Ukiah Automotive Investments v. Mitsubishi Motors of North America, Inc.

Full title: UKIAH AUTOMOTIVE INVESTMENTS, Plaintiff, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS OF NORTH…

Court: United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, N.D. California

Date published: Nov 15, 2004

04-3932 MMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2004)

Opinion

UKIAH AUTOMOTIVE INVESTMENTS, Plaintiff, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants MITSUBISHI MOTORS CREDIT OF AMERICA, INC., Counterclaimant v. UKIAH AUTOMOTIVE INVESTMENTS, Counterdefendant MITSUBISHI MOTORS CREDIT OF AMERICA, INC., Cross-claimant v. THOMAS COGLIANO, Cross-defendant UKIAH AUTOMOTIVE INVESTMENTS, Counterclaimant, and THOMAS COGLIANO, Cross-claimant v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al. Counterdefendants and cross-defendants No. 04-3932 MMC (Docket No. 29) United States District Court, N.D. California. November 15, 2004

          ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REMAND; VACATING HEARING

          MAXINE CHESNEY, District Judge.

         Before the Court is a motion, filed by plaintiff Ukiah Automotive Investments ("UAI") and cross-defendant Thomas Cogliano ("Cogliano"), to remand the above-titled action to state court. Defendants Mitsubishi Motors of North America, Inc. ("MMNA") and Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. ("MMCA") have filed opposition. UAI and Cogliano have not filed a reply. Having reviewed the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for November 19, 2004, and rules as follows.

         UAI's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges that MMNA violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ("RICO"), and that both MMNA and MMCA violated several state laws. UAI and Cogliano assert that the state law claims substantially predominate over the RICO claim, and that, as a consequence, the Court should remand the entire action.

         A defendant may remove an action in which the plaintiff has alleged a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (providing civil action "founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable"). If such an action is properly removed, the district court cannot remand the entire action. See Brockman v. Merabank , 40 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding district court erred by remanding action in which plaintiff alleged claims against Resolution Trust Corporation, in light of federal statute providing district courts have original jurisdiction over claims against that entity; noting "the district court could neither dismiss the entire case for lack of jurisdiction nor remand it"). Here, the FAC includes a claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction, specifically, the RICO claim. Consequently, the Court cannot remand the entire action. See id.

         Accordingly, as UAI and Cogliano seek remand of the entire action, ¹ the motion to remand is hereby DENIED.

1 Assuming, arguendo, the state law claims substantially predominate over the RICO claim, the Court would have discretion to remand the state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). There being no request to remand only the state law claims, however, the Court does not decide whether the state law claims, in fact, substantially predominate over the RICO claim and, if so, whether remand of the state law claims would be appropriate.

         This order terminates Docket No. 29.

         IT IS SO ORDERED.