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finding Johnson v. Everyrealm to be persuasive in holding the EFAA permitted the plaintiff to invalidate her arbitration agreement with her former employer as to all claims asserted in her lawsuit, including a claim under Lab. Code, § 6310 for retaliation for reporting a workplace injury
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Case No. 23-cv-02451-WHO
2023-08-11
Tyonna TURNER, Plaintiff, v. TESLA, INC., et al., Defendants.
Jura Andrew Hartley, J. Hartley Law, APC, El Segundo, CA, Rahul Sethi, Sethi Law Firm, Pasadena, CA, for Plaintiff. Kiran Singh Lopez, Tesla, Inc., Fremont, CA, for Defendant Tesla, Inc.
Jura Andrew Hartley, J. Hartley Law, APC, El Segundo, CA, Rahul Sethi, Sethi Law Firm, Pasadena, CA, for Plaintiff. Kiran Singh Lopez, Tesla, Inc., Fremont, CA, for Defendant Tesla, Inc.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 15 William H. Orrick, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 ("EFAA"), which President Biden signed on March 3, 2022, amended the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to prohibit the enforcement of otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements for claims arising from sexual harassment. 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). Plaintiff Tyonna Turner ("Turner") filed a complaint against defendant Tesla, Inc., alleging seven causes of action stemming from her employment at Tesla. Complaint ("Compl.") [Dkt. No. 2] at Ex. 1. Five of her claims stem directly from allegations of sexual harassment in violation of California Gov't Code § 12940(k), California Gov't Code § 12940(j)(1), Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k), and the California's Fair Employment and Housing Act and Labor Code based in part on conduct occurring after March 3, 2022. And while the two other claims are not strictly sexual harassment claims, their resolution is intertwined with the resolution of the sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, the EFAA renders the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable in Turner's entire case because it involves a plausibly pleaded sexual harassment dispute. See Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc., No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d 535, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023). Tesla's motion is DENIED.
Turner also sues ten Doe defendants who are not parties to the arbitration agreement between Turner and Tesla.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Tesla hired Turner on November 30, 2020, as a production associate in its Fremont manufacturing facility. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 7. She was 18 years old. Id. ¶ 8. Her employment offer, which Tesla claims was executed on November 30, 2020, included an arbitration clause.
[T]o ensure the rapid and economical resolution of disputes . . . you and Tesla agree that any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to your employment, or the termination of your employment, will be resolved to the fullest extent permitted by law by final, binding and private arbitration . . . under the current rules of JAMS for employment disputes . . . .Declaration of Kimmie Nguyen ("Nguyen Decl.") [Dkt. No. 18], Ex. B at 3.
Turner does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, nor does she challenge the agreement as procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Instead, she asserts that the "pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalidated by the [EFAA]." Oppo. at 2:6-7. She alleges that while she was employed at Tesla, her coworkers sexually harassed her "persistently [and] approximately 100 times" and that the company failed to take remedial action after she complained to her supervisors on at least two occasions. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12.
In March 2021, Turner complained about the harassment to her supervisor, who allegedly responded with the statement "[i]t's hard to find out who people are, but if I can't that just how people are." Id. ¶ 10 [sic]. Later, in January 2022, Turner alleges that a co-worker (defendant "Nester Doe") began harassing her. Id. ¶ 11. She alleges that Nester Doe's harassment took the form of comments about her weight, requests that she "come over to his apartment," comments about her clothing, and comments about Nester Doe's own masculinity. Compl. ¶ 11. She alleges that Nester Doe would "follow her around, stalk her, [and] stare at her." Id. According to Turner, the harassment lasted for several months. Id. She alleges that she complained to her supervisor about Nester Doe's harassment on September 14, 2022. Id. ¶ 12.
Turner separately alleges that she suffered three distinct workplace injuries for which she faced adverse actions by Tesla. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Her injuries included a wrist strain she alleges resulted from "repetitive motion[s]," a concussion for which she filed a worker's compensation claim, and on September 14, 2022, an injury to her right knee and thigh caused by a car backing into her. Id. ¶ 13.
Turner states that on or about September 14, 2022, Tesla terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting workplace injuries and for reporting her sexual harassment to her supervisor. Compl. ¶ 43. She asserts that Tesla's stated reason for the termination was that "she did [not] meet Tesla's integrity standards." Id. ¶ 14. She contends that Tesla discriminated against her because of her gender in its enforcement of these integrity standards. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Turner filed a complaint for damages in Alameda County Superior Court. She alleges seven causes of action against Tesla, including: (1) Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(j)(1); (2) Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(a); (3) Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(h); (4) Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(k); (5) Violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 6310 relating to workplace safety; (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; and (7) Failure to Provide Wages at Termination in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 201-203. Compl. ¶18-49. Tesla removed the case to this court, Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 2], and moves to compel arbitration. See generally Motion ("Mot." or "MTC") [Dkt. Nos. 14, 15]. In the alternative, Tesla argues that all arbitrable claims should be severed and compelled to arbitration while the remaining claims are stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration. ("Repl.") [Dkt. No. 24].
