Even though initial processing by the trial judge is apt to make a contribution to any subsequent consideration of bail, our responsibility in the statutory scheme, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has asserted, "is not merely appellate but includes the duty to make an independent determination of all relevant factors."See, e. g., United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct. 347, 30 L.Ed.2d 294 (1971); United States v. Sine, 461 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D.S.C. 1978); United States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 789 (S.D.Fla. 1977); United States v. Parr, 399 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D.Tex. 1975); United States v. Quicksey, 371 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.W.Va. 1974).See, e. g., United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d at 1296; United States v. Porter, D.C., 297 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (1969).
The dismissal as to the remaining defendants must be reversed. If plaintiff can show that these defendants conspired to use the Parole Board solely for the purpose of gathering evidence in an unrelated criminal matter, with the result that Steinhoff deliberately misstated the basis for issuance of the warrant, a jury may find that appellant's constitutional rights have been violated. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 80 S.Ct. 683, 690, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); United States v. Polito, 583 F.2d 48, 53 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct. 347, 30 L.Ed.2d 294 (1971); and cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). A similar finding might be made if plaintiff is able to establish that he was physically abused following his apprehension.
This determination is properly within the trial judge's discretion. United States v. Drumright, 534 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1976), U.S. Appeal Pending; United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct. 347, 30 L.Ed.2d 294 (1971). A critical issue in the case at hand was Nolan's intent and knowledge. Proof of the British conviction was very relevant in the proof of those elements of the crime.
Defendant used each bill in purchasing merchandise. The Tri-State bill was pertinent to the knowledge and intent of the defendant in passing the Duckwall's bill. The court did not abuse its discretion in receiving the Tri-State bill. United States v. Baca, 10 Cir., 444 F.2d 1292, 1294-1295, cert. denied 404 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct. 347, 30 L.Ed.2d 294, and cases there cited. The objection to the Duckwall's bill goes to the chain of custody.
Since Thorne is now held as a convicted defendant rather than merely on a criminal charge not yet brought to trial, the issue as to the legality of his continued pretrial detention has been mooted, and it therefore becomes unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issues presented. See United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1971). Cf. Clayton v. Stone, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 358 F.2d 548 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
Second, ample evidence was adduced during the trial to enable the jury to conclude that the narcotics purchased from Stuart were the same as the exhibits admitted into evidence. Barquera v. California, 374 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct. 347, 30 L.Ed.2d 294 (1971). 3. Entrapment instructions.
Hence, Agnew offers the government nothing of merit. The United States also relies upon Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) and United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir. 1971) to establish that when officers act in good faith and in so doing make a reasonable mistake, their misunderstanding is excused to the extent that the search is held nonviolative. Abel and Baca were, however, both premised on specific findings of the respective district courts, that the agents had not acted in bad faith and that the warrant had in the regular course of events been issued in good faith.
pra note 17, 139 U.S.App.D.C. at 337-338, 433 F.2d at 495-496. See also United States v. Long, supra note 29, 137 U.S.App.D.C. at 276-277, 422 F.2d at 713-714; United States v. Jackson, supra note 14, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 208, 209-210, 417 F.2d at 1155, 1156-1157; Banks v. United States, supra note 13, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 257, 414 F.2d at 1153; United States v. Leathers, supra note 17, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 41-42, 412 F.2d at 172-173; Chapman v. United States, supra note 18, 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 74, 75, 408 F.2d at 1277, 1278; United States v. Blyther, supra note 29; United States v. Harrison, supra note 14, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 392, 405 F.2d at 357; Weaver v. United States, supra note 15; Byrd v. United States, supra note 15; McCoy v. United States, supra note 47, 123 U.S.App.D.C. at 82, 357 F.2d at 273; Hansford v. United States, supra note 13; Hairston v. United States, supra note 24, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 32-33, 343 F.2d at 314-315; United States v. Bennett, 444 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296-1297 (10th Cir. 1971). I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Because he has been convicted, he no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, and thus there is no constitutional 2 right to reasonable bail. See United States v. Provenzano, 602 F.Supp. 230, 232 (E.D .La. 1985) ("There is no constitutional guarantee of bail pending appeal.") (citing United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971)). The statute governing release or detention pending sentence or appeal under the circumstances of this case mandates detention "unless
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (bold in original). Before Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act, post-conviction, pre-sentence bail rested entirely within courts' discretion. See United States v. Baca, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he language of 18 U.S.C. 3148 makes it clear that whether a convicted person is released on bail rests in the trial court's discretion."). Today, § 3143 sharply curtails that discretion.