Ulbrich v. Coolidge

5 Citing cases

  1. De Campos v. Ferrara

    90 So. 3d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    See e.g., Bane v. Bane, 775 So.2d 938, 943 (Fla.2000); Vitale v. Vitale, 31 So.3d 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Dean v. Dean, 655 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The parties' Property Settlement Agreement contains neither a provision for the award of attorney's fees and costs nor an express waiver of attorney's fees and costs.

  2. De Campos v. Ferrara

    No. 3D10-3009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jun. 6, 2012)

    See Sasnett v. Sasnett, 683 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ("In order to find that a waiver of rights has occurred, the language used in the agreement must clearly and unambiguously express waiver or the language must be such that an interpretation of the agreement as a whole can lead to no other conclusion but waiver."); Scott v. Scott, 303 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) ("Just as the award of attorney's fees is dependent upon express authority to that effect (statute or contract) likewise the waiver of attorney fees should also be dependent upon express language which we find lacking in instant case."); Posner v. Posner, 237 So. 2d 186, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). See e.g., Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 943 (Fla. 2000); Vitale v. Vitale, 31 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). --------

  3. Vitale v. Vitale

    31 So. 3d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times

    "[I]n cases involving a marital settlement agreement with a prevailing party provision, section 61.16, Florida Statutes, cannot be used as a basis for an award of attorney's fees." Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing Zakian v. Zakian, 837 So.2d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Dean v. Dean, 655 So.2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). Instead, the provisions in the marital settlement agreement awarding attorney's fees are generally enforced.

  4. Avellone v. Avellone

    973 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

    Although section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a court may, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees to the other party in dissolution of marriage, support, and custody cases, this statute and its focus on the parties' financial resources is irrelevant in this case given the parties' agreement. See Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("[I]n cases involving a marital settlement agreement with a prevailing party provision, section 61.16 . . . cannot be used as a basis for an award of attorney's fees."); Dean v. Dean, 655 So.2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("We agree with the husband that the right to attorney's fees is governed only by the contract and that section 61.16 . . . and the conditions to an award under that statute are therefore irrelevant."); see also Matt v. Mott, 800 So.2d 331, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("To the extent that on remand the trial court determines that certain fees and costs are not recoverable by Ms. Mott under the prevailing party provision of the marital settlement agreement, the trial court must then consider whether those fees and costs would be recoverable . . . under the other terms of the agreement or under section 61.16. . . ."). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's Order on Clarification of Attorney's Fees and remand with instructions to award the former wife $10,000 in appella

  5. Avellone v. Avellone

    Case No. 1D06-5219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2007)

    Although section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a court may, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees to the other party in dissolution of marriage, support, and custody cases, this statute and its focus on the parties' financial resources is irrelevant in this case given the parties' agreement. See Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("[I]n cases involving a marital settlement agreement with a prevailing party provision, section 61.16 . . . cannot be used as a basis for an award of attorney's fees."); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("We agree with the husband that the right to attorney's fees is governed only by the contract and that section 61.16 . . . and the conditions to an award under that statute are therefore irrelevant."); see also Mott v. Mott, 800 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("To the extent that on remand the trial court determines that certain fees and costs are not recoverable by Ms. Mott under the prevailing party provision of the marital settlement agreement, the trial court must then consider whether those fees and costs would be recoverable . . . under the other terms of the agreement or under section 61.16. . . ."). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's Order on Clarification of Attorney's Fees and remand with instructions to award the former wife $10,000 in appel