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. "[C]ourts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038, (2006). The FAA reflects both a " 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,' and the 'fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.' " Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (first quoting Moses H. Cone, Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); then quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010)). The FAA also contains a savings clause, which provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Generally, the applicable contract defenses include fraud, duress, or unconscionability. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740.
When deciding a motion to compel arbitration, a district court must "treat the facts as they would when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Shepardson v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-05102-EMC, 2016 WL 1322994 at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46754 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016) (citing Chavez v. Bank of Am., No. C 10-653 JCS, 2011 WL 4712204, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011)). Additionally, courts apply federal substantive law to questions regarding the interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreements generally, and state contract law to questions concerning whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). To determine whether a state "common law rule makes an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable, [the Court] must consider both the federal law of arbitration and the state rule at issue." Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016).
The EFAA amends the FAA. It provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.9 U.S.C. § 402(a).
Under the EFAA, a "sexual harassment dispute" relates "to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law." 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). Its application "shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator," under federal law, "irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing the agreement," or "whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator." 9 U.S.C. § 402(b); Walters v. Starbucks Corp., 623 F.Supp.3d 333, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).
DISCUSSION
Tesla argues that Turner's claims fall within the enforceable scope of the parties' arbitration agreement and that the arbitration agreement itself is valid and enforceable. See MTC at 6:7-13:18. Turner does not challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement. The issue is whether the EFAA renders it unenforceable.
Tesla argues that Turner has waived any opposition to the parties' arbitration agreement because she failed to dispute that her claims are within its scope. Repl. at 1 n.1. It is wrong. Turner argues that the EFAA renders the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable as to her claims. Oppo. at 2:6-7. See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App 4th 243, 288, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 296 (2009).
Tesla seeks judicial notice of fifteen orders from various courts granting motions to compel arbitration filed by Tesla or its affiliate entities. They are of limited value. I take notice of Exhibits A through O as they are court records. See, e.g., Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys. Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Judicial notice may be taken of 'adjudicative facts' such as court records, pleadings."); Horton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-05322-WHO, 2016 WL 1139004, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016) (same). Only one, a minute order discussing a pro se employment discrimination complaint against Tesla, addresses the EFAA, and it is inapposite because that plaintiff's employment was terminated prior to the EFAA's effective date, so there was no question that the EFAA did not apply. See RJN, Ex. J, Minute Order, Lowther v. Tesla Inc., Case No. 21-04735-EMC (N.D. Ca. May 5, 2022).
Tesla's motion presents three questions. First, does Turner's complaint allege "conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute" for the purposes of the EFAA? 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). Second, does the EFAA make the arbitration agreement unenforceable for the entirety of the Turner's claims, or only for the claims of sexual harassment? Third, if a subset of Turner's claims are compelled to arbitration, should the other claims be stayed pending the arbitration?
I. TURNER'S ENTIRE COMPLAINT SHOULD PROCEED IN THIS COURT
The EFAA is "enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute." 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). I must determine (1) whether Turner's claims fall temporally within the scope of the EFAA, and (2) which of Turner's claims qualify as sexual harassment claims for the purposes of the EFAA.
A. Turner's claims accrued after March 3, 2022
The EFAA was enacted on March 3, 2022, and does not have retroactive effect. See Pub. L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022); see, e.g., Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc., No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d 535, 550 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023) (collecting cases and finding that "the EFAA applies only to claims that accrued on or after March 3, 2022."). Therefore, I must first determine whether any of Turner's claims accrued on or after March 3, 2022.
Tesla argues that at least one of Turner's sexual harassment claims arose prior to March 3, 2022, and that this claim is therefore subject to the parties' arbitration agreement. See Repl. at 2:13-3:11. Turner alleges that she first complained of sexual harassment to her supervisor in March 2021. Id. ¶ 10. She states that she was subsequently harassed by Nester Doe beginning "[o]n or about January 2022" and continuing "[o]ver the next several months." Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Turner further asserts that "[o]n or about September 14, 2022, she complained to her supervisors of Nester's harassment." Id. ¶ 14. On the same day, Turner was told that her employment was terminated. Id. ¶ 14. She received a letter from Tesla on October 7, 2022, confirming that her employment had been terminated. Id.
The reference point for the accrual of Turner's claims varies based on the cause of action. Five of Turner's claims arose out of or following her termination on September 14, 2022. Those claims allege that Tesla terminated her in substantial part due to her gender (Second Claim), that Tesla terminated Turner in retaliation for her reports of harassment and workplace injuries (Third, Fifth, and Sixth Claims), and that Tesla failure to pay wages to Turner after termination (Seventh Claim). The adverse action underlying these claims was Turner's termination; the accrual date is after the EFAA was in effect. C.f., Newcombie-Dierl v. Amgen, Case No. 22-2155-DMG (MRWx), 2022 WL 3012211 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2022).
