Immigration judges are not required to grant a continuance just because an active I-130 Petition has been filed on the movant's behalf. See, e.g., Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2008). The BIA established five illustrative factors that immigration judges should consider when adjudicating a motion to continue:

An unreasonable continuance would thwart the operation of the statutes providing for removal of inadmissible . . . and deportable . . . aliens." Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407-09 (6th Cir. 2008). As the IJ recited, Hashmi establishes a series of factors that may be considered in determining whether to continue immigration proceedings.

Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey, 507 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir. 2007). We review the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of the motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the denial was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.

"We review the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of [Moussa's] motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion standard." Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2008). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the denial was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination."

Regarding the first argument, "[i]t is well-settled that whether to grant a continuance is a determination left to the broad discretion of the IJ." Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Sedrakyan v. Gonzales, 237 Fed.Appx. 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2003)). This court has previously rejected the same due process argument made by Ramirez, "holding failure to obtain discretionary relief `does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest' protected by the Constitution."

An unreasonable continuance would thwart the operation of the statutes providing for removal of inadmissible . . . and deportable . . . aliens." Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, the BIA determined that the IJ had not abused his discretion in finding no good cause because Kwak had received numerous continuances, he had failed to demonstrate at any time that the pending appeal of his denied application for a waiver of excludability was likely to be successful, and the DHS had opposed a further continuance.

We review a denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2008). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the denial was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination."

We have held that finding "'good cause' is crucial since a continuance, in effect, allows an alien to remain in the United States for a period of time without any defined legal immigration status." Maldonado-Reyes v. Holder, 531 F. App'x 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here, the BIA's reason for its affirmance of the IJ's denial of the continuance motion was that Brushtulli provided no "objective medical evidence suggesting he was unable to testify accurately before the Immigration Judge, and he [had] not explained in detail what testimony he claims was affected by his physical and/or mental state at the hearing."

Given the prior denial and the agency's notice of intent to deny the second, the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Antonio's second request for a continuance based on the poor prospects for success. See Calma, 663 F.3d at 879 (concluding that IJ did not abuse discretion by taking into account "speculative nature of [petitioner's] hopes for later adjustment" based on pending I-130 visa petition); Pede, 442 F.3d at 571 (explaining that denial of continuance was not abuse of discretion given "ultimate hopelessness" of application for adjustment of status); Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Notice of Intent to Deny wife's I-130 petition "provided evidence to the IJ of the doubtful validity" of petitioner's marriage); Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that petitioner "had no right to the adjudication of a second I-130 petition stemming from a marriage that had already been determined to lack bona fides"); see also Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 792 (noting that previously rejected I-130 petitions are relevant in evaluating request for a continuance); In re Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653, 657 (BIA 1978) (explaining that it is not abuse of discretion to deny request for continuance after "determin[ing] that the visa petition is frivolous or that the adjustment of status would be denied"). PETITION DENIED.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. "Finding 'good cause' is crucial since a continuance, in effect, allows an alien to remain in the United States for a period of time without any defined legal immigration status." Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, the IJ provided Maldonado-Reyes with a five-month continuance to obtain counsel.