Opinion
No. 4:18-cr-6054-EFS-1
2022-11-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Sami ANWAR, Defendant.
Brian M. Donovan, Daniel Hugo Fruchter, Russell E. Smoot, Tyler Howard Louis Tornabene, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff.
Brian M. Donovan, Daniel Hugo Fruchter, Russell E. Smoot, Tyler Howard Louis Tornabene, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER GRANTING THE UNITED STATES' MOTION TO AUTHORIZE PAYMENT FROM INMATE TRUST ACCOUNT
EDWARD F. SHEA, Senior United States District Judge
Before the Court is the United States' Motion to Authorize Payment from Inmate Trust Account. Based on a review of the deposit history, the Court concludes that Defendant has received into his trust account substantial resources from friends and family, and 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) therefore mandates that such substantial resources be applied toward the restitution and fines that Defendant currently owes. The Court therefore grants the United States' motion as set forth below.
ECF No. 300.
A. Background
In November 2019, a jury found Defendant guilty of wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, fraudulently obtaining controlled substances, and furnishing false or fraudulent material information. In October 2020, as part of his sentence, Defendant was ordered to pay $4,400.00 in penalty assessments and $1,890,550.10 in restitution, for a total amount owed under the judgment of $1,895,250.10.
ECF No. 241.
Through the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, Defendant has thus far paid a total of $150.00 toward the penalty assessment, leaving an amount owed of $1,895,100.10. Defendant's inmate trust account, maintained on his behalf by the BOP, currently has a balance of $3,011.44.
ECF Nos. 302-3, 302-4.
ECF Nos. 302-3, 303.
B. The United States' Motion
In its June 30, 2022 motion, the United States "requests this Court to enter an order authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to turn over to the Clerk of Court all of the funds held in the inmate trust account for the above named Defendant, less $200 to remain in the account, as payment toward the criminal monetary penalties imposed in this case." The motion primarily invokes the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)—specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). And the Court ordered the United States to show cause why such relief should be granted in light of the unpublished decision of United States v. Poff. Thereafter, on August 4, 2022, the United States filed a statement of Defendant's inmate trust account showing the various deposits into the account and their sources.
ECF No. 300 at 1.
See, generally, ECF No. 300.
See United States v. Poff, 781 F. App'x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2019).
See ECF No. 303.
C. The Contents and Status of Defendant's Trust Account
The materials filed by the United States show that Defendant's inmate trust account started with a $615.97 deposit near the end of October 2020. The United States believes this deposit to be a balance transfer from his account at the Benton County Jail, but nothing of record indicates what sources originally contributed to that $615.97. Additionally, and most recently, in June and July 2022, Defendant received a $27.90 payroll deposit. Defendant's trust-account information does not reflect any other deposits that appear could be based on wages, benefits, or the like.
See ECF No. 303; see also ECF No. 302 at 2.
From November 2020 through May 2022, Defendant received $8,030.00 into his trust account via outside deposits. This sum was deposited into Defendant's account via 25 separate Western Union transfers made by his spouse and a few other individuals. The deposits were usually in the amount of $300.00, though there are three instances in which the same person made two deposits (each for $300.00) on the same day.
See ECF No. 303.
The United States alleges in its briefing that the depositing individuals are likely friends or family members of Defendant, see ECF No. 302 at 2, and Defendant has not asserted otherwise. Even if one or more of the individuals is not a relative or friend, however, the Court's analysis would be the same.
See ECF No. 303.
Pending the Court's decision on the United States' motion, the Court previously ordered the Bureau of Prisons to place a hold on any withdrawals from Defendant's trust account, except for $500.00, which remained available to him as general funds. In the roughly three months since the United States first filed its motion, Defendant has filed no response; nor has he otherwise expressed any objection to the motion or the United States' other supportive filings.
D. Applicable Law and Analysis
The United States asserts two distinct avenues of recovery against the funds in Defendant's inmate trust account: 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (requiring substantial resources received to be applied to restitution and fines owed) and 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) (allowing for modification of a payment plan based on changed financial circumstances). The Court need only reach the first.
1. As used in § 3664(n) , the term "any source" is not limited to windfalls.
The entirety of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) is a single sentence: "If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration, such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed."
In Poff, a Ninth Circuit panel was "persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's analysis . . . that § 3664(n) refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections that become 'suddenly available' to the defendant." Although some circuits disagree, the Poff court applied the noscitur a sociis canon to the language "including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" and found that such language constituted examples that "share the relevant characteristic of a one-time, lump-sum payment—a category that would not include, for example, periodically paid prison wages." The Poff court then went on to reason that "Congress would not have included those three examples if it intended § 3664(n) to apply more broadly." This Court respectfully disagrees.
