Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GRALAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jill Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Joseph Andrade, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial confirmation hearing on September 6, 2013 (jury trial September 24, 2013).
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the trial confirmation hearing to September 27, 2013, for a change of plea and to exclude time between September 6, 2013 and September 27, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare). The parties further request the jury trial date of September 24, 2013 be vacated in light of the requested change of plea hearing.
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, JILL THOMAS, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, JOSEPH ANDRADE.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery and conduct investigation.
b. Currently the discovery in this case includes 2, 962 pages, 14 video DVDs, and 1 audio CD.
c. Counsel for Mr. Andrade and the Government are actively discussing resolution and the specific language of the plea agreement. A proposed plea agreement is being crafted by the Government in response to the ongoing negotiations between the parties. Counsel for Mr. Andrade needs additional time to review the agreement with Mr. Andrade and discuss the terms and consequences of the plea agreement.
d. Counsel for the defendant believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of September 6, 2013 to September 27, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.