Opinion
8:21-cv-01067-MGL-JDA
06-03-2021
Ty'Shun Mario Ka'l Bessellieu, Plaintiff, v. Shep Bone, Sergeant Church, John Gregory, Noel Smith, Shane Powers, Allen Morris, One Unknown Authority of the Georgetown County Detention Center, Robert Harry O'Donnel, Jimmy A. Richardson, II, Alicia A. Richardson, Warden of Kirkland Correctional Institution, Bryan P. Stirling, Jana Hollis, Colonda Robinson, Warden of Lee Correctional Institution, Jermaine Moore, Warden of Broad River Correctional Institution, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Ty'Shun Mario Ka'l Bessellieu (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, purportedly challenging his arrest, prosecution, conviction, sentence, and certain conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on April 7, 2021, by filing a verbose 128-page Complaint, asserting nine claims against the seventeen Defendants named in the caption above. [Doc. 1.] Upon review, the undersigned concluded that many of the claims and Defendants in the Complaint were subject to dismissal and that the Complaint as a whole failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on April 7, 2021. [Doc. 1-4 at 1 (envelope, stamped as received by the prison mailroom on April 7, 2021).]
Accordingly, by Order dated May 6, 2021, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 9.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to proceed with his claims against Jana Hollis, Colonda Robinson, and Jermaine Moore for excessive use of force if he filed an amended complaint that complied with Rule 8. [Id. at 2, 25-26.] The Court granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Court's Order. [Id. at 27.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
[Id. at 28.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Additionally, Plaintiff was ordered to bring the case into proper form by filing service documents for each Defendant named in the amended complaint. However, 2016A2220200464 and 2016A2220200465).
Plaintiff's claims arise from his arrest, prosecution, conviction, and sentence in the Georgetown County Court of General Sessions and his subsequent incarceration at the Georgetown County Detention Center as a pretrial detainee and as a prisoner in the custody of SCDC at the Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”), the Lee Correctional Institution (“Lee”), and the Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”). Plaintiff contends he is “being held captive in [SCDC] without having been lawfully convicted” in violation of the United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 13.] On March 22, 2018, Plaintiff was sentenced in the Georgetown County Court of General Sessions to a total term of imprisonment of sixteen years after being convicted of four counts of attempted murder (case numbers 2016A2220200467, 2016A2220200470, 2016A2220200471, and 2016A2220200472), possession of a weapon during a violent crime (case number 2016A2220200466), unlawful possession of a weapon (case number 2016A2220200468), discharging a firearm into a dwelling (case number 2016A2220200469), and two counts related to drug charges (case numbers See State of South Carolina v. Bessellieu, available at Georgetown Cty. Pub. Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Georgetown/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by the case numbers listed above) (last visited May 5, 2021).
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state court actions and his prior actions filed in this Court. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff did not bring the case into proper form. Because Plaintiff has ignored this Court's Orders and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Plaintiff asserts nine claims in his Complaint.
[Doc. 1.] Claim 1 is asserted against Defendants Bone, Church, Gregory, Smith, Powers, Morris, and O'Donnel. [ Id. at 15-28.] Claim 1 relates to Plaintiff's arrest on August 31, 2016. [Id. at 15.] Plaintiff alleges that Bone, Gregory, and Powers, who are all officers with the Georgetown Police Department, responded to an incident involving a shooting and that the officers concluded that Plaintiff was the shooter. [Id. at 15-16.] The officers then went to Plaintiff's residence and conducted an unlawful search, which included pinging Plaintiff's cell phone in an attempt to locate him. [Id. at 17-18.] Morris, an investigator with the Georgetown Police Department, then unlawfully secured a search warrant and an arrest warrant, which were issued by O'Donnel, a magistrate judge, purportedly without probable cause. [Id. at 18.] Plaintiff was eventually located and arrested. [Id. at 19-22.] During the arrest, the arresting officers struck Plaintiff in the head with a pistol and then beat and assaulted him after he fell to the ground. [Id. at 23-24.] The officers then placed Plaintiff under arrest. [Id. at 24.] The officers also searched Plaintiff and confiscated numerous personal items, including a firearm, drugs, a bandana, and money. [Id. at 25.] Plaintiff was then taken to the Georgetown Police Department and interrogated. [Id. at 26.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 1 appears to assert claims for unlawful arrest, unlawful search, and excessive use of force.
