Opinion
2:21-cv-01131 WBS DMC
02-09-2022
JEANNETTE TURNER, SHANA GUIOL, GREG GUIOL, TIANA MONTALFO, and KEN McCARTY, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF TEHAMA, DAVID GREER, and DAVID HENCRAFT, Defendants.
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Jeannette Turner and her children, Shana Guiol, Greg Guiol, Tiana Montalfo, and Ken McCarty, brought this action against Tehama County, David Greer, and David Hencraft under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional rights and for infliction of emotional distress under California law. (See Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiffs allege defendants improperly searched Turner's home, arrested her, and sought her prosecution for perjury without legal justification, leading to her conviction, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights and of plaintiffs' First Amendment right to familial association. (See id.) Plaintiffs brought this action after Turner's perjury conviction was overturned in 2020. (See id.) Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint. (See Mot. (Docket No. 8-1).)
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Turner moved to Tehama County in 1995. (Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 6.) She previously qualified as a Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) recipient, but her SSI benefits were suspended pending appeal. (Id. at ¶ 5.) In June of 1995, the County required Turner to re-apply for SSI and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) benefits. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.)
Based on alleged contradictions between her AFDC application and loan applications, in February of 1996 defendants sought perjury charges against Turner. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11.) The Tehama District Attorney's Office charged her with perjury, and she was arrested and jailed. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In July of 1996, defendant Greer and others sought a search warrant to support the charge, and Greer, defendant Hencraft, and others executed the warrant at Turner's home and again arrested Turner. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.)
Plaintiffs allege that, despite Turner's proof of entitlement to the benefits for which she had applied, the District Attorney's office continued to pursue the perjury charge “at the urging” of Greer, Hencraft, and others, who “misled” the District Attorney's office by providing “false evidence.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Turner was convicted of perjury in October of 1996. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18.) On November 14, 1996, Greer obtained a bench warrant for her arrest because she was late to a required court appearance, and he arrested her upon her arrival. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Her appeal of the suspension of benefits was granted in June of 1996, and her were benefits reinstated. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
In February of 1997, Turner was sentenced to three years in prison, a sentence that was stayed pending appeal. (Id. at ¶ 19.) While the appeal was pending, she was charged with drug possession based on methamphetamine allegedly found in her closet during the July 1996 search of her home, to which she pled guilty. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) In February of 1998, she was jailed again for one day, and although no charges were filed, her car was impounded and she had to pay to retrieve it. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Plaintiffs have not indicated why Turner was jailed on this occasion or whether it relates to the other noted charges.
Turner began serving her sentence in April of 1998 and was released from prison by “the early 2000s.” (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28.) In 2017, California enacted Penal Code section 1473.7, which allowed post-conviction relief for defendants with new evidence of their innocence and extended the available time to prove it. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Pursuant to section 1473.7, on June 10, 2020, the Tehama County Superior Court ordered that Turner's perjury conviction be overturned. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs brought this action on June 25, 2021. (See Compl.)
Plaintiffs' filings do not state the basis for Turner's conviction being overturned, though at oral argument plaintiffs' counsel stated that it was because the false statements in her benefits application were immaterial to her actual eligibility.
II. Discussion
The inquiry in addressing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether, taking the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the complaint has alleged “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory, ” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001), and thereby stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Courts are not, however, “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
The complaint contains claims for violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment right to familial association and for infliction of emotional distress. (See Compl.) It also refers to their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and its cover sheet lists the cause of action as “wrongful prosecution & search.” (See Id. at ¶¶ 4, 40; Docket No. 1-1.) The inclusion of the County also indicates that plaintiffs intend to assert a claim for municipal liability under Monell. (See Compl.) A. Constitutional Claims
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims, which are based on events that took place in the 1990s, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See Mot. at 12-15.) The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is based on state law, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), which in California is two years, Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014).
However, “a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994).
Since Turner's perjury conviction was overturned on June 10, 2020, any § 1983 claim attributable to her conviction did not accrue until that date and therefore was not time-barred when this action commenced. See Id. at 486-90. Conversely, any claim not so attributable is now barred by the statute of limitations.
1. Fourth Amendment - Unlawful Search and Seizure
The complaint alleges defendants improperly obtained and executed a search warrant at Turner's home in July of 1996. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 13-14.) The only fruit of this search noted in the complaint, however, was methamphetamine, for which Turner was separately convicted of possession. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Because the complaint does not allege that this conviction has been overturned, a finding that the search was unconstitutional would violate Heck, and thus plaintiffs' challenge is barred.
Plaintiffs challenge the impoundment of Turner's car, (Compl. at ¶ 23.), but offer no indication of how this claim is not time-barred. Their opposition also asserts that Turner “suffered a warrantless search that led to her first arrest and charges of perjury in February of 1996, ” (Opp. at 10), but no such search is alleged in the complaint.
