While the appellants insist that the court below erred in admitting, for example, the laundry bag and the hat on the ground that there was no proof that the laundry bag and the hat in the Oldsmobile were in fact used by the appellants in the course of the robbery, nonetheless it is our opinion that the identifications of the items admitted were legally sufficient. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8 Cir. 1964); Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681 (6 Cir. 1951); United States v. Brazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7 Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951), rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 889, 72 S.Ct. 171, 96 L. Ed. 667 (1951); White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509 (5 Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 999, 73 S.Ct. 1142, 97 L.Ed. 1405 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 843, 74 S.Ct. 17, 98 L.Ed. 363 (1953). For the sake of brevity further discussion respecting the problems presented by the articles taken from the automobile and admitted in evidence is set out in the footnote.

This Court now holds that a valid separate offense may be charged under either statute notwithstanding the widely disparate punishment provisions. In United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1951), the defendants were found guilty of kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The defendants appealed, arguing that section 1201(c) had repealed section 371 with respect to conspiracy to kidnap, and the indictment therefore had been defective.

United States v. Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1980); Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation 14, Ch. 55A.10 (1988). And of course numerous cases have recognized that more detailed statutes criminalizing substantive acts, enacted after § 371, do not impliedly repeal or preempt the prohibition on conspiracy to commit those acts contained in § 371. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828, 104 S.Ct. 103, 78 L.Ed.2d 107 (1983); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lasby v. United States, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 889, 72 S.Ct. 171, 96 L.Ed. 667 (1951); Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Pezzati, 160 F. Supp. 787 (D.Colo. 1958).

The conspiracy remains none the less a crime because by its success an additional crime has been committed. . . . Consequently, the substantive offense is not merged in the charge of conspiracy, . . . and the parties may be punished for their agreement to commit a crime as well as for the completed crime." United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1951). Alternatively, the defendants contend that the conspiracy counts cannot stand, asserting that the distinguishing element — the agreement among the defendants to commit the substantive offenses — was not proven. The gist of defendants contention in this regard is that no independent evidence was offered to show the existence of an agreement to violate the Dyer Act, and that the government's evidence was limited to proof of substantive offenses alleged in the indictment.

He says that because the indictment did not specify these reasons, the defendants could only be convicted for holding the Jeppes for ransom or reward. United States v. Varner, 7 Cir., 1961, 283 F.2d 900; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878. Kidnapping to prevent capture is not considered holding for ransom or reward.

" This Court said in United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878, 884: "As to the argument that the verdict is inconsistent, it will be enough to say that where a defendant is charged by two or more counts in an indictment, consistency between the verdicts on the several counts is not necessary. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356; United States v. Denny, 7 Cir., 165 F.2d 668; and United States v. Coplon, 2 Cir., 185 F.2d 629, 633, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041. A verdict of acquittal on one count does not invalidate a verdict of guilty on another count, although the same evidence is offered in support of each. Garrison v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 149 F.2d 844, 845.

There is no merit to this contention. It is well settled that when a conspiracy is charged, the trial court has jurisdiction if any overt act in furtherance thereof is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, even though other overt acts be alleged to have occurred elsewhere. Moomaw v. United States, 5 Cir., 220 F.2d 589; United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 197 F.2d 26; Kott v. United States, 5 Cir., 163 F.2d 984; Ladner v. United States, 5 Cir., 168 F.2d 771; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878. Count one of the indictment specifically alleged overt acts committed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and the appellant was therefore properly indicted and tried in that jurisdiction. It is contended that the indictment is fatally defective because (1) it does not set forth the method, manner and means by which the conspiracy was formed and accomplished; and (2) it is duplicitous for the reason that the substantive counts charged more than one offense, that is, that he "did transport, bring and import" constituted one crime; "caused to be transported" charged a second crime, and "aided, abetted and assisted in the transportation" charged a third crime.

Whatever intimations defendant envisages this Court as having made in United States v. Moloney, 7 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 344, 346, the case is unavailing here on Morris' contention that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts. We recognized the value of United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878, in our Moloney opinion and apply it here. Careful consideration of those remarks, challenged here by defendant, made to jurors by the district judge during the voir dire examinations has shown us there is absent any sound reason for overturning the jury's verdict.

When a single conspiracy is charged, the trial court has jurisdiction if any overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy is done within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, even though other overt acts be alleged and proved to have occurred elsewhere. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114; United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 197 F.2d 26; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878; Ladner v. United States, 5 Cir., 168 F.2d 771; Kott v. United States, 5 Cir., 163 F.2d 984. Hence, there is no merit in appellants' attack on the jurisdiction of the trial court. Since the indictment alleged one grand conspiracy, with many overt acts occurring in the Northern District of Alabama, we think the trial court did not err in admitting the Government's evidence concerning the conditions and events in Tennessee.

The trial court instructed the jury that if appellant aided or abetted in the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2, he should be found guilty as a principal; yet the jury, by finding the appellant not guilty on Counts 1 and 2, concluded that appellant neither posted the extortion letters nor aided or abetted Foley in so doing. We recognize that the general rule is that the verdict of a jury need not be consistent as between different counts, United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878, 884, yet the situation at bar is closely analagous to that which gave this court considerable concern in United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321. There Chief Judge Major stated, in 176 F.2d at page 330: "Any difference between concerted action to commit an act and participation in a joint enterprise to commit the same act is not discernible to me." Count 1 charged that appellant and Foley deposited an extortion letter in the United States mails on June 22, 1951; Count 2 charged that they deposited a second extortion letter in the United States mails on June 25, 1951. Thus the conspiracy charged was that they unlawfully schemed, planned, confederated and combined together to deposit in the United States mails two extortion letters, one on June 22 and one on June 25, 1951. Hence, if they conspired, the conspiracy was complete on June 25 at the time the second letter was deposited in the United States mails.