States v. Parker, 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 857; Wheatley v. United States, 4 Cir., 159 F.2d 599; United States v. McGrady, 7 Cir., 191 F.2d 829; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878; Brooks v. United States, 4 Cir., 199 F.2d 336. Because of the seriousness of the offense charged and the fact that the defendant is acting as his own counsel we have not strictly confined our consideration to the issues that may properly be considered in a case of collateral attack but have searched the record and are convinced that the defendant has had a fair trial, that his guilt has been abundantly proven and that there has been no miscarriage of justice.