Poff, 781 F. App'x at 594 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Compare, e.g., id.; Hughes, 914 F.3d at 951 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[W]e think this provision refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections."), with, e.g., United States v. Rios, 835 F. App'x 684, 686 (3d Cir. 2021) (upholding application of $5,000 in prison trust account and noting that the defendant did not assert that such money was "solely the accumulation of prison wages"); United States v. Black, No. 21-2311, 2022 WL 1011676, at *2 (7th Cir. 2022) ("[T]he list in § 3664(n) is non-exhaustive, and we have held that the provision permits seizure of funds from any source—no matter how acquired or for what purpose—to satisfy restitution."); United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 786-87 (8th Cir. 2022) ("[W]e cannot agree with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that § 3664(n) refers only to 'windfalls or sudden financial injections.' "); United States v. Toole, No. 21-10651, 2022 WL 503736, at *2 (11th Cir. 2022) (upholding the application of a $1,200 stimulus payment received by the defendant under the CARES Act toward his restitution obligation); United States v. Elwood, 757 F. App'x 731, 736 n.5 (10th Cir. 2018) ("[T]he MVRA requires prisoners to apply 'substantial resources from any source'—not just from windfalls—to their restitution obligations.").
Poff, 781 F. App'x at 594-95 (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 195 (2012)).
As noted in the Poff decision, the surplusage canon "cautions against 'an interpretation that renders a provision pointless[.]" See Poff, 781 F. App'x at 595 (cleaned up) (citing Scalia & Garner, at 176).
Although the Court has carefully considered the panel's reasoning in Poff, that decision is unpublished and does not create binding precedent. See Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 870 n.7 (9th Cir. 2022).
As a preliminary matter, the canon of noscitur a sociis generally applies where the term being interpreted is contained within the same list as the words being used to inform the term's meaning by establishing a shared characteristic. The term "any source" in § 3664(n) is separated from the list that follows it. Even more, the broad conclusions drawn in the Poff decision overlook other important statutory language, the sentence structure, as well as other reasons why Congress may have chosen to specify the inclusion of inheritance, settlements, and other judgments.
See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543-44, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Env't Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378, 126 S.Ct. 1843, 164 L.Ed.2d 625 (2006) ("The canon, noscitur a sociis, . . . is invoked when a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the words grouped in a list should be given related meaning[.]" (cleaned up); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371, 114 S.Ct. 1669, 128 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) ("That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well."(emphasis added)).
a. Starting with the Statutory Language
As stated by the Ninth Circuit,
The interpretation of a statutory provision must begin with the plain meaning of its language. To determine plain meaning, we examine not only the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the statute as a whole, including its object and policy. If the language has a plain meaning or is unambiguous, the statutory interpretation inquiry ends there. If the statutory language lacks a plain meaning, we may employ other tools, such as legislative history, to construe the meaning of ambiguous terms. If a criminal statute remains ambiguous even after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, the rule of lenity obliges the court to select the least-harsh interpretation consistent with the statutory language.
United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
Here, § 3664(n) expressly applies to "substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment[.]" The word "any" has an expansive meaning, "that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever [source of substantial resources]." And a list introduced by the word "including" is presumed to be non-exhaustive. Limiting recovery under § 3664(n) to only those sources that are of a kind with inheritance, settlements, and judgments would ignore the expansive terms "any" and "including."
18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (emphasis added); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (noting that the meaning of a phrase may be informed by "the neighboring words with which it is associated").
See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997).
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 132 (2012); see also id. at 226 ("When a definitional section says that a word 'includes' certain things, that is usually taken to mean that it may include other things as well.").
Alternatively, such an interpretation would require reading out the first comma that offsets the specific examples provided (i.e., "substantial resources from any source including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment").
Further, the overall content and grammatical structure of § 3664(n) do not suggest that Congress specifically identified inheritance, settlements, and judgments as a way of deviating from the common meaning of "any." To the contrary, the use of "from any source" along with offsetting commas and the preposition "including"—as well as the general purpose of the statute—all suggest that the list was included to make clear and emphasize that § 3664(n) applies even where the substantial resources stem from inheritance, a settlement, or a judgment. After all, "[f]ollowing the general term with specifics can serve the function of making doubly sure that the broad (and intended-to-be-broad) general term is taken to include the specifics."
