As concerns Garavito–Garcia's particular insufficiency claim, “[t]he government may prove the defendant's knowing participation in a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence,” which “may include, for example, a defendant's association with conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” or “his presence at critical stages of the conspiracy that cannot be explained by happenstance.”United States v. Allen , 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).United States v. Anderson , 747 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[F]ederal title to the land is merely a jurisdictional prerequisite," so we assume that "knowledge thereof is not an element of the substantive offense." United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2015).
As an initial matter, Shipp waived his Rule 43(a) claim because he never objected to the District Court's remarks. See United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2015). In any event, "routine administrative procedures relating to jury selection are not part of the true jury impanelment process in which parties and counsel have a right to participate."
In similar cases concerning the application of a mens rea requirement in a federal criminal statute to an element limiting that statute to offenses that relate to the federal government or its jurisdiction, we have "look[ed] to the language of the statute, the intent of Congress as expressed in the legislative history, and cases involving the interpretation of this and similar statutes" for guidance. United States v. Allen , 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 1855, which imposes criminal penalties for willfully setting fire to federal land, requires that the defendant know the land is federal). Cotto argues that we resolved this issue in United States v. Brown , 937 F.2d 32.
The jury thus had more than an ample basis on which to conclude that Sampson’s response to Agent Hosey’s question was false. See United States v. Garavito-Garcia, 827 F.3d 242, 248 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence "bears a heavy burden," and that a conviction will be upheld "if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (quoting United States v. Allen , 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) ) ). Ahmad testified that he had previously shown Sampson a copy of the check register page, telling him that it was responsive to a government subpoena and that Ahmad needed his advice. According to Ahmad, Sampson instructed Ahmad to lie to the government about the document’s existence.
Conspiracy consists of three elements: "(1) an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act; (2) knowingly engaging in the conspiracy intending to commit those offenses that were the objects of the conspiracy; and (3) commission of an 'overt act' by one or more members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2002)). In a conspiracy case, "[t]he traditional deference accorded to a jury's verdict is especially important" because "a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel."
This presents an issue of first impression in this Court, which we address by looking "to the language of the statute, the intent of Congress as expressed in the legislative history, and cases involving the interpretation of this and similar statutes." United States v. Allen , 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).The statute's text reveals no great insights.
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction bears a "heavy burden" because, although our standard of review is de novo, we must affirm a conviction "if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). To prove insider trading as a tipper, the government must demonstrate that a defendant (1) owed a duty of confidentiality respecting material nonpublic information, (2) breached that duty by intentionally or recklessly relating such information to a tippee who could be anticipated to trade thereon, and (3) did so in exchange for personal benefit.
On de novo review of these sufficiency challenges, we conclude, as the district court did, that they fail on the merits. See United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (observing that, on de novo review of sufficiency challenge, court must view evidence in light most favorable to government, drawing all permissible inferences in its favor, and deferring to jury's assessments of witnesses' credibility). a. Separate Conspiracies
In answering this issue, one of first impression in our Circuit, we look to the statutory language, cases that have interpreted this statute, and the legislative history. See United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.2015). On its face, the statute requires that process be mailed “to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state.”