II The modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction stems from this Court's decision in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Prior to Gibbs, this Court had recognized that considerations of judicial economy and procedural convenience justified the recognition of power in the federal courts to decide certain state-law claims involved in cases raising federal questions.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). [2] This is because a federal district court with power to hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c) — as it has always had under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966). That state law claims "should" be dismissed if federal claims are dismissed before trial, as Gibbs instructs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 228, has never meant that they must be dismissed.
To exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims not otherwise cognizable in federal court, "the court must have jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a `common nucleus of operative fact.'" Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). See generally C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3567 pp. 443-47 (1975).
In order to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court must first have before it a claim sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Furthermore, the federal claim and state claim must stem from the same "common nucleus of operative fact"; in other words, they must be such that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."
While with respect to litigation where nonfederal questions or claims were bound up with the federal claim upon which the parties were already in federal court, there is nothing in Art. III's grant of judicial power that prevents adjudication of the nonfederal portions of the parties' dispute, it is quite another thing to permit a nonfederal claim in turn to be the basis for joining a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists, simply because that claim derives from the "common nucleus of operative fact," giving rise to the dispute between the parties to the federal claim. Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, distinguished. The addition of a completely new party under such circumstances would run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.
Here, ICS' state law claims are legal "claims" in the sense that that term is generally used to denote a judicially cognizable cause of action, and they and the federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, see Mine Workersv. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725. Pp. 163-166.
Section 1367 codifies the concepts previously known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Prior to this statute, the primary source of guidance for the exercise of pendent claim jurisdiction was United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Gibbs divided the analysis into two sections: the power of a federal court to exercise pendent claim jurisdiction, and its discretion not to do so despite having the power.
American Fire Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). Suits involving pendent (now "supplemental") state claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact", see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), do not fall within the scope of § 1441(c), since pendent claims are not "separate and independent". Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354, 108 S.Ct. 614, 621, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
Nevertheless, because plaintiffs no longer have any viable federal claim, any remaining state law claims belong in state, rather than federal, court. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well."); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 79 n. 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130). The district court should therefore decline supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.
There are special reasons to adjudicate the pendent claim where, as here, the claim, although called "statutory," is in reality a constitutional claim arising under the Supremacy Clause, since "federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of pre-emption principles." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729. Pp. 545-550.