See U.S. Nat. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) "Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor and, at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter." (cleaned up).
Scalia & Garner at 204. See also United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 786 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting the same and concluding, "that is the more logical interpretation of § 3664(n)"). By way of analogy, one could imagine a statute that applies to "all fruit, including tomatoes, peppers, and pumpkins." Especially because not everyone may immediately think of them as fruit, the specific reference to tomatoes, peppers, and pumpkins should not be read to limit the statute's application to only that fruit which is grown on a vine (or some other shared characteristic between the three listed fruits).
The Court can conceive of at least two explanations for why Congress may have wished to make "doubly sure" that the term "any source" is understood to include inheritance, settlements, and judgments. The first is because various laws can sometimes treat those specific sources of income differently than others. For instance, in 1996—the same year § 3664(n) was enacted—Congress also amended the tax code to exclude from gross income "the amount of any damages (other than punitive) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness." The express inclusion of inheritance, settlements, and judgments serves as special emphasis and clarification that those sources of income, too, are subject to § 3664(n). And by doing so, the provision guards against those sources receiving special treatment based on whatever other federal, state, or local laws that currently exist or may be enacted in the future.
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2); see also, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(b)(2) (exempting from executions on judgments certain monies "payable on account of judgments, arbitrations, [and] compromises," which arise from injury or loss of future earnings).
b. The Legislative History
Another possible reason for the list's inclusion can be found in the legislative history. In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act. Then, in 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress incorporated and updated the 1982 Act into what is now called the MVRA. The MVRA included the addition of § 3664(n).
Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1232.
Leading up to its enactment, a December 1995 Senate Report, in relevant part, described the legislative history as follows:
The 1982 act sought to remedy the unfortunate situation noted by the committee
that "restitution lost its priority status in the sentencing procedures of our federal courts long ago. As a matter of practice, restitution is infrequently used and indifferently enforced."
. . .
Unfortunately, however, while significant strides have been made since 1982 toward a more victim-centered justice system, much progress remains to be made in the area of victim restitution.
. . .
That same Senate Report then summarized the section creating § 3664(n) by saying it "provides that any substantial resources acquired by an incarcerated defendant owing restitution shall be applied to restitution still owed."
The committee amendment is intended first, to require that full restitution be ordered to the victims of all covered offenses in which there is an identifiable victim, second, to establish one set of procedures for the issuance of restitution orders in Federal criminal cases, and third, to consolidate the procedures for the collection of unpaid restitution with existing procedures for the collection of unpaid fines, while at the same time strengthening these procedures.
S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13-14 (1995) (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-518 at 111-12 (1996) ("The managers intend that the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 665 (S. Rept. 104-179) should serve as the legislative history for this subtitle.").
S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 14 (1995) (emphasis added).
In advocating for passage of the 1996 Act, Senator Charles Ernest Grassley said, "With respect to terrorism, and the Oklahoma City bombing, this means that the families of the bombing victims can seek restitution. So if the bombers come into money from any source, the victims' families can receive restitution. This is a very positive development." Admittedly, Senator Grassley also later referenced windfalls when referring to § 3664(n), saying,
142 Cong. Rec. S3379, 1996 WL 179597. The Court recognizes that although Senator Grassley was highly involved in the formation and passage of the MVRA, his concerns and commentary do not necessarily reflect the understanding or intent of the other enacting legislators.
Also, the [adopted provision] provided that should prisoners who have been ordered to pay restitution file a prisoner lawsuit and receive a windfall, that windfall will go to the victims and not to the prisoner. This should take some of the lure out of prisoner lawsuits. Importantly, . . . [it] also provides that windfalls received by prisoners from all sources, including lawsuits, will go to pay victims.
142 Cong. Rec. S3379, 1996 WL 179597.
Overall, however, Senator Grassley's references to windfalls appear tied primarily to a specific concern about prisoner lawsuits. Indeed, before enactment of the MVRA, Senator Grassley had previously introduced a different bill that was more narrowly tailored to addressing prisoner lawsuits, saying,
[I]mportantly, my bill provides that prisoners who file prisoner lawsuits must notify their victims in writing of the lawsuit and turn any monetary award over to the victims if the prisoner has not fully satisfied his duty to pay restitution. I think this will help deter many prisoner lawsuits, because criminals will realize that even if they hit the jackpot they can't keep the money.