As noted, Plaintiff's verbose Complaint is comprised of 128 pages. As such, the Court provides only a brief summary of the allegations from the Complaint pertinent to the Court's evaluation of the Complaint. However, the undersigned has carefully reviewed all of Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint.
Claim 2 is asserted against Defendants Gregory, Morris, and O'Donnel. [Id. at 28-35.] Claim 2 relates to the investigation and prosecution of the criminal actions against Plaintiff noted above. [Id.] Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Morris obtained unlawful arrest warrants and conducted an unlawful search of his residence. [Id. at 33-34.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 2 appears to assert claims for unlawful search and seizure and malicious prosecution.
Claim 3 is asserted against Defendants Powers, One Unknown Authority of the Georgetown County Detention Center, and O'Donnel. [Id. at 35-47.] Claim 3 relates to Plaintiff's detention at the Georgetown County Detention Center and certain judicial proceedings before his trial. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that his detention was unlawful. [Id. at 36, 47.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 3 appears to assert claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
Claim 4 is asserted against Defendants Bone, Gregory, Morris, and O'Donnel. [Id. at 47-52.] Claim 4 relates to the issuance of arrest warrants against Plaintiff, his arrest on August 31, 2016, and subsequent bail proceedings held before O'Donnel on August 31, and September 1, 2016. [Id.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 4 appears to asserts claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Claim 5 is asserted against Defendants J. Richardson and A. Richardson, who are both prosecutors with the Georgetown County Solicitor's Office. [Id. at 52-68.] Claim 5 relates to these Defendants' conduct in prosecuting the criminal actions against Plaintiff, beginning in November 2016 and culminating in his trial in March 2018. [Id. at 52-58.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 5 appears to assert claims for malicious prosecution.
Claim 6 is asserted against Defendants Warden of Kirkland and Stirling. [Id. at 68-77.] Claim 6 relates to Plaintiff's incarceration at Kirkland after being sentenced on the convictions for the crimes noted above. [Id. at 68.] Plaintiff was transported to Kirkland on March 23, 2018, after being sentenced in the Georgetown County Court of General Sessions. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Warden of Kirkland and Stirling held him against his will, subjecting him to involuntary servitude, even though he explained to them that he had not been lawfully convicted. [Id. at 69.] Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants explained to him “that they had no authority to correct such issue and that the Plaintiff would have to obtain the sought remedy of his release from the courts.” [Id. at 70.] Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have denied inmates the “right to reproduction and interaction with the opposite sex” [id. at 71-73] and have misappropriated funds to cut the food budget, depriving inmates of nutritious meals [id. at 73-77]. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 6 appears to asserts claims for false imprisonment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Claim 7 is asserted against Defendants Stirling, Warden of Lee, Robinson, Hollis, and Moore. [Id. at 77-93.] Claim 7 relates to Plaintiff's incarceration at Lee after being sentenced on the convictions for the crimes noted above. [Id. at 77.] Plaintiff was transferred from Kirkland to Lee on August 20, 2018. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that the Warden of Lee continued to falsely imprison him even though he explained that he had not been lawfully convicted. [Id. at 78.] Plaintiff alleges that the Warden of Lee explained to him that he would have to take this issue up with the court. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived access to showers, recreation, legal materials, and nutritious meals. [Id. at 78-79.] Plaintiff alleges that he filed staff requests and grievances, but they were not processed and went unanswered. [Id. at 79, 83-87.] Finally, Plaintiff makes allegations about an incident that occurred on April 18, 2019, during which Robinson discharged her chemical munition against Plaintiff, causing him to suffer pain and injury [id. at 80-82], and another incident that occurred on January 7, 2020, during which Robinson, Hollis, and Moore conducted a search of Plaintiff's cell, all three Defendants assaulted Plaintiff, and Moore discharged her chemical munition against Plaintiff, causing him to suffer pain and injury [id. at 88-92]. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 7 appears to assert claims for false imprisonment, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and excessive use of force.
