Opinion
C/A No. 7:18-cv-2968-BHH-JDA
11-14-2018
Eugene Harold Tyler, Plaintiff, v. Kurt H. Jacobsen, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Eugene Harold Tyler ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Spartanburg County Detention Center, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was arrested at his home on the morning of August 31, 2018. [Doc. 1 at 5.] At that time, Plaintiff asked to secure his house and shop and to put his motorbikes into the shop. [Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant said he would secure Plaintiff's house and shop, but that he did not do so, leaving Plaintiff's house and shop "wide open." [Id.] As a result, according to Plaintiff, all of his possessions were taken. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff therefore contends that Defendant "'deprive[d] [Plaintiff] of property'" by failing to lock up Plaintiff's house and shop. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, the following items were stolen from his shop: four motorbikes, tools worth $100,000, clothing worth $15,000, five large flat screen televisions, and a coin collection. [Id. at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as follows: $150,000 for tools; $15,000 for clothes; $25,000 for motorbikes; $4,500 for televisions; and $10,000 for coin collection. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. The core complaint in this action appears to be that Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his personal property by failing to properly secure Plaintiff's home and shop after arresting Plaintiff; however, such a contention does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff fails to identify what right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States Defendant purportedly violated. At most, the allegations in the Complaint appear to assert a claim for negligence. Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant stole the items, other than stating, "I think he had som[e]thing to do with it." [Doc. 1 at 4.] Nevertheless, liberally construing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In any case, the Supreme Court has held that deprivations of personal property do not support an action for damages under § 1983. See Baker v. Stevenson, No. 8:13-cv-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). Negligence, in general, is not actionable under § 1983. See Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75-78 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law. In other words, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that random and unauthorized deprivations of personal property by state officials do not rise to a federal due process violation where the state provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of the property or to compensate for the loss. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2008); Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561-63 (4th Cir. 2005); Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (4th Cir. 1986).
The case law is clear that the availability of a state cause of action for an alleged loss of property provides adequate procedural due process; in other words, where state law provides such a remedy, no federally guaranteed constitutional right is implicated. See King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986); Slaughter v. Anderson, 673 F. Supp. 929, 930 (N.D. Ill.1987). In South Carolina, the state provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of the property or to compensate for the loss. To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence relating to his lost property, such a claim may be cognizable under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. Section 15-78-30 and its subparts encompass a "loss" of property from an occurrence of negligence proximately caused by a person employed by the State of South Carolina, a state agency, or political subdivision while acting within the scope of his or her employment. Suits brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act must be brought in a state court within the boundaries of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-20(e) (providing that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff cannot pursue such a claim in this Court.
Further, while Plaintiff does not allege intentional property deprivation, even "an intentional deprivation of property by a state employee, if unauthorized, does not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for loss is available." Hammond v. Dean, No. 3:07-cv-654-SB, 2007 WL 3002362, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). Thus, even if Defendant intentionally took Plaintiff's property, Plaintiff has remedies under South Carolina law to obtain relief in state court. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530-36 (holding that intentional deprivations of property by State employees do not violate due process until and unless the State refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy); Mora, 519 F.3d at 230-31 (finding that the state courts were open to the plaintiff for claims of conversion or trespass to chattels and finding no reason to think that the state process was constitutionally inadequate); see also Samuel v. Ozmint, No. 3:07-cv-178-PMD-JRM, 2008 WL 512736, *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (noting that claims related to taking of personal property are cognizable under South Carolina state law); Greene v. Stonebreaker, No. 9:06-cv-3392-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 2288123, *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2007) (noting that a person in South Carolina appears to have adequate post-deprivation remedies for personal property loss). Plaintiff can bring an intentional tort civil action in the South Carolina state courts to remedy any intentional taking of his property. Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on any intentional loss of personal property fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge November 14, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).