Opinion
No. C 04-1841, Docket No. 3, 8, 12.
August 30, 2004
ORDER
The matter before the Court is a class action lawsuit brought by named Plaintiff Robin Tucker ("Tucker") against Defendant Casual Male Retail Group ("CMRG"). Tucker brings this lawsuit to allege wage and hour violations arising from CMRG's alleged misclassification of store managers as exempt employees and CMRG's alleged practice of denying its store managers overtime compensation and mandatory meal/rest breaks. On June 15, 2004, the Court requested briefing from the parties on whether the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action [Docket No. 7]. Having read and considered the papers submitted by the parties and being fully informed, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby DECLINES to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action.
BACKGROUND
Tucker filed his First Amended Complaint against CMRG in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 103 CV006876, on October 16, 2003. The state court action was brought on behalf of Tucker individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, alleging, inter alia, that CMRG misclassified its store managers as overtime exempt employees, failed to pay them overtime for all hours worked and failed to provide meal periods and rest periods in violation of California's wage and hour laws.
On April 27, 2004, Tucker brought a motion to, inter alia, amend the First Amended Complaint to include a class seeking claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 ("FLSA"). The state court denied Plaintiff's motion. The Amended Notice of Ruling provides that "Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is DENIED as to all proposed amendments relating to claims based on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act because such amendments would add multiple classes and two unrelated classes in this state law based action[.]" Flores Decl., Exh. B.
Tucker filed the present action on May 10, 2004, seeking compensation resulting from Defendant's alleged wage and hour violations under both California law and the FLSA. On the same day, Tucker also filed a Notice of Pendency of State Court Action ("Notice") [Docket No. 3]. The Notice stated that a related case entitled Tucker v. Casual Male Retail Group, Inc., is currently pending in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara, Case. No. 103 CV006867, and requested that the pending state court action be "coordinated" with this case to "avoid the unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense and the potentially conflicting results if the cases proceed before different Judges." Id. The Court liberally construed the Notice as a request for this Court to temporarily abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action and on June 15, 2004, requested briefing on the matter [Docket No. 7].
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, federal courts may not refuse to adjudicate a case which falls within their jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court has recognized at least four exceptions to this rule. The primary exceptions are the three abstention doctrines recognized inRailroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941),Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). These abstention doctrines allow a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction based on principles of proper constitutional decision making and proper regard for federal-state relations.
The fourth exception, invoked in this action, is the Colorado River doctrine. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Under this doctrine, the Court may stay an action in deference to pending state proceedings. Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). The decision to stay is not based on the above considerations, but rather on "considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. This doctrine is not a doctrine of abstention per se; the Court retains jurisdiction over the action, but stays proceedings to avoid the waste of judicial resources. See Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415 n. 5.
This Circuit considers six primary factors in determining whether a stay is appropriate under Colorado River: "(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the relative convenience of the forums; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; . . . (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction[;] . . . (5) whether state or federal law controls[;] and (6) whether the state proceeding is adequate to protect the parties' rights." Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415 (internal citations omitted). These factors are considered "in a pragmatic and flexible way, as part of a balancing process." Id. "Because of the flexible approach called for by the Supreme Court, this list of factors is not exclusive, and others may be considered." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990).
In applying this doctrine, the Court must bear in mind that the general rule is "that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (internal quotation and citation omitted). A stay under this doctrine is "appropriate only when certain `exceptional circumstances' are present." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19493, *20-21 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the Court has discretion in applying this doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that "the district court's discretion . . . [must be] exercised within the `exceptional circumstances' limits of the Colorado River doctrine."Travelers, 914 F.2d at 1367. " Any doubts as to whether a factor exists should be resolved against a stay." Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
The Court has carefully considered all six factors enumeratedsupra. All of these factors either weigh against abstention or are neutral and therefore do not support a stay of this action.
The instant case does not evince any special concerns regarding piecemeal litigation. The case involves ordinary employment, contract and labor law issues. There is no vastly more comprehensive state action pending. In contrast to Nakash, the state court proceeding has not progressed significantly. Cf. Nakash 882 F.2d at 1413 (affirming decision to abstain, in part because the federal suit was filed five years after the state suit and 70 hearings and almost 100 depositions had been held in connection with the state proceeding, in addition to the production of 300,000 documents). Furthermore, the record does not support a finding that Tucker filed the instant action in bad faith in an attempt to forum shop. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action. See Fireman's Fund, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19493 at *20-21 (noting that the court can only abstain where there are exceptional circumstances);Travelers, 914 F.2d at 1367 ("To determine whether a stay is warranted, the relevant factors must be balanced, `with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.'" (citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Court DECLINES to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action [Docket Nos. 3, 8]. Defendant's request for a stay [Docket No. 12] is DENIED in its entirety.
Given this, Plaintiff is expected to file a Request for Dismissal in Tucker v. Casual Male Retail Group, Inc., currently pending in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara, Case. No. 103 CV006867, as soon as Defendant files its Answer herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.