Claim 8 is asserted against Defendants Warden of Kirkland, Stirling, and Hollis. [Id. at 93-104.] Claim 8 relates to Plaintiff's incarceration at Kirkland after being sentenced on the convictions for the crimes noted above. [Id. at 93.] Plaintiff alleges he was transferred from Lee to Kirkland on January 8, 2020, and was placed in the Maximum Security Unit (“MSU”). [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he was placed in lock up in violation of SCDC policy and his due process rights. [Id. at 96.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 8 appears to assert claims for false imprisonment, due process violations, and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Claim 9 is asserted against Defendant Warden of Broad River. [Id. at 105-107.] Claim 9 relates to Plaintiff's incarceration at Broad River after being sentenced on the convictions for the crimes noted above. [Id. at 105.] Plaintiff alleges he was transferred from Kirkland to Broad River on January 10, 2021, and was placed in the Restrictive House Unit (“RHU”). [Id. at 105.] After his arrival, Plaintiff informed the Warden of Broad River that he was being unlawfully imprisoned because he had not been lawfully convicted. [Id. at 105-06.] The Warden of Broad River told Plaintiff that he would have to take that issue up with the courts. [Id. at 106.] Plaintiff also alleges that one of the law computers is broken and that mailroom personnel pick up outgoing mail only on Fridays. [Id. at 106-07.] Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Claim 9 appears to assert claims for false imprisonment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
For his injuries, Plaintiff makes the following allegations. As to Claim 1, Plaintiff contends he has lost his sense of security, happiness, and peace of mind. [Id. at 109.] Additionally, Plaintiff suffered abrasions on the top and side of his head, lacerations inside his mouth, a swollen abdomen, and lacerations on his arms, all resulting from the purported assault that occurred during his arrest on August 31, 2016. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he was denied medical treatment for these injuries. [Id.] Plaintiff also suffered defamation of his character and emotional anguish as a result of his false arrest. [Id. at 110.] As to Claim 2, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional anguish and distress and psychological “malfunction.” [Id.] As to Claims 3, 4, and 5, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional distress. [Id. at 110-11.] As to Claim 6, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional distress and sexual frustration. [Id. at 111.] As to Claim 7, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional distress, sexual frustration, a rash on his skin due to the deployment of chemical munitions, lacerations on his hands and wrists due to the flap being slammed on him, an injured hip bone from falling off the bed, and injuries to his eyes due to poor lighting. [Doc. 111-12.] Additionally, as to the purported assault that occurred on January 7, 2020, Plaintiff alleges he was temporarily blinded and suffered a swollen face, a bruised and swollen abdomen, lacerations on his face and head, and a bruised ego. [Id. at 112.] As to Claim 8, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional distress, sexual frustration, arthritis, stiff muscles, and bodily pain due to his lack of exercise and recreation, the loss of dexterity in his fingers and toes due to the “frigid temperatures” at Kirkland, and a stiff neck due to the denial of his right to a pillow. [ Id. at 112-13.] Finally, as to Claim 9, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional and mental distress and sexual frustration. [Id. at 113.]
