The district court granted in part and denied in part McKamey's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a discussion of qualified immunity, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that qualified immunity was not applicable to Walsh because she was a private actor and concluded that “immunity is available to Defendant Walsh.” United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga (“Pet Supply I”), 921 F.Supp.2d 835, 857–58 (E.D.Tenn.2013). The district court did not rule on whether qualified immunity was available to Nicholson and Hurn in their individual capacities.

The district court granted in part and denied in part McKamey's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a discussion of qualified immunity, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that qualified immunity was not applicable to Walsh because she was a private actor and concluded that “immunity is available to Defendant Walsh.” United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga (“Pet Supply I”), 921 F.Supp.2d 835, 857–58 (E.D.Tenn.2013). The district court did not rule on whether qualified immunity was available to Nicholson and Hurn in their individual capacities.

"For the reasons the Court concluded qualified immunity was inappropriate for the individual defendant[ ], it also concludes qualified immunity is inappropriate for [the private-entity defendant, Baker]." United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F. Supp. 2d 835, 860 (E.D. Tenn. 2013). Baker's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 43) will therefore be denied as to Plaintiff's First Amendment-retaliation claim.

Not only would considering their contents to resolve factual disputes be improper, but on a Rule 12(c) motion the Court must regard 3 the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F.Supp.2d 835, 843-44 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, I may take notice that the Committee denied Howe's claim, but I cannot properly take notice of the merits of that denial.

The Court's ruling in this regard is in full accordance with case law in this circuit. See Jergens v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr. Adult Parole Auth., 492 F. App'x. 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2012); United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (taking judicial notice of the existence of previous filings and their contents but declining to consider the contents as resolving factual disputes) (citation omitted).

In each of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs, the government took direct action to prohibit or impair the business in question. See United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F. Supp. 2d 835, 850-51 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (pre-process revocation of building permit sufficient to support a due process claim); B & B Target Ctr., Inc. v. Figueroa-Sancha, 871 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D.P.R. 2012) (revocation of gunsmith's license constituted a cognizable constitutional injury); City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ohio 1943) (ordinance imposing barber shop closing hours unconstitutional). Here, in contrast, there was no license or permit revocation, there was no injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from operating a business, and there was no other legal impediment to conducting business (i.e., fines and penalties) imposed.

Therefore, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim under the Tennessee Constitution. Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996); Holloran v. Duncan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 774, 803 (W.D. Tenn. 2015); DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1083 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F. Supp. 2d 835, 861 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Bowden Bldg. Corp. v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm'n, 15 S.W.3d 434, 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Cohn v. Nat'l Bd. of Trial Advocacy, 238 F.3d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).