The sexual harassment allegations against Nester Doe and Does 2-10, are all encompassed within Turner's first cause of action for creating a hostile work environment. Defendants argue that the hostile work environment claim should be severed such that the portion relating to Does 2-10 is compelled to arbitration because Turner's complaint does not contain specific allegations that Does 2-10 continued to harass her beyond March 3, 2022. It would be illogical to bar Turner from discussing any pre-March 3, 2022 conduct in connection with a claim that is before me. Moreover, the complaint does not concede that the harassment by Does 2-10 ceased at any point prior to Turner's termination. Accordingly, I find that all of Turner's claims are temporally within the scope of the EFAA.
B. Turner's Claims Should Not be Severed
Tesla argues that, because Turner asserts sexual harassment and non-sexual harassment claims within the same complaint, the FAA requires me to sever the non-sexual harassment claims and compel Turner to resolve those through arbitration, even if some claims remain before me. See Reply at 3:12-4:25. But for the EFAA context, that would be appropriate. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 22, 132 S.Ct. 23, 181 L.Ed.2d 323 (2011) (holding that when a complaint contains both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, the [FAA] requires courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where this would result in inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
The EFAA, in contrast to the FAA, demonstrates Congress's preference that plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment be permitted to be heard in court and not be compelled to arbitration. "The FAA's mandate in support of its 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' may be 'overridden by a contrary congressional command.' " Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc., No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d 535, 558 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023) (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98, 132 S.Ct. 665, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012)).
As a result, I find that the EFAA permits me to find that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable with respect to Turner's entire case because the core of her case alleges "conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute" as defined by the EFAA. Id. at 558-60; c.f., Mera v. SA Hospitality Group, LLC, No. 123CV03492PGGSDA, 675 F.Supp.3d 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2023) (compelling wage and hour claim to arbitration where the EFAA applied to plaintiff's other claims).
Johnson v. Everyrealm is persuasive concerning its statutory interpretation of the EFAA and its result. In Johnson, plaintiff brought several claims against the defendants, including, race discrimination claims, pay discrimination claims, and sexual harassment and gender discrimination claims. Case No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d at 546-47. Because the court found that plaintiff had plausibly pleaded sexual harassment claims, it construed the EFAA to make the entire case unenforceable under the parties' arbitration agreement. Id. at 552-54, 557-60. According to Johnson, "the text of § 402(a) makes clear that its invalidation of an arbitration agreement extends to the entirety of the case relating to the sexual harassment dispute, not merely the discrete claims in that case that themselves either allege such harassment or relate to a sexual harassment dispute." Id. at 559.
Tesla cites Mera in support of its argument that I should sever Turner's non-sexual harassment-based claims from the claims that fall under the scope of the EFAA and compel them to arbitration. Repl. at 3:22-4:1. In Mera, the plaintiff brought both sexual harassment related claims and an "unrelated wage and hour claims." Case No. 123CV03492PGGSDA, 675 F.Supp.3d at 447. The court held, just as the Johnson decision did, that since the enactment of the EFAA "an arbitration agreement executed by an individual alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute is unenforceable . . . to the extent that the case filed by such individual 'relates to' the sexual harassment dispute." Id. Plaintiff's wage and hour claims in Mera were brought on behalf of " 'all non-exempt employees' . . . [that] were 'subjected to [d]efendants' decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure to pay them their proper wages.' " Id. at 448. In contrast, Turner's workplace injury and wage claims relate only to her own experience and employment at Tesla—and are intertwined with her sexual harassment claims. I find that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to each cause of action in Turner's complaint.
C. Claims One, Two, Three, Four, and Six Allege Conduct Covered Under the EFAA
As discussed below, claims one through four and claim six of Turner's complaint allege sexual harassment and conduct arising from Turner's reports of her experiences of sexual harassment on the job. The parties' arbitration agreement is unenforceable with respect to these claims.
1. Claim One: Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(j)(1)
Turner's first cause of action alleges sexual harassment in violation of California Gov't Code § 12940(j)(1). Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(j)(1) covers workplace harassment based on sex, gender, gender identity, and gender expression. "Harassment of an employee . . . shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." § 12940(j)(1). "Loss of tangible job benefits shall not be necessary in order to establish harassment." Id. Tesla concedes that Turner's first cause of action is a "sex-based harassment claim." See Repl. At 4:5-7.