Finally, Plaintiff requests the following relief. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order banning Defendants Bone, Church, Gregory, Smith, Powers, and Morris from “operating within [their] governmental functions.” [Id. at 114.] Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Bone, Church, Gregory, Smith, and Powers in an amount exceeding $150,000. [Id. at 114-16.] Plaintiff seeks money damages from each Defendant in the amount of $50,000 for each federally secured right that was violated. [Id. at 116.] Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages from Defendants Morris and O'Donnel. [Id. at 116-17.] Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of orders (1) prohibiting the Defendant One Unknown Authority of the Georgetown County Detention Center from operating the Georgetown County Detention Center as a jail facility, (2) requiring any jail, prison, or similar facility to comply with the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (3) prohibiting cash bail requirements within the State of South Carolina. [Id. at 117-18.] Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages from Defendant One Unknown Authority of the Georgetown County Detention Center in the amount. [Id. at 118.] Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of orders (1) prohibiting the practice of the South Carolina county grand jury system, (2) banning the Court of General Sessions from operating as a judicial body within the State of South Carolina, (3) prohibiting county solicitors from exercising the power to authorize persons to act on their behalf, (4) forbidding SCDC and Defendants Stirling and Warden of Kirkland from accepting custody of any person without legal verification, (5) mandating that Defendant Stirling “remodel the policy of the SCDC to eliminate” discriminatory actions towards or placement of inmates, (6) requiring Defendant Stirling to “remodel the SCDC food service operations, ” (7) limiting the amount of funding that Defendant Stirling and SCDC may spend on lawyers, (8) prohibiting SCDC personnel from carrying chemical munitions, (9) requiring Defendants to compensate Plaintiff for his submitted grievances, (10) requiring Defendants Warden of Kirkland and Stirling to “disban the operational functions” of Kirkland, and (11) requiring Defendant Stirling and SCDC to implement policies and procedures to rehabilitate all inmates. [Id. at 118-121.] Finally, Plaintiff seeks release from custody in SCDC. [Id. at 118.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under the less stringent standard applicable to pro se pleadings, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Thus, although a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below. Defendants entitled to dismissal
First, several Defendants named in this action are subject to dismissal because they are entitled to immunity or are not proper parties subject to suit under § 1983.
Defendant O'Donnel
Plaintiff sues Robert Harry O'Donnel, who is identified as a state magistrate judge that presided over certain state court proceedings in Plaintiff's criminal actions and authorized search and arrest warrants related to the underlying charges against Plaintiff. [Doc. 1 at 5, 33, 39-40.] It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they have acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant O'Donnel relate to his judicial actions. Thus, because the alleged misconduct of Defendant O'Donnel arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar Plaintiff's claims against him.
Defendants J. Richardson and A. Richardson
Next, Plaintiff sues Jimmy A. Richardson, II (“J. Richardson”) and Alicia A. Richardson (“A. Richardson”). [Doc. 1 at 5.] J. Richardson is the Solicitor and A. Richardson is an Assistant Solicitor, both with the Georgetown County Solicitor's Office.[Id.] In Claim 5 of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that these two Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution during their prosecution of Plaintiff's criminal actions in the Georgetown County Court of General Sessions. [Id. at 52-68.] However, these two Defendants are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. For example, when a prosecutor “prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding, ” “appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application, ” or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial “motions” hearings, absolute immunity applies. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-45 (2009). Here, these Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct appears intricately related to the judicial process. Therefore, Defendants J. Richardson and A. Richardson have absolute immunity from this suit and should be dismissed from this action. Additionally, Claim 5 is subject to dismissal because it relates solely to Plaintiff's allegations against these two Defendants.
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310.
Defendant Stirling
Plaintiff also names Bryan P. Stirling, who is the Director of SCDC. [Doc. 1 at 6.] However, Defendant Stirling is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint about his direct involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, Plaintiff makes only general, vague allegations about this Defendant's obligations over SCDC and the prisons at which Plaintiff has been incarcerated. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Governor of South Carolina and former director of SCDC), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Further, construing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Stirling as based on supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendant Stirling to demonstrate that he was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant Stirling, and he should be dismissed from this action on that basis. See Ford v. Stirling, No. 2:17-cv-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017).
