Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorney
TIMOTHY WARRINER, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Francisco Parra Arrellanez
DINA SANTOS, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Jovany Romo Arrellanes
RICHARD DUDEK, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Efrain Padilla Pena
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Garland E. Burrell, JR. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Francisco Parra Arrellanez, Jovany Romo Arrellanes, and Efirain Padilla Pena, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 16, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 20, 2015 and to exclude time between January 16, 2015 and March 20, 2015, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and wiretap applications in electronic form constituting approximately 4000 pages of documents. The United States also represents that the discovery includes approximately 20 CDs of audio recordings, including intercepted communications, and transcripts and line reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Further, counsel for all of the defendants have requested that the United States prepare plea agreements for the consideration of their clients. The United States has presented offers to the defendants, who have all requested additional time to discuss the agreements with their clients and to consider the discovery provided as it relates to the provisions of the plea agreements.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 16, 2015 to March 20, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.