Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JARED C. DOLAN, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
DAVID FISCHER, Counsel for Defendant, AVTAR BAINS.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status of trial on August 6, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 17, 2015, and to exclude time between August 6, 2015, and September 17, 2015, under Local Code T4. The parties also request that the November 9, 2015, trial date and the October 1, 2015 trial confirmation date, be vacated.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for the defendant has had the defendant examined by a physician to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. The defendant has provided that report to the government. Based on that report, and that no other defendants remain in this matter, counsel anticipate meeting with the physician over the next month to determine the appropriate resolution of this case, or, in the alternative, whether litigation is necessary to determine the competency of the defendant.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 6, 2015 to September 17, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
f) Time is also excluded under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(A), as the delay is caused from a proceeding, including an examination, to determine the competency of the defendant.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.