141 Cong. Rec. H13874-01, 1995 WL 709823.
Yet, when Congress ultimately approved the MVRA, it chose to use much broader language (while still specifically addressing Senator Grassley's concerns). Senator Grassley's comments regarding windfalls, therefore, offer little support for the theory that § 3664(n) was intended to reach only such windfalls—especially given his view that under the MVRA as it was enacted, if an inmate owing restitution was to "come into money from any source," then such money would be applied toward restitution. Thus, to the extent § 3664(n)'s language is unclear, the overall legislative history suggests that at least part of the reason why Congress included the specific examples it did was to give clear notice of the provision's scope to those inmates who owe restitution and might otherwise expect to retain sums received via an inheritance, settlement, and/or other judgment.
See 142 Cong. Rec. S3379, 1996 WL 179597.
c. Conclusion as to Sources Subject to § 3 664 (n)
Based on the plain language of § 3664(n), its purpose, its sentence structure, the applicable canons of construction, and the legislative history, the Court finds that an individual person, including a friend or family member, qualifies as a "source" for purposes of § 3664(n). Thus, to the extent Defendant received substantial resources from an individual, § 3664(n) mandates that those resources be applied toward Defendant's owed restitution and fines.
2. As used in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) , the term "substantial resources" includes sums received in multiple installments.
Neither the statute nor any other authority articulates what constitutes "substantial resources" for purposes of § 3664(n). Common usage and context suggest that, as used here, "substantial" refers only to overall monetary value; so long as the resources at issue are worth a sum that is "considerable" or "significantly great," they will fall within § 3664(n)'s ambit. The Court finds no reason to read into the statute a requirement that the resources at issue must also be received "unexpectedly" and/or or as a lump sum which is, by itself, substantial.
See Substantial, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial ("considerable in quantity: significantly great"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (requiring "the value of such resources" to be applied toward owed restitution and/or fines (emphasis added)).
Contra. Poff, 781 F. App'x at 594.
More than one problem would arise if courts were to exclude from § 3664(n) substantial aggregated sums merely because the money was received via multiple deposits in an amount that, by itself, is not substantial. First, doing so would ignore the practical reality that the three listed examples—inheritance, settlements, and judgments—are frequently distributed in multiple installments over time. Second, excluding aggregated sums would produce the absurd result of allowing an owing inmate to effectively bypass § 3664(n) altogether by simply arranging for multiple smaller deposits.
Based on the above, the Court finds that the term "substantial resources" in § 3664(n) is not limited to resources made suddenly available via a lump-sum payment. This leaves only the question of whether the record in this case shows receipt by Defendant of "substantial resources" from qualifying sources. As explained below, the Court answers that question in the affirmative.
3. Defendant received substantial resources subject to § 3664(n).
To determine whether Defendant has received substantial resources subject to § 3664(n), the Court looks to the source and timing of each of the various deposits into Defendant's trust account.
a. Initial Deposit of $615 .97: Already Spent
Section 3664(n) applies only to funds that were received by Defendant during a "period of incarceration." The Ninth Circuit has held that pretrial detention does not qualify as incarceration for purposes of § 3664(n).
Here, it appears that the $615.97 initially deposited into Defendant's inmate trust account may have been receive prior to imposition of his sentence, and it is unclear from whom or from where Defendant originally received that sum. The Court therefore finds that the $615.97 initial deposit is not subject to § 3664(n). However, this does not end the analysis.
As discussed further below, Defendant's expenditures from his trust account far surpass his $615.97 starting balance. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to treat Defendant's expenditures as coming out of the starting balance before the later-received amounts from other sources. Thus, because the full $615.97 starting balance has already been spent, its exclusion does not ultimately impact how much of Defendant's current account balance is subject to § 3664(n).
This is true even if it is assumed that none of the starting balance was applied toward the total of $167.00 Defendant spent as co-pays, to buy books, and as quarterly payments toward his owed criminal assessments. See ECF No. 303.
Cf. In re California Trade Tech. Sch., 923 F.2d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the first-in-first-out (FIFO) accounting principle in the bankruptcy context).
b. Prison Wages of $55 .80: Excluded
Most courts, including the court in Poff, have concluded that prison wages do not fall within § 3664(n)'s ambit. Further, unlike amounts received outside individuals, there are compelling policy reasons why normal prison wages should be excluded. Prison employment programs do more than merely provide a way for prisoners to earn wages; they also encourage good behavior through eligibility requirements and provide a means of learning workplace skills. As stated by the Eighth Circuit,
See, e.g., Poff, 781 F. App'x 593, 594-95; United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2022).
