Opinion
Docket No. 326766.
06-30-2016
TYLER v. TYLER.
Neal D. Nielsen, Brighton, for plaintiff. Gentry Nalley, PLLC (by Kevin S. Gentry and Heather KS Nalley), for defendant.
Neal D. Nielsen, Brighton, for plaintiff.
Gentry Nalley, PLLC (by Kevin S. Gentry and Heather KS Nalley), for defendant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and OWENS and BOONSTRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's order dismissing without prejudice his complaint for divorce. We affirm.
In his complaint for divorce, plaintiff alleged that the parties were married in April 2014 and that there were no minor children "from this current marriage." Plaintiff acknowledged that an action involving these parties had been previously filed in the court, but indicated that the previous action was no longer pending. There is no information in the record before us regarding what this previous action entailed, but plaintiff contends on appeal that the parties had been previously married to each other (from 2005 to 2010), that the parties had children together as a product of the first marriage, and that the previous action was a divorce proceeding.
Defendant never filed a response to the complaint; however, according to the trial court, she separately filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that there were minor children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for a default and an accompanying affidavit, and a default was entered. Thereafter, the trial court sua sponte set aside the default and dismissed the case. The entirety of the court's dismissal order reads as follows:
This case was filed February 25, 2015. It came to the attention of the Court that there are minor children although the complaint alleges there are not. The defendant, Jamie Tyler, subsequently filed a complaint for
divorce properly alleging that there are minor children on March 4, 2015. The plaintiff filed a default in this case on March 26, 2015.
IT IS ORDERED that the default is set aside and this case is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly dismissed his divorce action because he was under no obligation to state in his complaint that there were minor children from the parties' first marriage. "A trial court's decision to dismiss an action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Donkers v. Kovach, 277 Mich.App. 366, 368, 745 N.W.2d 154 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes." Radeljak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 475 Mich. 598, 603, 719 N.W.2d 40 (2006).
An examination of the applicable court rule reveals the error of plaintiff's argument. MCR 3.206(A) states:
(5) In an action for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment of marriage, or affirmation of marriage, regardless of the contentions of the parties with respect to the existence or validity of the marriage, the complaint also must state
* * *
(b) whether there are minor children of the parties or minor children born during the marriage....
The two categories—"minor children of the parties" and "minor children born during the marriage"—are separated by the disjunctive "or" and establish overlapping but not coextensive domains. The rule clearly includes children that do not fall into the category of "minor children born during the marriage," such as children of the parties born before the marriage and children adopted by the parties.
The trial court has express authority to dismiss a complaint. MCR 2.504(B)(1) provides, "If a party fails to comply with [the court] rules or a court order, upon motion by an opposing party, or sua sponte, the court may enter a default against the noncomplying party or a dismissal of the noncomplying party's action or claims." Because plaintiff failed to comply with the court rule, the trial court properly dismissed his complaint.
We affirm.
MARKEY, P.J., and OWENS and BOONSTRA, JJ., concurred.