Summary
In Turner v. State, 46 So. 3d 568, 2010 WL 3802538 (Fla. 2010) (table), this Court stated that "[b]ecause the expert reports conclusively rebutted the first-prong of Turner's Atkins claim, the trial court did not err in summarily denying Turner's claim that he was mentally retarded."
Summary of this case from Haliburton v. StateOpinion
Case No. SC09-1957.
September 28, 2010.
Lower Tribunal No(s). 16-1984-CF-6504.
William Thaddeus Turner, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the denial of a motion to vacate his death sentence on the ground that he is mentally retarded. We previously affirmed Turner's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Turner v. State, 530 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1987). We also affirmed the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Turner v. State, 614 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1992). In 2004, relying on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Turner filed a motion seeking to vacate his death sentence on the ground that he is mentally retarded. On September 14, 2009, the trial court summarily denied Turner's motion. We affirm.
To prove mental retardation, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen. See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). To satisfy the first prong, the defendant must establish that he or she has an IQ of two or more standard deviations below the mean. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007). In accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, the trial court appointed two mental health experts to examine Turner. One mental health expert determined that Turner's full-scale IQ was 98, and the other expert determined that Turner's full-scale IQ was 108. Both of these scores fell within the average intelligence range. Because the expert reports conclusively rebutted the first-prong of Turner's Atkins claim, the trial court did not err in summarily denying Turner's claim that he was mentally retarded.
Turner also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying two motions to disqualify. First, Turner filed a motion to disqualify the trial court in 2004, in which he asserted that the trial court should have been disqualified due to an ex parte communication with the State. The trial court denied the motion. In 2006, Turner filed a petition for review of the trial court's denial. We denied Turner's petition because the motion to disqualify had been untimely. Turner v. State, SC06-1359 (Fla. order filed Oct. 12, 2007).
Turner is not entitled to relitigate the propriety of the denial of the 2004 motion to disqualify. See, e.g., Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1083 (Fla. 2008) (denying "attempt to relitigate" claim that sentencing proceeding was unfair as a result of an ex parte communication between the sentencing judge and the prosecutor because the claim had been "already decided adversely to Tompkins"). Second, Turner filed a motion to disqualify filed on February 20, 2009, which was also denied by the trial court. A motion to disqualify the trial court must be filed "within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion." Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(e). The most recent trial court conduct cited as a basis for disqualification in the February 20, 2009, motion was the trial court's May 23, 2008, denial of two motions to appear pro hac vice. Turner offered no compelling reason why he could not have filed a motion to disqualify within ten days of the filing of the May 23, 2008, orders. Accordingly, Turner's motion to disqualify was untimely and thus, properly denied.