Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV074500.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
McAdams, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Leonard Tyson appeals from a judgment after a jury trial in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident that involved five vehicles and multiple impacts. Tyson, who was driving the first car in line, argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s special finding that defendant and respondent Timothy Cunningham, who was driving the fifth vehicle in line, was not negligent. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the special verdict and will affirm the judgment.
The facts are based on a clerk’s transcript, a partial reporter’s transcript, and trial exhibits. The liability witnesses at trial included all five drivers, the investigating officer, and two accident reconstruction experts. There were also four witnesses who testified regarding damages. The partial reporter’s transcript contains only the testimony of Cunningham, one of the other drivers, and the two accident reconstruction experts. Initially, we questioned whether the record was sufficient to permit review under the substantial evidence standard. But after reviewing the limited record in this case, we conclude that it contains substantial evidence that supports the jury’s verdict.
This litigation arises out of a five-car, multiple-impact motor vehicle accident that occurred shortly before noon on New Year’s Day, January 1, 2005, on Interstate 280 near McLaughlin Avenue in San Jose, California. All of the vehicles were driving in the number four northbound lane.
Appellant Tyson drove the first car in line, a 2001 Lexus RX300 (Lexus). Hong Van Thi Le drove the second car in line, a 2002 Honda Civic (Civic). Phuc Xuan Doan drove the third vehicle in line, a 1996 Ford Econoline van (Econoline) that belonged to his employer, Sun Sheetmetal Solutions, Inc. (SSS). Robert Hernandez drove the fourth vehicle in line, a 2004 Honda Odyssey minivan (Odyssey). Cunningham drove the fifth vehicle in line, a 1997 Dodge B250 maxivan (Dodge).
Testimony of Timothy Cunningham
Cunningham was the sole proprietor of a heating and air conditioning business and used the Dodge in his business. At the time of the accident, he was using the Dodge for personal business. Cunningham described the weather on the day of the accident as “dismal.” It had just stopped raining, but was still cloudy “here and there.” The roadway was wet and “pretty smooth” because it had just been repaired. Cunningham was in the number four, far-right traffic lane. There was an on-ramp or feeder lane to his right. Traffic was very light. The posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour. Cunningham estimated his speed at 50 miles per hour, about the same speed as the cars in front of him.
All of a sudden, Cunningham saw the rear end of the Econoline, which was 200 to 300 feet and two cars ahead of him, “pop up” and stop very abruptly. The Econoline “went way up,” as if it had hit something in front of it. The Odyssey was between Cunningham’s van and the Econoline. The Odyssey was “pretty close” to the Econoline. It was 175 to 200 feet in front of Cunningham when the Econoline stopped. He saw the Odyssey’s brakes lights come on for a short time; he did not think the Odyssey had much time to stop.
After he saw the Odyssey start to brake, Cunningham “jammed on” his brakes, but did not have enough time to stop. Cunningham’s van started to skid and veered to the left. His right front bumper hit the left rear of the Odyssey. Cunningham estimated his speed at the time of the impact as 10 miles per hour. The impact only “nudged” the Odyssey forward a little bit. Cunningham told the investigating officer that he was “pretty sure” the Odyssey hit the Econoline before Cunningham hit the Odyssey.
Testimony of Robert Hernandez
Hernandez was driving the Odyssey, the fourth vehicle in line, between the Econoline and Cunningham’s van. It had been raining, the sun was just starting to come out, and traffic was light. Hernandez was driving at 60 to 65 miles per hour when all of a sudden he realized that the Econoline, which was 200 to 400 yards ahead of him, was stopped.
Hernandez was caught off guard, but tried to stop slowly because he did not want to hydroplane. When he was 20 to 40 feet away from the Econoline, he thought he had avoided a collision. Then he felt a jolt from the back that carried him into the Econoline. He described the impact from the Dodge as a “heavy jolt,” but not heavy enough to trigger his airbag. At the time of this impact, Hernandez’s foot was no longer on the brake. When he was hit from behind, Hernandez was not stopped; he was still moving really slowly. The impact from the rear pushed him 10 to 15 feet forward, into the Econoline. Hernandez was “very certain” he did not hit the Econoline before he was hit from the rear. He did not know whether his impact with the Econoline pushed the Econoline forward. Hernandez veered to the left. The impact with the Econoline “decimate[d]” the right front corner of his Odyssey. There was also damage to the left rear of the Odyssey. The impact dislodged a rack that was on the top of the Dodge, which flew forward, landed on the Odyssey, and slid down the left side of the Odyssey onto the roadway.