Defendants Warden of Lee, Warden of Kirkland, and Warden of Broad River
Finally, Plaintiff names as Defendants in this action the Wardens of Lee, Kirkland, and Broad River. [Doc. 1 at 5-7.] However, these three Defendants are subject to summary dismissal for the same reasons that Defendant Stirling is entitled to dismissal. First, Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint about the Wardens' direct involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, and instead he makes only general, vague allegations about their respective obligations over the prisons at which Plaintiff has been incarcerated. As noted, absent allegations of specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, his Complaint is insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Tracey, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2. Likewise, Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants fail under a theory of supervisory liability. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798; Ford, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2.
Additionally, Plaintiff's primary contention as to the three Wardens is that they have impermissibly held him in custody against his will because his conviction and sentence are unlawful. And, for his relief, Plaintiff seeks release from imprisonment. As explained in the section below, such a claim is not proper in this § 1983 action. Accordingly, the three Wardens are entitled to dismissal from this action.
Claims subject to dismissal
In addition to the above Defendants being entitled to dismissal from this action, the claims asserted in the Complaint are also subject to dismissal. Indeed, for the reasons below, the entire Complaint is subject to dismissal.
Failure to state a claim under Rule 8(a)
As an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that the entire Complaint is subject to dismissal because it does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the Complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Additionally, Rule 8(d)(1) mandates that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” The purpose behind Rule 8 is “to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Lagana v. Shearin, No. PJM-cv-14-970, 2014 WL 11996364, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2014) (“[A] pleading must give the court and Defendants ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'”) (citations omitted).
This Court has the authority to dismiss excessively long complaints under Rule 8 where the length renders the complaint unintelligible. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of 17 complaint consisting of 155 pages and 99 attachments); In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint consisting of 600 paragraphs spanning 240 pages); Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Svcs., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the 119-page “less than coherent” complaint should have been dismissed); Kuehl v. FDIC, 8 F.3d 905, 906-09 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of 43-page complaint); Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 717 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of 98-page complaint); Spencer v. Hedges, 838 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, although the Court must liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants, see Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 2002), “there are limits to which the court may go in dealing with such filings.” Gardner v. Easley, No. 5:07-CT-3104-D, 2007 WL 9728762, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 27, 2007); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.”)).
Here, Plaintiff has exceeded those limits and has failed to comply with Rule 8. Plaintiff's 128-page Complaint, along with 48 pages of attachments, is voluminous, rambling, and contains numerous patently frivolous claims and allegations. See, e.g., Boulineau v. Horry Cty. Council, No. 4:17-cv-00394-RBH, 2018 WL 826723, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2018). To the extent Plaintiff has asserted viable claims in his Complaint, they are “interspersed through [dozens] of pages of extraneous, irrelevant and repetitive material.” Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981) (finding that, although the pro se complaint contained potentially viable claims, the court should dismiss the action under Rule 8 because the voluminous, repetitive, and conclusory allegations were not a “short and plain statement” of the facts and legal claims and that such a complaint “places an unjustifiable burden on defendants to determine the nature of the claim against them and to speculate on what their defenses might be, ” and “imposes a similar burden on the court to sort out the facts now hidden in a mass of charges, arguments, generalizations and rumors”); see also Adams v. Elrich, No. 20-cv-1988, 2021 WL 1424058, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021). However, “a court is not obliged to ferret through a complaint, searching for viable claims.” Considder v. Medicare, No. 3:09-cv-00049, 2009 WL 9052195, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2009), aff'd, 373 Fed.Appx. 341 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, the Complaint “is not a ‘short and plain statement,' nor is it ‘concise and direct,' and the convoluted and redundant narratives and far-fetched legal conclusions render the complaint nearly incomprehensible.” Fauber v. Commw., No. 3:10-cv-00059, 2010 WL 4961743, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). As such, it is subject to dismissal for failing to comply with Rule 8.