[C]ourt orders withdrawing prison wage payments made into inmates' Commissary and Inmate Deposit accounts at the behest of prosecutors could significantly threaten prison security and administration by hurting inmate morale, discouraging inmates from gaining the benefits of prison work, and interfering with the BOP's carefully constructed Inmate Financial Responsibility Program that includes provisions for paying restitution obligations while incarcerated.As such, the Court excludes $55.80 in prison wages from its § 3664(n) assessment. Moreover, the Court notes that Defendant received his prison wages only recently and that they amount to a relatively small sum. The Court therefore declines to treat any of Defendant's expenditures as coming out of his prison wages.
United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 545.11).
Although the Court need not decide the issue here, it is questionable whether $55.80, by itself, would constitute substantial resources for purposes of § 3664(n).
c. Remaining Amount: Subject to § 3664(n)
Aside from Defendant's starting balance and prison wages earned, Defendant received into his trust account a total of $8,030.00 in deposits made by his wife and a few other individuals. Normally, this entire amount would be subject to § 3664(n)'s mandate, and the Court would therefore be required to apply it toward Defendant's owed restitution and fines. Here, however, Defendant's current account balance is only $3,011.44, reflecting that he spent $5,690.33 over the past two years. Of his expenditures, $167.00 went toward medical co-pays, books, and quarterly criminal-assessment payments. So, even setting aside this $167.00, Defendant's account information shows that he has spent over $4,800 in funds that probably should have been applied toward his restitution and fine obligations.
See ECF No. 303.
Of the $3,011.44 remaining in Defendant's trust account, $55.80 constitutes prison wages that, for the reasons discussed above, are excluded for purposes of § 3664(n). Additionally, although the BOP provides for an inmate's subsistence during incarceration, the Court finds Congress would not have reasonably intended § 3664(n) to prevent an indebted prisoner from receiving and spending small sums of money to pay for basic living expenses not covered by the BOP—such as books, co-pays for healthcare, and/or a reasonable amount of standard commissary items. For this reason, the Court excludes from its § 3664(n) analysis an additional $500.00 as basic living expenses. After subtracting the combined exclusions of $555.80 from Defendant's balance of $3,011.44, this leaves a total of $2,455.64 in deposits that are potentially subject to § 3664(n).
See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2019).
The Court is unaware of any authority or standard metric for determining what would constitute a reasonable amount for the basic living expenses (beyond those covered by the BOP) of a given prisoner. Here, the Court arrived at the $500.00 amount based on an overall assessment of Defendant's expenditures to date, the commissary's prices and monthly spending limit, and the overall purpose of both § 3664(n) and the MVRA. Cf. ECF No. 303; cf. also FCI Sheridan Commissary List (July 2014) available at https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/she/SHE_fdc_CommList.pdf (last viewed Oct. 26, 2022); Zoukis Consulting Group, Inmate Canteen/Inmate Commissary Items, https://prisonerresource.com/prison-life/first-day-in-prison/inmate-canteen-prison-commissary/ (last viewed Oct. 26, 2022).
Again, there is no authority setting forth how much money is required to be considered "substantial" under § 3664(n). Regardless, considering common usage of the word "substantial" in relation to money, the fact the BOP pays for the vast majority of Defendant's living expenses while incarcerated, and the purchasing power of money in the prison setting, the Court finds $2,455.64 to be substantial for purposes of § 3664(n). Accordingly, up to $2,455.64 of Defendant's balance must be applied to the restitution and fines he still owes.
E. Conclusion
Because Defendant received substantial resources in the amount of $2,455.64 from other individuals via deposits into his inmate trust account, under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), that $2,455.64—to the extent it is still in his account—must be applied toward the owed restitution and fees.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The United States' Motion to Authorize Payment from Inmate Trust Account, ECF No. 300, is GRANTED.
2. The Bureau of Prisons is authorized and directed to turn over to the Clerk of this Court the lesser sum of EITHER $2,455.64 OR the balance of the account minus $555.80 (to be retained in the account), from the inmate trust account held for the following inmate:
Sami Anwar, Reg. No. 21140-085
FCI Sheridan
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 5000
Sheridan, OR 97378
3. The hold previously placed on the above inmate trust account by the Court's July 28, 2022 order, ECF No. 301, is LIFTED.
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to apply the funds received toward the restitution and fees currently owed by Defendant pursuant to his criminal judgment in this matter, ECF No. 241.
IT IS SO ORDERED.