2. Fourth Amendment - Wrongful/Malicious Prosecution
Defendants concede the malicious prosecution claim is not time-barred because it did not accrue until 2020, when Turner's conviction was overturned. (See Reply at 2 (Docket No. 12).) Even so, plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts showing any defendant caused Turner's prosecution, a required element of any § 1983 claim. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). When a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a prosecutor's decision to bring charges, that decision is often “a superseding or intervening cause of [the] constitutional tort plaintiff's injury, precluding suit against the officials who made an arrest or procured a prosecution.” See Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008). This is due to “a rebuttable presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment regarding the existence of probable cause in filing a complaint.” Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This presumption may be rebutted, however, if
the prosecutor was pressured by police or was given false information; the police ‘act[ed] maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person'; the prosecutor ‘relied on the police investigation and arrest when he filed the complaint instead of making an independent judgment on the existence of probable cause for the arrest'; or the officers ‘otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.'Beck, 527 F.3d at 862-63 (citations omitted).
Many of the allegations regarding defendants' role in Turner's prosecution are conclusory and unsupported by averments of fact. For example, plaintiffs allege Greer and Hencraft prompted the decision to prosecute Turner by “urging” the district attorney to do so and by “misle[ading]” her with “false evidence.” (Compl. at ¶ 16.) However, plaintiffs do not indicate what the alleged false evidence defendants provided was.
Further, although the complaint suggests probable cause to prosecute Turner was lacking because the false information in her benefits application was immaterial to her eligibility, (see Id. at ¶¶ 5-17), it does not allege that Greer and Hencraft had exclusive possession of this information and withheld it from the district attorney, causing her to be unaware that probable cause was lacking, see Beck, 527 F.3d at 862-63. And while plaintiffs' opposition states that defendants failed to disclose the fact that Turner qualified for SSI benefits “when seeking a search warrant, ” (Opp. at 13) -- a detail not alleged in the complaint -- it does not state that they prevented the district attorney from learning of Turner's actual qualification status.
Because the complaint does not indicate why Turner's conviction was overturned, any malicious prosecution claim also fails because such claims must allege that the prosecution or conviction was terminated in a way reflecting the defendant's innocence. See Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.
3. First Amendment - Interference with Familial Association
Plaintiffs also allege they were wrongfully separated while Turner was incarcerated, in violation of their First Amendment right to familial association. (See Compl. at ¶ 40.)
Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized claims under the First Amendment “for unwarranted interference with the right to familial association, ” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), neither the parties nor the court have identified precedent evaluating such claims under these circumstances. Even so, plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is likewise deficient because the complaint fails to plausibly allege that defendants caused Turner's incarceration, as it does not plead facts showing they, and not the District Attorney, were responsible for her prosecution. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942. As such, this claim must also be dismissed.
4. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs' only reference to the Fourteenth Amendment relates to jurisdiction. (See Compl. at ¶ 4.) However, “[w]here government behavior is governed by a specific constitutional amendment, claims under section 1983 alleging unlawful government action must be evaluated under that specific constitutional provision, ” rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 1:12-cv-428 LJO SKO, 2014 WL 204058, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2014) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). Because plaintiffs' claims arise under the First and Fourth Amendments, they must be assessed thereunder. The court will therefore dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
The complaint also references the Fifth Amendment in noting jurisdiction. (See Compl. at ¶ 4.) Because plaintiffs do not otherwise mention this amendment, nor is an alleged Fifth Amendment violation apparent, the court will not address it here.
5. Municipal Liability
A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when execution of one of its policies or customs causes violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 694. For such claims, a complaint must identify “facts regarding the specific nature of th[e] alleged ‘policy, custom[, ] or practice.'” A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs' complaint does not specify what “policy, custom, or practice” they claim caused the alleged violations or indicate which rights such policy or custom violated. See Id. Although their opposition states that they seek to challenge the County's misapplication of regulations in determining Turner's eligibility for benefits, (see Opp. at 13-14), this is not stated in the complaint. Nor do plaintiffs allege facts showing such misapplication amounted to a “practice[ ] . . . so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage' with the force of law, ” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (citation omitted), as it must to state a Monell claim. The court will therefore grant the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the County. B. State Law Claims
Nor would such allegations show how plaintiffs' Monell claim -- based on events in the 1990s -- is not time-barred.
The complaint also alleges that “the employees of the county, ” through “their conduct, ” “caused emotional distress to each of the plaintiffs.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 43.) California law provides for two kinds of tort claims premised on infliction of emotional distress: intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259, 1264 (4th Dist. 2005).
To state a claim for intentional infliction, “a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe . . . emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation.” Id. at 1259. Negligent infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand, is simply a species of the tort of negligence. Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 69 Cal.App.4th 652, 656 (4th Dist. 1999). As with any negligence claim, a plaintiff must allege “the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.” Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, plaintiffs' complaint fails to provide even the most basic details such as (1) which defendants are being sued on each claim, (2) for what particular conduct each is being sued, (3) which plaintiffs were affected by that conduct and how it harmed them (beyond the vague allegation that “each of the plaintiffs” suffered “emotional distress”), and (4) how the particular harm those plaintiffs suffered is directly attributable to specific conduct by particular defendants. Nor are facts supporting the other elements of either claim alleged. As such, plaintiffs' state law claims for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint (Docket No. 8) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with this Order.