Testimony of Plaintiff’s Accident Reconstructionist, Robert Lindskog
Robert Lindskog is a registered engineer with 30 years’ experience in accident reconstruction. He has analyzed over 3,000 crashes and testified in court more than 200 times.
Lindskog discussed perception/reaction time, impact speed, change in velocity, conservation of energy, and conservation of momentum. Generally, energy has to be resolved and in a car accident that is usually done by braking distance or crush damage to the vehicle. Applying these concepts, he can estimate impact speed from the damage to the vehicles. One important factor to consider is the relative weight of the vehicles. The Econoline weighted 5, 177 pounds without the driver, accessories or equipment. The Civic weighed less than half that (2,500 pounds), so one would expect more than two times the crush damage to the Civic than the Econoline. The Odyssey weighed 4,300 pounds and the Dodge weighed 4,325 pounds plus what Cunningham added to it.
Lindskog testified that there were four separate impacts. In the first impact, the Econoline hit the rear of the Civic, causing major crush damage to the Civic’s right rear and major damage to the entire front end of the Civic, including buckling of the hood. The first impact caused the Civic to accelerate rapidly forward. Assuming Le’s Civic was traveling at 40 miles per hour and had slowed to 20 miles per hour before being hit by the Econoline and given the relative size of the vehicles, the first impact caused Le’s Civic to accelerate to 35 miles per hour. Although Doan testified that he was stopped before the crash, Lindskog thinks that is very unlikely. The photos that were in evidence depict significant damage to the front end and major damage to the rear end of Le’s Civic, including crumpling of the entire rear trunk area.
In the second impact, Le’s Civic was pushed into the rear of Tyson’s Lexus. The Civic’s front bumper went under the rear of the Lexus damaging the rear body pan, rear bumper, tailgate, stabilizer/anti-roll bar, brackets and right frame rail. According to Lindskog, it takes a major impact to create as much damage as the Lexus suffered. Lindskog stated that the Civic hit the Lexus twice, but he could not discern the relative severity of the two impacts.
In the third impact, Cunningham’s Dodge hit Hernandez’s Odyssey. Lindskog described this as “another significant or major impact.” The damage to the Odyssey is offset to the left front and left rear, which suggests that Cunningham was anticipating making a lane change to avoid collision.
In the fourth impact, the Odyssey was pushed into the rear of the Econoline. The photographs show major crush damage to the right front of the Odyssey and buckling on the left rear of the Econoline. There was more crush damage to the Odyssey than the Econoline because the Econoline was heavier than the Odyssey, but the damage to the Econoline was still significant. Given the damage to the Odyssey, Lindskog opined that it was not possible that the Odyssey just nudged the Econoline.
After the initial impacts, the cars were close enough together that the forces easily transferred from the Econoline to the Civic to the Lexus. Lindskog stated that the force from the fourth impact on the Lexus was significant because there was significant crush damage to the rear of the Econoline. On the other hand, he was not able to discern the severity or magnitude of the fourth impact on the Lexus.
In response to a jury question, Lindskog stated that while it was possible that the Odyssey hit the rear of the Econoline before it was hit by the Dodge, it was improbable given the relative weights of and damage to the vehicles. He testified that accident reconstruction does not guarantee an accurate portrayal and that he did not have sufficient information in this case because he was not able to inspect the vehicles. Since he did not inspect the vehicles, he was not able to determine “which impact caused which damage.” On the other hand, he was confident that his opinions were “probably correct.”
Testimony of Cunningham’s Accident Reconstruction Expert, Richard Stuart
Richard Stuart, Ph.D. is a physicist. He has been doing accident reconstruction for 40 years. He has analyzed about 16,000 motor vehicle accidents, and testified in about 900 trials.
Stuart agreed with Lindskog that the first impact occurred when the Econoline rear-ended the Civic. He opined that the Civic was stopped when it was struck by the Econoline, that the Econoline hit the Civic at about 20 to 29 miles per hour, and that it pushed the Civic forward at 16 to 23 miles per hour into the Lexus. The whole rear end of the Civic got “smashed flat” with “10 to 16 inches net crush at the rear.” Stuart described the impact between the Econoline and the Civic as “sizeable,” a “real smash” and agreed with Lindskog that this impact was the most severe. He opined that the Econoline hit the Civic before the Odyssey hit the Econoline.
