Opinion
Case No.: 1:12-CR-00102-LJO
01-29-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOSE ALCARAZ-PALACIO, Defendant.
ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 068525 NICHOLAS A. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 275568 LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI Attorney for Defendant, JOSE ALCARAZ-PALACIO Kevin P. Rooney Assistant United States Attorney
ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 068525
NICHOLAS A. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 275568
LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI
Attorney for Defendant,
JOSE ALCARAZ-PALACIO
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO
CONTINUE SENTENCING
Date: February 4, 2013
Hon. Lawrence J. O'Neill
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on February 4, 2013, at 9:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until March 4, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between February 4, 2013, and March 4, 2013, under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. The government does not object to the continuance.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 4, 2013, to March 4, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence. IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Kevin P. Rooney
Assistant United States
Attorney
______________________
Anthony P. Capozzi
Attorney for
JOSE ALCARAZ-PALACIO
ORDER
For reasons set forth above, the continuance requested by the parties is granted for good cause and time is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act from February 4, 2013, to, and including, February 4, 2013, based upon the Court's finding that the ends of justice outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS ORDERED that the Sentencing currently scheduled on February 4, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. is continued to March 4, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. O'Neill IT IS SO ORDERED.
Lawrence J. O'Neill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE