Opinion
18 Civ. 8515 (GBD) (KHP)
02-26-2020
RACHELLE BRIANA TYSON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK (ADMINISTRATIVE CHILD SERVICES) and NANCY SANCHEZ, Child Specialist Supervisor, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
:
Pro se Plaintiff Rachelle Briana Tyson brings this action against Defendants the City of New York and Nancy Sanchez, a Child Specialist Supervisor with the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), alleging that Defendants violated her due process rights by removing her son from her care, and by filing an Article 10 petition against her under the Family Court Act that resulted in her losing custody of her son. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) The Article 10 petition charged Plaintiff with neglecting her son by failing to provide appropriate supervision and adequate food. (Decl. of Sharon Sprayregen in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. ("Decl."), Ex. A (Article 10 Pet.), ECF No. 27-1, at Addendum I.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants based the petition on unfounded "allegations of malnourishment [that] had been disproven [at] trial." (Compl. at 5.) She further alleges that Sanchez instructed caseworkers to threaten to remove Plaintiff's son with no evidence of neglect or abuse, directed caseworkers to harass Plaintiff's family, and removed Plaintiff's son from her custody and placed him into the care of the son's father, notwithstanding the father's history of domestic violence and substance abuse. (Id. at 5-6.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Notice of Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 26.)
Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker's November 8, 2019 Report and Recommendation (the "Report"), recommending that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted and that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. (Report, ECF No. 33, at 16-17.) Magistrate Judge Parker advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the Report would constitute a waiver of those objections on appeal. (Id. at 17.) No objections have been filed. Having reviewed the Report for clear error and finding none, this Court ADOPTS the Report in full.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Reports and Recommendations.
A court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations" set forth in a magistrate judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Amagistrate judge's report to which no objections are made is reviewed for clear error. See Edwards v. Fischer, 414 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted). "In clear error review, a court should reverse a finding only if it is 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,' and not merely if it 'would have decided the case differently.'" Hernandez v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 6644 (KPF) (DF), 2015 WL 321830, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully"; stating a facially plausible claim requires the plaintiff to plead facts that enable the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). The factual allegations pled must therefore "be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
A district court must first review a plaintiff's complaint to identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court then considers whether the plaintiff's remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, assumed to be true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.; see also Targum v. Citrin Cooperman & Co., LLP, No. 12 Civ. 6909 (SAS), 2013 WL 6087400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013). In deciding the 12(b)(6) motion, the court must also draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2013). This is particularly true for pro se plaintiffs, whose submissions are read liberally and interpreted to "raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).
II. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Magistrate Judge Parker correctly found that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Defendants violated her substantive due process rights. (See Report at 10-13.) There is no violation of substantive due process rights where "exigent circumstances require the ex parte temporary removal of a child from the home and a court proceeding is promptly held following the removal of the child." (Id. at 10 (collecting cases)); see e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[B]rief removals generally do not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation, at least where the purpose of the removal is to keep the child safe during investigation and court confirmation of the basis for removal." (citing Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 600-01 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1999))). Here, exigent circumstances warranted the initial removal of Plaintiff's son from her custody because Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for psychiatric treatment after attempting to commit suicide while her son was in her care. (Decl., Ex. A (Article 10 Pet.), at Addendum I.) ACS filed the Article 10 petition four days after Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide, (see id.), and Plaintiff was given prompt notice of the petition and appeared and testified at a hearing in Bronx County Family Court, (see Decl., Ex. D (Bronx County Family Court Order), ECF No. 27-4; Decl., Ex. F (Bronx County Family Court Hr'g Tr. dated Dec. 3, 2015), ECF No. 27-6). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of her substantive due process rights.
As Magistrate Judge Parker properly concluded, nor has Plaintiff adequately alleged any violation of her procedural due process rights. (See Report at 13-14.) "A parent may not lawfully be deprived of the custody of his or her child without a hearing 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Gottlieb v. Cty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). "It is established, however, that government officials may remove a child from his or her parents' custody before a hearing is held where there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a threat to the child's health or safety is imminent." Id. (citations omitted). In this action, as noted above, the Article 10 petition was filed days after Plaintiff's suicide attempt. (See Decl., Ex. A (Article 10 Pet.), at Addendum I.) A hearing was held the same day that the petition was filed, but because Plaintiff was still hospitalized, the Bronx County Family Court scheduled another hearing so that Plaintiff could attend and have an opportunity to be heard. (Decl., Ex. C (Bronx County Family Court Hr'g Tr. dated Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 27-3, at 6:5-7:5.) In sum, "there is nothing Plaintiff alleges about the process, and nothing this Court can discern from the Family Court Proceedings, that would give rise to a violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights as a matter of law." (Report at 13-14.)
Magistrate Judge Parker also appropriately determined that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, given Plaintiff's failure to adequately plead any other claim. (Id. at 14-16.) First, Sanchez is entitled to qualified immunity because "it was objectively reasonable for [her] to believe [that her] conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable caseworker would have known." V.S. v. Muhammad, 595 F.3d 426, 431 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Specifically, Sanchez complied with the procedures set forth in the Family Court Act when filing the Article 10 petition, and nothing in the record suggests that a "reasonable caseworker" would disagree with the actions that she took. (See Report at 14-15.) Second, Plaintiff cannot allege any claim of municipality liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she fails to demonstrate that she "suffered the denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom." Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727, 756 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, (1978). Third, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that ACS employees harassed her, Plaintiff does not advance any non-conclusory allegations in support of this contention. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's challenge to her son's placement with his father, this "is a challenge to the final family court order that awarded custody to the father that this Court cannot disturb." (Report at 16.)
It bears noting that this action is the third that Plaintiff has filed in connection with the removal of her son from her custody. The first action was discontinued without prejudice on June 16, 2016. (Stipulation, Tyson v. The City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 75 (RA), ECF No. 15.) The second action was dismissed without prejudice on December 14, 2017 for failure to prosecute. (Order, Tyson v. Sanchez, No. 16 Civ. 6201 (VEC) (SDA), ECF No. 27.) As Magistrate Judge Parker correctly observed, Plaintiff has also failed to prosecute the instant action. (See Report at 7.) In particular, Plaintiff filed neither a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, nor objections to the Report. Moreover, the last time that she took any step in this action appears to be around July 2019, when she did not consent to Defendants' request for an extension of time to file their motion to dismiss. (See Defs.' Letter dated July 5, 2019, ECF No. 24, at 1 (noting that "Plaintiff does not consent" to request for extension").) --------
III. CONCLUSION
Magistrate Judge Parker's Report is ADOPTED. Defendants' motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 26), is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed close the motion accordingly, and to mail a copy of this memorandum decision and order to Plaintiff. Dated: New York, New York
February 26, 2020
SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
GEORGE B. DANIELS
United States District Judge