We do not believe the trial judge manifestly erred in awarding Mrs. Cargile $500.00 for her pain and suffering. In the recent case of Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, La. App. 1st Cir., 156 So.2d 98, the court affirmed an award of $500.00 to a woman who had incurred a mild whiplash injury to the neck and contusions of the shoulder and elbow. Mrs. Cargile's injuries do not appear more serious than the plaintiff in that suit.
In Barras v. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York, La. App. 3 Cir., 152 So.2d 74, we considered the junction of a parish shell road with a hard surfaced, heavily traveled state highway to be an "intersection," as that term is used in LSA-R.S. 32:233 (now LSA-R.S. 32:76). And in Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, La. App. 1 Cir., 156 So.2d 98, it was held that the junction of a side street with a state highway was an "intersection," within the meaning of that statute. In that case the court pointed out that the speed limit on the highway was 60 miles per hour, that the side street was "quite obscure to vision," that it "was not visibly a very significant street," and that although it "may be somewhat obscure at a distance, it is a blacktopped intersecting street that leads to a residential section and comes squarely under the prohibitory provision as interpreted by a long line of jurisprudence."
The record indicates that the width of La. Highway No. 308 was approximately 22 feet and that both the State Highway and Duet Lane were blacktopped. Counsel for appellants argues that the intersection of Duet Lane and State Highway No. 308 was in fact an intersection within the meaning of LSA-R.S. 32:76 and cites the case of Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, La.App., 156 So.2d 98, which was considered by this Court in 1963. The accident which was the subject of the litigation in that case occurred at the intersection of Harding Boulevard and Nottingham Street in the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
It is true that speculation, conjecture, mere possibility, and even unsupported probability are not sufficient to support a judgment. Crier v. Marquette Casualty Co., La.App., 159 So.2d 26; Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App., 156 So.2d 98; Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Insurance Co., La.App., 130 So.2d 153; Moore v. Employers Liability Assur. Co., La.App., 124 So.2d 804; Wilson v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., La.App., 92 So.2d 781; Henderson v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., La.App., 80 So.2d 438; Pinkney v. Cahn Inv. Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 345. However, when one has suffered multiple injuries as Plaintiff did, and who had to undergo the oral and chest surgery described above, it is more probable than not, because of his weakened condition, that he became a ready prey to the subsequent attack of hemoptysis.
00 awarded to Lucas, considering the minimum extent of the injury and the other factors and circumstances of this case, is adequate and not in error. See Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Co., La. App. 1 Cir., 156 So.2d 98, and Cutrer v. Travelers Indemnity Co., La. App., 170 So.2d 693. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee.
In Barras v. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York, 152 So.2d 74 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963) we held the junction of a parish shell road with a hard surfaced, heavily traveled state highway was an intersection. Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, 156 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1963) involved the junction of a state highway, 24 feet wide, on which the speed limit was 60 mph, with a blacktopped intersecting street in a "semi-residential" area near Baton Rouge. The court held this was an intersection.
Most of these cases were affirmations of the trial court's judgment. Johnson v. Shreveport Transit Company, 188 So.2d 713 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1966); Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, 156 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1963); Rochon v. Moore, 218 So.2d 918 (La. App.3d Cir. 1969); Robertson v. Insurance Company of North America, 171 So.2d 715 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1965); Northern Insurance Company v. Grayco Marine Corporation, 176 So.2d 744 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1965); Fontenot v. Travelers Insurance Company, 179 So.2d 520 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1965); Bryant v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, 158 So.2d 263 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963); McCastle v. Stewart Stevenson Truck Co., 147 So.2d 678 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1962); Cooper v. Hargreve, 210 So.2d 64 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1968); and numerous other cases. We find no manifest error in the trial court's finding that plaintiff's injuries were more severe than those in the above cases.
Appellants cite a long line of cases in which left-turning motorists have been held negligent under similar circumstances. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Co., 228 So.2d 88 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1969); Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, 156 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1963); Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding And Insurance Co., 130 So.2d 153 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1961). Appellees cite a long line of cases in which left-turning motorists have been held to be free of negligence in a like situation.
A left-turning motorist cannot discharge his burden of ascertaining whether the turn can be made in safety by making his observation some distance from the intersection, but he is required to look to his rear immediately before attempting the turn. Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, 156 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1963). The physical facts clearly show that Mrs. Whittington was already in the passing lane and overtaking the plaintiff at the time he commenced his turn.
The trial court erred in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in this instance. The cases of Scrantz v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, La.App., 281 So.2d 820; Ulmer v. Travelers Insurance Company, La.App., 156 So.2d 98, and Johnson v. Wilson, 239 La. 390, 118 So.2d 450, are clearly distinguishable on the facts from instant case. None of these cited cases involve an intersection of roads or streets that cross each other and controlled by a red, amber and green traffic light.