As stated, the Court informed Plaintiff in its May 6, 2021, Order that he may be able to proceed with his claims against Jana Hollis, Colonda Robinson, and Jermaine Moore for excessive use of force if he filed an amended complaint that complied with Rule 8. [Doc. 9 at 25-26.] However, Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous
Further, the undersigned finds that the entire Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous. The crux of this action involves Plaintiff's contention that his incarceration is unconstitutional because he was not lawfully convicted. Although Plaintiff makes other allegations, many of which are addressed below, each of his purported claims is premised, at least in part, on his assertion that his conviction is unlawful. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 13, 37-38, 40, 47, 55, 57-58, 67-70, 77-78, 92-94, 102-05.] And, for his relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court release him from incarceration. [Id. at 118.] The Court need not address each and every frivolous allegation, but concludes that, as a whole, this action presents a patently frivolous attack on Plaintiff's conviction and sentence, which is not proper in this civil rights action.
Plaintiff makes numerous frivolous allegations throughout his Complaint. For example, Plaintiff contends that his conviction is improper because the “Court of General Sessions is an unlawful judicial body.” [Id. at 58.] Also, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stirling “has unlawfully confiscated and money laundered substantial amounts ‘annually' exceeding one hundred (100) plus million dollars for [personal] and unrelated expenses, ” and has used that money to “train[ ] professional lawyers to disenfranchise any lawsuits brought against himself.” [Id. at 74-75.]
Critically, release from prison is not a proper remedy in a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff seeks release from the custody of SCDC, such relief may be sought only in a habeas action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus); see also Griffin v. Padula, 518 F.Supp.2d 680, 686 (D.S.C. 2007) (identifying when a claim is properly cognizable under § 2254 rather than § 1983). Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is frivolous and should be dismissed on this basis.
Plaintiff's requests for money damages are barred by Heck
Next, Plaintiff's requests for money damages as to Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck. Plaintiff seeks money damages against certain Defendants for purported constitutional violations related to his arrest, prosecution, conviction, and sentence. However, his claims are premature because he is currently serving a sentence for convictions that have not yet been invalidated. In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement, which Plaintiff has not satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, resulting in his unlawful detention. However, Plaintiff's convictions have not been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are barred and should be dismissed as a right of action has not accrued.
Additionally, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 appear to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. “The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in South Carolina is three years.” Cash v. Horn, No. 7:16-cv-3654-MGL-PJG, 2018 WL 1747945, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1748289 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2018); Pitts v. South Carolina, No. 8:20-cv-00092-JFA-KFM, 2020 WL 4506830, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 4506681 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2020) (explaining the three-year statute of limitations applies to excessive force claims and that a cause of action accrues on the date the alleged excessive force occurred). Here, Plaintiff was arrested on August 31, 2016, pursuant to a warrant issued that same day. “[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's false arrest claim began to run on August 31, 2016, and expired three years later on August 31, 2019. Plaintiff filed the instant case on April 7, 2021, well beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations for false arrest. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant J. Richardson filed indictments against him on November 16, 2016, and that a trial was held from March 19 through 22, 2018. [Id. at 52, 58.] Any claims, including a malicious prosecution claim, resulting from any unlawful conduct on these dates are also time bared. Finally, Plaintiff's excessive use of force claim is also time barred as he alleges he was assaulted on August 31, 2016, the date of his arrest. [Id. at 23-24.] In sum, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are each time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Remaining allegations in Claims 6, 7, 8, and 9
Finally, the remaining allegations in Claims 6, 7, 8, and 9 fail to state a claim for relief. As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff asserts a claim for false imprisonment in Claims 6, 7, 8, and 9. However, for the reasons noted above, Plaintiff's claims for false imprisonment and the relief he seeks (release from incarceration) are not properly before this Court in this § 1983 action.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert any other causes of action in Claims 6, 7, 8, and 9, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief for the reasons below.
Denial of Contact and Conjugal Visits
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied contact or conjugal visits with members of the opposite sex. [Doc. 1 at 71-73.] However, inmates do not have a constitutional right to contact visits or conjugal visits. In re Anderson, 296 Fed.Appx. 347, 348 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The Constitution does not guarantee conjugal visitation privileges to incarcerated persons.”); Roberson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 8:09-cv-1333-CMC-BHH, 2010 WL 679070, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2010), aff'd, 396 Fed.Appx. 968 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim regarding contact or conjugal visits is subject to dismissal as a matter of law.