Stuart testified that Cunningham’s contact with the Odyssey was not transmitted to Tyson’s Lexus; that the Lexus was not influenced in any way by Cunningham’s impact with the Odyssey. He estimated the speed of Cunningham’s Dodge at 6 to 13 miles per hour when it rear-ended the Odyssey. If you assume none of the vehicle operators applied their brakes and Cunningham’s maximum speed was 13 miles per hour, the impact between Cunningham’s van and the Odyssey transmitted nothing to the Lexus. Cunningham’ s testimony that he was travelling 10 miles per hour at the time of impact was consistent with the damage to the vehicles and Stuart’s calculations. After the Dodge hit the Odyssey, the Odyssey underwent a velocity change and sped up by four to eight miles per hour. There were three vehicles between Cunningham’s van and Tyson’s Lexus and in Stuart’s view, there was no way that a modest initial impact by Cunningham was going to have any effect “down the line.”
Stuart testified that the damage to the front end of the Odyssey was too large to be a result of the impact to its rear and opined that the Odyssey hit the Econoline twice. He stated that Hernandez’s testimony regarding the accident was inconsistent with the physical evidence. In particular, the damage to the rear of the Odyssey is a lot less than the damage to its front end. Generally, if you get “smashed” in the rear and strike the car in front of you, the damage to the rear is greater than the damage to the front. Stuart conclude that Hernandez had not stopped before he collided with the Econoline.
Procedural History
Pleadings and Parties
Initially, Tyson sued only Cunningham. Later, Tyson filed amendments to his complaint naming SSS and its employee Doan as defendants. Le and Hernandez were brought in via cross complaints. It appears Le and Hernandez settled prior to trial. The only defendants that were parties at trial were Cunningham, SSS, and Doan.
Jury Verdict
The jury rendered a special verdict in which it found (1) that Cunningham was not negligent; (2) that Doan (the driver of the Econoline) was negligent and that Doan’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Tyson’s injuries; (3) that “non-party tortfeasors” were negligent, but that their negligence was not a substantial factor in causing injury to Tyson; and (4) that Tyson was not negligent. The jury assigned 100 percent responsibility for Tyson’s injuries to Doan and SSS.
With regard to damages, the jury found that Tyson had no lost earnings. The jury disallowed several of the medical expenses that Tyson claimed and awarded $4,249 for past medical expenses. The jury awarded $1,000 in property damage and $938.39 in rental car expenses. The jury did not award any future economic loss or noneconomic damages. The total verdict was $6,187.39 for Tyson.
Motion for New Trial
Tyson filed a motion for new trial arguing that the verdict was defective as a matter of law because the “jury found that defendant Cunningham was not negligent in spite of overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence of his negligence” and because the jury wrongfully withheld an award of non-economic damages.
The court denied the motion for new trial with regard to Cunningham. The court found that Tyson was entitled to non-economic damages and denied the new trial motion provided that SSS and Doan consent to increase the judgment from $6,187.39 to $15,000.
Tyson appeals from the judgment on the jury’s verdict, not the order on the new trial motion.
Discussion
Tyson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Cunningham was not negligent.
Standard of Review
“When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, italics omitted.) As long as there is substantial evidence, the appellate court must affirm, even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled differently if they had presided over the proceedings below and even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result. (Bowers v. Bernards, at p. 874.) An appellate court is “not in a position to weigh any conflicts or disputes in the evidence. Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, [the appellate court] may not substitute [its] own inferences or deductions for those of the trial court. [Its] authority begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. [Citations.] Therefore, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s decision, and resolving conflicts in support of the trial court’s decision.” (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 778-779.)
“Substantial” evidence is not synonymous with “any” evidence. (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) “ ‘[S]ubstantial’... clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance.... It must be reasonable..., credible, and of solid value....” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) “Thus, the focus is on the quality, not the quantity of the evidence. Very little solid evidence may be ‘substantial,’ while a lot of extremely weak evidence might be ‘insubstantial.’ ” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871.) The testimony of a single witness may constitute “substantial” evidence. (Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.)
Analysis
Tyson argues that the jury committed reversible error when it found that Cunningham was not negligent. He contends that the jury’s finding “ran contrary to the law and ignored the uncontradicted evidence that established Cunningham’s negligence.”
Tyson focuses on the fact that Cunningham’s van collided with the rear end of the Odyssey. He argues that Cunningham collided with the Odyssey because he violated Vehicle Code section 22350, the Basic Speed Law, and section 21703, the statute that forbids following another vehicle too closely and that absent some exculpatory evidence, such as intervening forces or sudden unexpected events, a driver who violates either section 22350 or section 21703 should be found negligent. Citing Gornstein v. Priver (1923) 64 Cal.App. 249, 255, Tyson asserts that the mere fact that Cunningham struck the vehicle ahead of him furnishes some evidence that he was driving too fast or following too closely.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
The Basic Speed Law provides that “No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.” (§ 22350.) Section 21703 provides that “[t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon, and the condition of, the roadway.”
