The Defendants argue that Florida courts uniformly hold that contractual privity between the plaintiff and the defendant is required to maintain both breach of express warranty claims and breach of implied warranty claims, citing Fields v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1259 (N.D.Fla.2009); T.W.M. v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 844 (N.D.Fla.1995); and O'Connor v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 699 F.Supp. 1538, 1543–44 (S.D.Fla.1988). Further, the Defendants argue that since the Plaintiff has failed to allege that she purchased the Steam Vac directly from the Defendants, the Plaintiff has failed to plead the requisite element of privity for a breach of express or implied warranty action, and thus such an action should be dismissed.

As a preliminary matter, “[t]he law of Florida is that to recover for the breach of a warranty, either express or implied, the plaintiff must be in privity of contract with the defendant.” T.W.M. v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (internal citations omitted).

Because Alea does not allege that he purchased the bat directly from Wilson, his implied warranty claim fails. See Hill v. Hoover Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing a breach of implied warranty claim under Florida law because the plaintiff "failed to allege that she purchased the [product] directly from the Defendants, but rather, specifically alleged that she purchased the [product] from a third-party retailer"); T.W.M. v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995) ("A plaintiff who purchases a product but does not buy it directly from the defendant, is not in privity with the defendant."). The law of express warranty is murkier.

Florida and Minnesota law differ on the issue of privity — here, Florida law requires privity to maintain a breach of warranty action while Minnesota law does not. Compare T.W.M. & S.M. v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995) ("The law of Florida is that to recover for the breach of a warranty, either express or implied, the plaintiff must be in privity of contract with the defendant.") with Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977) (stating that "the absence of privity would not bar" breach of warranty claims)

"The law of Florida is that to recover for the breach of a warranty, either express or implied, the plaintiff must be in privity of contract with the defendant." T.W.M. v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 842, 844 (N.D.Fla. 1995) (citing Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 520 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1988) Intergraph Corp. v. Stearman, 555 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990)); Elizabeth N. v. Riverside Group, Inc., 585 So.2d 376, 378 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) ("A warranty, whether express or implied, is fundamentally a contract. A contract cause of action requires privity.") (quoting Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts Corp., 373 So.2d 689, 692 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979)); Hernandez v. Coopervision, Inc., 691 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997) (dismissing claims for implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose due to lack of privity).

Under Florida law, merely setting forth conclusory allegations in the complaint is insufficient to entitle a claimant to recover punitive damages. See T.W.M. v. American Medical Sys., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 845 (N.D.Fla. 1995); Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1537, 1542-43 (S.D.Fla. 1989). Instead, a plaintiff must plead specific acts committed by a defendant.

Godelia v. Doe 1, 881 F.3d 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018) (comparing T.W.M. v. Am. Med. Sys., 886 F.Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (stating that privity is required for all express warranty claims), with Smith, 663 F.Supp.2d at 1342-43 (recognizing that privity may not be required for all express warranty claims)). Godelia held that even if court assumed privity was required, it had sufficiently been pled by allegations the plaintiff contracted directly with the manufacturer.

Under Florida law, merely setting forth conclusory allegations in the complaint is insufficient to entitle a claimant to recover punitive damages. See T.W.M. v. American Medical Sys., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 845 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1537, 1542-43 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Instead, a plaintiff must plead specific acts committed by a defendant.

Although the complaint states Mr. Stanziano “was in privity with Genzyme throughout his treatment with his Genzyme case coordinator as well as being registered in the Genzyme sponsored Fabry Registry,” the complaint does not allege that he and Genzyme had a buyer-seller relationship. See id. (“A plaintiff who purchases a product, but does not buy it directly from the defendant, is not in privity with that defendant” (quoting T.W.M.v.Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995).); cf. id.

"A plaintiff who purchases a product, but does not buy it directly from the defendant, is not in privity with that defendant." T.W.M. v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995). However, Florida jurisprudence recognizes the third-party beneficiary exception.