Denial of Grievance Process
Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim regarding the grievance procedures at Kirkland, Lee, and Broad River, alleging that he has submitted numerous requests to staff members (“RTSM”) and grievances, but that his RTSMs and grievances have been denied or unanswered. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 79, 85-87, 96-97, 99-103.] Plaintiff's allegations are without merit because he has not stated a constitutional claim. The law is well-settled that an inmate has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-38 (1977). Further, even if a prison provides for a grievance procedure, violations of those procedures do not amount to a civil rights cause of action. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (dismissing a claim that prison officials retaliated against a plaintiff when he was barred access to the grievance process because “the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure”). Likewise, the failure of a prison official to follow prison procedures does not, standing alone, amount to a constitutional violation. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (explaining violations of prison policies which fail to reach the level of a constitutional violation are not actionable under § 1983); Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 2007 WL 904826 at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“Plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). As such, Plaintiff's claim that he was denied grievance proceedings is without merit and subject to dismissal. See Roberson, 2010 WL 679070, at *13.
Denial of Access to Legal Materials
Next, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim that he has been denied access to legal materials. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 79, 103, 106.] “It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Warfield v. Harford Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 18-cv-3240-PWG, 2019 WL 3718956, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2019). “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). “A prisoner claiming a Bounds violation must show: (i) that shortcomings in the prison's library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to attack his sentence, directly or collaterally, or to challenge the conditions of his confinement; and (ii) that he was actually injured as a result of these shortcomings.” Hinojos v. Byars, No. 2:13-cv-1900-JFA-WWD, 2014 WL 3687400, at *8 (D.S.C. July 23, 2014). To state a claim for denial of court access, a plaintiff must allege that he has been prejudiced in pursuing non-frivolous litigation concerning his conviction or prison conditions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996). The right of access to the courts is the “right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to present, ” and violations of that right occur only when an inmate is “hindered [in] his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants caused actual injury, such as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353-54. The actual-injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim, but instead requires that the inmate demonstrate that his “non-frivolous” civil rights legal claim has been “frustrated” or “impeded.” Id. at 353-55. “Actual injury cannot be established merely by conclusory statements that the inmate would have fared better in litigation had he or she had more or better access to legal research materials.” Jones v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., 586 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (D.S.C. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff has made no allegations of any real injury and/or prejudice that he actually suffered as a result of the alleged inadequate access to legal materials. See Lewis at 350-55 (explaining a plaintiff must allege actual injury resulting from an allegedly inadequate jail library in order to state a claim under § 1983). Plaintiff has not identified any specific claim that he has been unable to litigate because of the alleged denial of access to a law library or access to the courts. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that he has been denied access to legal materials and access to the court, but he fails to allege any specific facts as to how any case has been adversely affected due to his denial of access to the court or to legal materials. Thus, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to show an actual injury. In the absence of an alleged actual injury and prejudice to a constitutional right resulting from Plaintiff's lack of access to legal materials or access to the courts, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants on which this Court may grant relief. See, e.g., Payne v. Lucas, No. 6:11-cv-01767-DCN-KFM, 2012 WL 988137, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988133 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012); Crawford v. Nash, No. 4:08-cv-4092-GRA-TER, 2009 WL 580348, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim.
Conditions of Confinement
Finally, Plaintiff presents numerous cursory allegations about the conditions of his confinement. Interspersed throughout the Complaint are allegations that Plaintiff was denied access to recreation, nutritious meals, showers, a heated cell, adequate light, and a pillow. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 73-77, 78-79.] However, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific individual responsible for the deprivation of any constitutional right, and he fails to allege specific facts to support the denial of any constitutional right in the conditions of his confinement other than making general, vague allegations. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible and any such claims are subject to dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated May 6, 2021. [Doc. 9.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).