“When one vehicle runs into the rear of another, negligence is not necessarily established as a matter of law.” (Leighton v. Dodge (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 54, 57.) Whether section 22350 or section 21703 has been violated is a question of fact for the jury. (Ibid.) “ ‘Cases involving rear-end collisions are legion. Although the contention is made often that the leader alone, or the follower alone, is guilty of negligence, in general, it has been held that the case as presented by each party creates a question of fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court.... The reasonableness of the speed at which defendant operated his vehicle, whether plaintiff gave a hand signal indicating an intention to stop [citation], whether the stop was sudden, whether defendant was driving too closely behind plaintiff’s vehicle, whether defendant was inattentive, all were questions of fact.’ ” (Hazel v. McGrath (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 382, 387, citing Lowenthal v. Mortimer (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 636, 638, 639.) In summary, the questions whether Cunningham was driving too fast or following too closely were for the jury and the fact that Cunningham rear-ended the Odyssey did not require a finding of negligence.
In our view, there was substantial evidence that supported the jury’s implied finding that Cunningham had not violated the Basic Speed Law or section 21703 and its express finding that Cunningham was not negligent. Cunningham testified that the posted speed was 65 miles per hour and that he was travelling 50 miles per hour before he saw the Econoline stop abruptly. He also testified that while the Odyssey was following the Econoline “pretty close[ly],” there was 175 to 200 feet between Cunningham’s van and the Odyssey when the Econoline stopped. Cunningham only saw the Odyssey’s brake lights come on for a short time. He did not think the Odyssey had much time to stop and was pretty sure that the Odyssey hit the Econoline before he (Cunningham) hit the Odyssey. Hernandez testified that he was caught off guard and that he, nonetheless tried to stop slowly because he did not want to hydroplane on the wet pavement.
Both experts agreed that the first impact between the Econoline and the Civic was a major impact. Defense expert Stuart testified that the Econoline hit the Civic at 20 to 29 miles per hour, hurling it forward from a stopped position into the Lexus at 16 to 23 miles per hour. The whole rear end of the Civic was “smashed flat” in that collision, with 10 to 16 inches of crush. Stuart also testified that Hernandez had not stopped before he collided with the Econoline and that the damage to the front end of the Odyssey was too large to be a result of the impact by Cunningham’s van. This supports the inference that Hernandez rear-ended the Econoline before he was struck by Cunningham. Cunningham testified that he was going 10 miles per hour when he hit the Odyssey and that his van only “nudged” the Odyssey forward a little bit. Stuart estimated Cunningham’s speed at impact at 6 to 13 miles per hour and concluded that, since there were three cars between Cunningham’s van and Tyson’s Lexus, Cunningham’s modest impact with the Odyssey did not influence Tyson in any way. This evidence supports the jury’s conclusions that Doan and one of the “non-party tortfeasors” were negligent and that Cunningham was not negligent.
Citing Larson v. Solbakken (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 410, 427, Tyson argues that Cunningham’s rear-end collision with the Odyssey raised an inference of negligence that required Cunningham to produce evidence that contradicted that inference and that Cunningham failed to offer such evidence. As set forth above, Cunningham provided substantial evidence, based on his own testimony, Hernandez’s testimony, and that of his expert, that contradicted any inference of negligence that may arise from being involved in a rear-end accident.
Tyson argues that Hernandez travelled over the exact same road and encountered the exact same situation that Cunningham did, that Hernandez had slowed down in a measured fashion that assured that he was going to avoid collision, and that Cunningham made no attempt to show that the conditions were different for him than they were for Hernandez. The record does not support Tyson’s factual assertion that the conditions were identical for Hernandez and Cunningham. There was evidence that Cunningham was confronted with a hazard that Hernandez did not face: Hernandez’s rear-end collision with the Econoline. Moreover, whether Hernandez had avoided a collision before he was struck from the rear by Cunningham was a disputed factual issue for the jury to resolve and the jury may not have believed Hernandez’s testimony on that issue. The jury did find that a “non-party tortfeasor” was negligent but that the non-party tortfeasor’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Tyson’s injuries.
For all these reasons, we conclude there was substantial evidence that supported the jury’s verdict.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.Mihara, J.