Under the equitable principles applied in Martinez, the absence of counsel on initial postconviction collateral review is “cause” to excuse the default of a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only when a State fails to appoint counsel after a petitioner properly has initiated those proceedings to challenge his trial counsel's performance. See, e.g., Jones v. Penn. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 492 Fed.Appx. 242, 246-47 (3rd Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1167 (2013); Castillo v. Ryan, No. 11-571-TUC-JGZ (LAB), 2013 WL 3282547, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 28, 2013); Uptegrove v. Villmer, No. 12-0456-CV, 2012 WL 3637707, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2012); Trust v. Larkins, No. 4:09-CV-1101, 2012 WL 4479088, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2012), report and recommendation adopted by, 2012 WL 4480719 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012); Anderson v. Koster, No. 11-1227-CV, 2012 WL 1898781, at *9 (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2012); Bland v. Hobbs, No. 5:11-CV-286, 2012 WL 2389904, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Ark. June 12, 2012), proposed findings and recommendations adopted by, 2012 WL 2874118 (E.D. Ark. July 13, 2012). “The Supreme Court was adamant that its holding in Martinez created only a ‘limited' and ‘narrow' exception to the rule established in Coleman [v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)].” Jones v. Penn. Bd., 492 Fed.Appx. at 246 (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9, 15). “Were it otherwise, the Martinez rule would encourage sandbagging substantial claims of ineffective assistance and could potentially apply to any defendant who failed to petition for state collateral review.” Id. at 247. Hoes never filed a Rule 37 petition in state c