Opinion
C. A. 6:24-cv-00863-HMH-KFM
04-15-2024
Brandon Turner, Plaintiff, v. Laurens City Police Department, Judge Terri Anderson, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 20, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed March 6, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 7). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. However, for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Laurens County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), filed this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's allegations involve the plaintiff's pending charges for three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, one count of possession of a stolen pistol, one count of unlawful carrying of a pistol, two counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs, one count of possession of schedule IV drugs, one count of
trafficking heroin (4 grams or more, but less than 14 grams), one count of domestic violence high and aggravated, and one count of possession with intent to distribute drugs near a school in the Laurens County General Sessions Court. See Laurens County Public Index, https://publicindex. sccourts.org/Laurens/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A3020400362, 2021A3020400364, 2021A3020400366, 2022A3010100423, 2023A3020400646, 2023A3020400647, 2023A3020400648, 2023A3020400649, 2023A3020400650, 2023A3020400651, 2023A3020400652) (last visited March 20, 2024).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges that the Detention Center conspired to “commit malice” upon him (doc. 1 at 2). He contends that he is being unlawfully held in the Detention Center and being slandered on the news as a member of the “blood money gang” (id. at 3). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to have his charges dismissed and money damages (id. at 4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. Nevertheless, as outlined below, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
Here, the plaintiff requests (in part) that this court interfere in his pending criminal matters in the Laurens County General Sessions Court, seeking to have his charges dismissed. However, this court should abstain from interfering with it because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. In Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the plaintiff has the opportunity to assert defenses to his pending charges in the Laurens County General Sessions Court. As such, the plaintiff has not made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court interfering with his criminal prosecution in the Laurens County General Sessions Court, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
Federal courts typically stay rather than dismiss claims for money damages during the pendency of the state court proceedings. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). Nevertheless, dismissal rather than a stay is appropriate when the plaintiff's damages claims are “plainly barred” for other reasons. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, as set forth in detail below, the instant matter is barred for other reasons; thus, it is subject to summary dismissal.
Failure to State a Claim
As noted above, the court should abstain from interfering with the plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings in the Laurens County General Sessions Court under Younger. However, even aside from Younger abstention, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Judicial Immunity
The plaintiff's claims against Judge Anderson are also subject to dismissal based on judicial immunity. It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his/her authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). Here, the plaintiff's allegations against Judge Anderson are unclear, but appear to involve Judge Anderson's judicial actions in the plaintiff's pending criminal matters. As such, judicial immunity squarely applies and any claims against Judge Anderson should be dismissed.
Laurens City Police Department
The Laurens City Police Department is not a “person” as defined by § 1983, thus, it is entitled to summary dismissal. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” As noted, this defendant is not a person; hence, it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Rhodes v. Seventh Circuit Solicitors Ofc., C/A No. 9:09-cv-1863-JFA-BM, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2009). As such, this defendant is entitled to summary dismissal.
Even construing the plaintiff's complaint as asserting a claim for municipal liability against this defendant (and presuming this entity were an appropriate entity for Monell liability), his claim still fails (see doc. 1). As an initial matter, municipalities and other local governing bodies are considered “persons” and may be sued under § 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, a county or city cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[N]ot every deprivation of a constitutional right will lead to municipal liability. Only in cases where the municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom' will liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest [s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”Id. (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217). Additionally, under Monell, municipal liability arises “only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.” Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations that his name is being slandered by this defendant fails to allege any constitutionally offensive action by an individual defendant - as there is no federal right of action for defamation, libel, or slander claims. See Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988); Garrett v. Aube, C/A No. 8:18-cv-01449-MGL-JDA, 2018 WL 3628848, at *3 (D.S.C. May 31,2018) (recognizing that one's reputation is not a liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke due process protections), report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 3619823 (D.S.C. July 30, 2018). Additionally, although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff). As such, even construing a claim under Monell, this defendant is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).