See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c) and 34, 18 U.S.C.A. The indictment charges an offense over which the court has jurisdiction. As to the scope of review, see United States v. Caplan, D.C.W.D.Pa. 1954, 123 F. Supp. 862, 863; personal jurisdiction, United States v. Rosenberg, 2 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 583, at page 603; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878, 882; venue, United States v. Cohen, 3 Cir., 1952, 197 F.2d 26, at page 28. All three were charged as conspirators.

While the appellants insist that the court below erred in admitting, for example, the laundry bag and the hat on the ground that there was no proof that the laundry bag and the hat in the Oldsmobile were in fact used by the appellants in the course of the robbery, nonetheless it is our opinion that the identifications of the items admitted were legally sufficient. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8 Cir. 1964); Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681 (6 Cir. 1951); United States v. Brazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7 Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951), rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 889, 72 S.Ct. 171, 96 L. Ed. 667 (1951); White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509 (5 Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 999, 73 S.Ct. 1142, 97 L.Ed. 1405 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 843, 74 S.Ct. 17, 98 L.Ed. 363 (1953). For the sake of brevity further discussion respecting the problems presented by the articles taken from the automobile and admitted in evidence is set out in the footnote.

This Court now holds that a valid separate offense may be charged under either statute notwithstanding the widely disparate punishment provisions. In United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1951), the defendants were found guilty of kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The defendants appealed, arguing that section 1201(c) had repealed section 371 with respect to conspiracy to kidnap, and the indictment therefore had been defective.

United States v. Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1980); Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation 14, Ch. 55A.10 (1988). And of course numerous cases have recognized that more detailed statutes criminalizing substantive acts, enacted after § 371, do not impliedly repeal or preempt the prohibition on conspiracy to commit those acts contained in § 371. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828, 104 S.Ct. 103, 78 L.Ed.2d 107 (1983); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lasby v. United States, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 889, 72 S.Ct. 171, 96 L.Ed. 667 (1951); Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Pezzati, 160 F. Supp. 787 (D.Colo. 1958).

The conspiracy remains none the less a crime because by its success an additional crime has been committed. . . . Consequently, the substantive offense is not merged in the charge of conspiracy, . . . and the parties may be punished for their agreement to commit a crime as well as for the completed crime." United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1951). Alternatively, the defendants contend that the conspiracy counts cannot stand, asserting that the distinguishing element — the agreement among the defendants to commit the substantive offenses — was not proven. The gist of defendants contention in this regard is that no independent evidence was offered to show the existence of an agreement to violate the Dyer Act, and that the government's evidence was limited to proof of substantive offenses alleged in the indictment.

As stated in United States v. Russo, 335 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1964): "A verdict of acquittal on one count does not invalidate a verdict of guilty on another count, even where the same evidence is offered in support of each count. United States v. Bazzell, 7th Cir. 1951, 187 F.2d 878, 884, cert. den. 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641, and cases there cited." Moreover, we do not necessarily agree that the record in the instant case requires a finding that the proof of the defendant's knowledge was the same as to all three counts.

t time. E.g., Gawne v. United States, 409 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25 L.Ed.2d 123, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1059, 90 S.Ct. 1368, 25 L.Ed. 2d 680 (1970) (victim forced to assist in "unlawful flight from Rawlings, Wyoming, to avoid prosecution for grand larceny"); United States v. Stubblefield, 408 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969) (abduction to facilitate escape following a jail break); United States v. McGrady, 191 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub nom., Paulding v. United States, 342 U.S. 911, 72 S.Ct. 305, 96 L.Ed. 681 (1952) (same); Hayes v. United States, 296 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 369 U.S. 867, 82 S.Ct. 1033, 8 L.Ed.2d 85 (1962) (abduction of police officer and business cashier to escape arrest for forgery); Brooks v. United States, 199 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1952) (abduction by Klansmen of couple who were transported to lonely spot and given a flogging, told to attend church and to stop living together and making liquor); United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951) (victim forcibly held and transported interstate for purpose of placing her in a house of prostitution); Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946) (to furnish interstate transportation); Langston v. United States, 153 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1946) (victim held for purpose of robbing him and to prevent him from reporting the theft and transportation of an automobile); Poindexter v. United States, 139 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1943) (transportation of female for purpose of rape); Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 192, 63 S.Ct. 187, 87 L.Ed. 179 (1942) (for purpose of holding stepdaughter in involuntary servitude); United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642, 59 S.Ct. 1044, 83 L.Ed. 1522 (1939) (victim seized and held to force him to confess to the Lindbergh kidnaping, "and thereby enhance the reputation of Ellis H. Parker as a successful

He says that because the indictment did not specify these reasons, the defendants could only be convicted for holding the Jeppes for ransom or reward. United States v. Varner, 7 Cir., 1961, 283 F.2d 900; United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 878. Kidnapping to prevent capture is not considered holding for ransom or reward.

This seems to be the general criterion which the courts have followed. United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878; Smith v. United States, 9 Cir., 173 F.2d 181; Robertson v. United States, 84 U.S.App. D.C. 185, 171 F.2d 345; Benson v. United States, 5 Cir., 112 F.2d 422; United States v. Lawrenson, 4 Cir., 298 F.2d 880, 884. An examination of the statutes, which have been adverted to heretofore, §§ 4401, 4411, 4412, 4421, 26 U.S.C.A., reveals there is a differentiation between a banker and numbers writer, that is between a person who is engaged in the business of accepting wagers, a banker and a receiver, one who receives wagers for or on behalf of any person. This differentiation is set out in United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 at 353, 77 S. Ct. 1138, 1 L.Ed.2d 1394. While, in that case, under the facts there obtaining, the Court held that the acceptor and receiver were labels which could be interchanged — were different sides of the same coin — by reason of the fact that the particular problem involved was whether or not a pick-up man who picked up the slips from a numbers writer or rece

See Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 127, n. 1, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522. The statute specifically excludes the taking of a minor by a parent. Compare Davidson v. United States, 8 Cir., 312 F.2d 163 (sexual molestation); United States v. Bazzell, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 878, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 849, 72 S. Ct. 73, 96 L.Ed. 641 (prostitution); Sanford v. United States, 8 Cir., 169 F.2d 71 (robbery); and United States v. Dressler, 7 Cir., 112 F.2d 972 (escape). See also Eidson v. United States, 10 Cir., 272 F.2d 684.