Turner alleges that she was "subject to harassing conduct by Nester Doe and other employees because of her gender." Compl. ¶ 20. According to Turner, the harassing behavior was "severe and pervasive" such that "[a] reasonable person in [her] circumstances would have considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or abusive." Id. She asserts that Tesla "knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to take immediate corrective action." Id. ¶ 21.
2. Claim Two: Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(a)
Under Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a), it is illegal:
[f]or an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, reproductive health decision making, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). Tesla argues that Turner's second cause of action is subject to the parties' arbitration agreement because it is not plausibly related to her sexual harassment claim. Repl. At 4:8-10.
Turner alleges that Tesla terminated her on September 14, 2022 "substantially because of her gender." Compl. ¶ 25. Although this cause of action does not directly allege sexual harassment, a claim for gender discrimination is substantially related to the underlying claim of sexual harassment. It is apparent that Turner's allegations of sexual harassment arise out of her gendered experience in the workplace. Turner says that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender when she was terminated for reporting sexual harassment. Her second cause of action is substantially related to her sexual harassment claim and her second cause of action is not subject to the parties' arbitration agreement.
3. Claim Three: Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(h)
Under Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h), it is illegal "[f]or any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part." Here, Turner alleges that she was terminated because she opposed the sexual harassment by Tesla employees (i.e., her coworkers). Compl. ¶ 29. Like Turner's first cause of action, Tesla concedes that Turner's third cause of action is a sex-based harassment claim. See Repl. At 4:5-7. The EFAA prevents it from being compelled to arbitration.
4. Claim Four: Failure to Prevent in Violation of Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(k)
Under Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k), it is illegal:
For an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment, to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring."Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k). Turner alleges that Tesla "failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment and discrimination." Compl. ¶ 35. Tesla concedes that this is a sexual harassment-based claim. Repl. at 4:11-12.
5. Claim Six: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act and Labor Code, it is unlawful to "discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" based on a protected classification. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12940. Tesla also concedes that this cause of action stems from the sexual harassment dispute. Repl. at 4:12-15. As it acknowledges, Turner alleges that she was wrongfully terminated because she reported workplace injuries, because she is a woman, and because she opposed sexual harassment. Compl. ¶ 43; Repl. at 4:12-15.
D. Claims Five and Seven Are Substantially Related to Turner's Sexual Harassment Claims
Claims five and seven are not on their face within the scope of the EFAA. However, because I find that they are substantially related to Turner's sexual harassment claims, Turner's fifth and seventh causes of action should not be severed and compelled to arbitration. See Johnson, No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d at 559-60; see also Mera, No. 123CV03492PGGSDA, 675 F.Supp.3d at 446-47.
1. Claim Five Violation of Labor Code § 6310 Does Not Directly Allege Sexual Harassment
Cal. Labor Code § 6310 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for filing a workplace complaint. Here, Turner alleges that Tesla fired her in response to her reporting workplace injuries. Compl. ¶ 34-35. The resolution of this claim is intertwined with Turner's sexual harassment claims. It will likely involve many of the same witnesses because they also arose from Turner's employment at Tesla. Turner asserts claims for wrongful termination both under the theory that she was terminated for reporting harassment and for reporting her injuries. And if Tesla responded to Turner's complaints by firing her as Turner alleges, it is plausible that both complaining of the workplace injuries and the sexual harassment (which also allegedly created workplace injuries) were motivating factors. This claim is inherently intertwined with the other causes of action such that it makes sense to have this claim proceed alongside the other causes of actions. See Johnson, No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d at 559-60; see also Mera, No. 123CV03492PGGSDA, 675 F.Supp.3 at 446-47.
2. Claim Seven: Failure to Provide Wages at Termination is Not Within the Scope of the EFAA
Under California Labor Code § 203, it is illegal to willfully fail to pay wages to an employee who is discharged or who quits. Tesla argues that Turner's seventh cause of action for unpaid wages at the time of termination is "completely untethered" from her sexual harassment allegations. Repl. 4:21-25.
Turner contends that she was terminated in retaliation for reporting, in part, sexual harassment. Consequently, Tesla's alleged failure to pay her wages after that termination arises out of the same underlying facts as her sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, this claim arose out of the same facts and circumstances underlying Turner's sexual harassment causes of action and is substantially related to her sexual harassment claim. See Johnson, No. 22 CIV. 6669 (PAE), 657 F.Supp.3d at 559-60; see also Mera, No. 123CV03492PGGSDA, 675 F.Supp.3d at 446-47. It is within the scope of the EFAA and is not subject to the parties' arbitration agreement.
Accordingly, Tesla's motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.
II. MOTION TO STAY
Tesla moves to have any non-arbitrable claims remaining before me stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration. Repl. at 4:26-5: 26. Because none of Turner's claims will be compelled to arbitration, Tesla's motion to stay is DENIED as moot.
CONCLUSION
Tesla's motion to compel arbitration is DENIED and its motion to stay the proceedings is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.