Mine Workers v. Gibbs

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill

    484 U.S. 343 (1988)   Cited 12,133 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that the Gibbs court was referring to the usual case, not every case, when it stated that state law claims should be dismissed if the federal claims are dismissed before trial

    II The modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction stems from this Court's decision in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Prior to Gibbs, this Court had recognized that considerations of judicial economy and procedural convenience justified the recognition of power in the federal courts to decide certain state-law claims involved in cases raising federal questions.

  2. Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc.

    114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997)   Cited 2,261 times
    Adopting the Gibbs concerns in interpreting § 1367

    28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). [2] This is because a federal district court with power to hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c) — as it has always had under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966). That state law claims "should" be dismissed if federal claims are dismissed before trial, as Gibbs instructs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 228, has never meant that they must be dismissed.

  3. L.A. Draper Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.

    735 F.2d 414 (11th Cir. 1984)   Cited 289 times
    Stating that "if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims"

    To exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims not otherwise cognizable in federal court, "the court must have jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a `common nucleus of operative fact.'" Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). See generally C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3567 pp. 443-47 (1975).

  4. Montefiore Medical Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272

    642 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2011)   Cited 385 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Noting that federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims and state claims "stem from the same ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ " (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) )

    In order to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court must first have before it a claim sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Furthermore, the federal claim and state claim must stem from the same "common nucleus of operative fact"; in other words, they must be such that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."

  5. Aldinger v. Howard

    427 U.S. 1 (1976)   Cited 842 times
    Distinguishing pendent-party jurisdiction from the type of pendent-claim jurisdiction permitted in Gibbs

    While with respect to litigation where nonfederal questions or claims were bound up with the federal claim upon which the parties were already in federal court, there is nothing in Art. III's grant of judicial power that prevents adjudication of the nonfederal portions of the parties' dispute, it is quite another thing to permit a nonfederal claim in turn to be the basis for joining a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists, simply because that claim derives from the "common nucleus of operative fact," giving rise to the dispute between the parties to the federal claim. Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, distinguished. The addition of a completely new party under such circumstances would run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.

  6. Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons

    522 U.S. 156 (1997)   Cited 5,573 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation” the Gibbs and Cohill values to determine whether it is proper to retain jurisdiction over state claims

    Here, ICS' state law claims are legal "claims" in the sense that that term is generally used to denote a judicially cognizable cause of action, and they and the federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, see Mine Workersv. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725. Pp. 163-166.

  7. Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph Cty

    22 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1994)   Cited 659 times
    Holding that the considerations articulated in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, survived the codification of 28 U.S.C. § 1367

    Section 1367 codifies the concepts previously known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Prior to this statute, the primary source of guidance for the exercise of pendent claim jurisdiction was United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Gibbs divided the analysis into two sections: the power of a federal court to exercise pendent claim jurisdiction, and its discretion not to do so despite having the power.

  8. Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster

    45 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1995)   Cited 993 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that § 1367(c) was intended to codify pendent jurisdiction law in Gibbs, stating that only one of the § 1367(c) criteria was allegedly applicable in the case (subsection (2)), and conducting a Gibbs/Camegie-Metlon analysis of that criteria/factor

    American Fire Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). Suits involving pendent (now "supplemental") state claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact", see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), do not fall within the scope of § 1441(c), since pendent claims are not "separate and independent". Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354, 108 S.Ct. 614, 621, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).

  9. Sadallah v. City of Utica

    383 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2004)   Cited 258 times
    Directing district court to enter judgment on federal law claims and to "dismiss any state law claims without prejudice" (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726)

    Nevertheless, because plaintiffs no longer have any viable federal claim, any remaining state law claims belong in state, rather than federal, court. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well."); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 79 n. 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130). The district court should therefore decline supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.

  10. Hagans v. Lavine

    415 U.S. 528 (1974)   Cited 3,372 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Describing Gibbs as requiring courts to consider the values of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants" as well as comity in determining whether an exercise of discretion would be appropriate

    There are special reasons to adjudicate the pendent claim where, as here, the claim, although called "statutory," is in reality a constitutional claim arising under the Supremacy Clause, since "federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of pre-emption principles." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729. Pp. 545-550.