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Union Street Furn. v. Hartford Fin.

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford
Jul 19, 2006
2006 Ct. Sup. 13123 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

Opinion

No. CV 04-4002621-S

July 19, 2006


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (NO. 105)


In this action the plaintiff, the owner of a commercial building in Stamford, has sued its property insurance carrier and the insurance agent who issued the policy on allegations that the insurer has failed to pay an insured loss consisting of damage incurred when the drains at the premises backed up causing water to accumulate which damaged the building and the contents and caused consequential damages. The First Count alleges breach of contract. The defendant's motion to strike has been granted as to the Second Count. (Private action under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act "CUIPA.") The Third Count alleges a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act by (CUTPA) by violations of CUIPA.

Now before the court are the objections of the defendant The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (The Hartford) to multiple interrogatories and production requests directed to the Third Count.

There is no question that CUIPA violations can serve as the basis for a private right of action under CUTPA. Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 663 (1986); Lees v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 229 Conn. 842, 850-51 (1994). With respect to alleged unfair settlement practices claimed to be in violation of CUIPA, the plaintiff must prove that the violations occurred ". . . with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice . . ." of the defendant. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6); Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796 (1995). Having that burden, the plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery as to whether or not the alleged unfair settlement practices of The Hartford claimed to have occurred with respect to the plaintiff's coverage, also occurred with respect to claims submitted by other insureds with similar coverage. The discovery sought must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Practice Book § 13-2, and must not subject the answering party to unjust annoyance, embarrassment oppression or undue burden or expense, Practice Book § 13-5. In this context of discovery directed to the existence of a "general business practice," it has been noted in a fire loss case that the information sought should ". . . pertain to other fire damage claims on which payment was denied by the defendant at or around the time of the denial of the plaintiff's claims . . ." and that the party seeking discovery ". . . should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which [the other party] may possess would turn up evidence helpful [to his case]." Gimmartino v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 1998 Ct.Sup. 4516; Docket No. CV94-0544556, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford (Mulcahy, J., April 13, 1998). Discovery in this context has also been allowed when it is ". . . narrow in scope and . . . pertinent to the merits of [the plaintiff's] CUTPA and CUIPA claims . . ." McGuire v. Rawlings Co., 2005 Ct.Sup. 4594, 39 CLR 36, Docket No. CV00-0375212S Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (Skolnick, J., March 14, 2005). The discovery sought by the plaintiff in this case has in many instances gone beyond those established parameters.

Apparently this discovery is often conducted, even after suit has been commenced, by bringing a separate quitable action for a Bill of Discovery. See, e.g., McGuire v. Rawlings Co., supra, and Legnos v. ITT Hartford et al., 2003 Ct.Sup. 13371, 36 CLR 91, Docket No. 56599, Superior Court, Judicial District of New London at New London (Hurley, J., December 1, 2003). But the discovery may also be conducted within the CUTPA/CUIPA case itself pursuant to Practice Book Rules. See, e.g., Gimmartino v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, supra.

Because the plaintiff has not responded to objections made by The Hartford, and since the Court does not have access to the actual interrogatories and production requests served by the plaintiff, the Court will deem the factual assertions made by the defendant as to the instructions and definitions within the discovery requests to be admitted. For instance, most of the interrogatories at issue purport to be limited to the "Relevant Time Period." The defendant claims (and the plaintiff does not dispute) that that capitalized term is nowhere defined in the discovery requests served or the accompanying instructions, which would result in the interrogatory or request being totally unlimited as to chronological scope and would presumably call for a response over the entire operating history of The Hartford and might very well call for responses as to practices long ago rescinded or modified. Likewise, although many of the discovery requests are limited geographically to "The State of Connecticut," others have no geographical limit, and would therefore presumably obligate the defendant to search its files on claims made throughout the United States or even perhaps throughout the world. Several of the plaintiff's requests seek information as to the "same or similar type policies" issued by The Hartford. The policy at issue appears to be a general property insurance policy which would presumably include such unrelated coverages as fire and theft losses. At least two of the discovery requests are keyed to definitions of terms supposedly contained in "instruction Number 8." The defendant claims (and the plaintiff does not dispute) that there is no instruction Number 8 accompanying the interrogatories or production requests. Certain Production Requests (Nos. 9 and 12) ask for documents concerning the relationship between The Hartford and certain unidentified parties.

Order

Against the foregoing general backdrop, the Court rules on the specific objections as follows:

Objection to Interrogatory No. 1 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 2 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 3 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 4 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 5 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 17 Overruled Objection to Interrogatory No. 28 Overruled Objection to Interrogatory No. 29 Overruled Objection to Interrogatory No. 33 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 34 Sustained Objection to Interrogatory No. 35 Sustained as to any Interrogatory or Production Request as which objection has been sustained. Otherwise: Overruled

Objection to Production Request No. 1 Sustained as to any Interrogatories as to which objection has been sustained. Otherwise: Overruled Objection to Production Request No. 2 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 3 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 6 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 7 Overruled Objection to Production Request No. 9 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 12 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 13 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 14 Sustained Objection to Production Request No. 15 Sustained (presumably a public document).

So Ordered.


Summaries of

Union Street Furn. v. Hartford Fin.

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford
Jul 19, 2006
2006 Ct. Sup. 13123 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
Case details for

Union Street Furn. v. Hartford Fin.

Case Details

Full title:UNION STREET FURNITURE AND CARPET, INC. v. THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES…

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford

Date published: Jul 19, 2006

Citations

2006 Ct. Sup. 13123 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

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