Opinion
6522.
Decided August 30, 2004.
Kevin Trombley, Harrisville, New York, Plaintiff.
Lorraine Sorrell, Chaumont, New York, Respondent.
The Petitioner instituted a claim against the Respondent in Small Claims Part of Watertown City Court on June 9, 2004 alleging the respondent owed him $3,000.00. This dispute allegedly arose over the breakdown of a social relationship between the parties.
The Respondent filed a counterclaim on June 16, 2004 for $2,697.00 and affixed to it an Order of Protection prohibiting the petitioner from "no communications what-so-ever" and to "stay away from Lorraine Sorrell" the respondent in this case. The Protection Order was issued on March 16, 2004 by Justice Richard Wallace of The Town of Lyme Court and later converted to a permanent Order of Protection in effect on June 16, 2004 when the petitioner filed this claim against the respondent and was in effect on July 22, 2004 when the parties appeared before this Court.
DECISION
It is quite clear from the copies of the supporting deposition of Lorraine Sorrell dated March 5, 2004 which was made part of the criminal charge upon which the March 16, 2004 Protection Order was based that the issues outlined in the Petitioner's Small Claims case in this Court were identical with those involved in the criminal proceeding.
The Judge in the criminal proceeding issued an Order directing the Plaintiff to specifically "refrain from communication by mail — with Lorraine Sorrell" (Order of Protection dated March 16, 2004) — not to mention under the stay away section of the Order the Plaintiff engage in "no communication what-so-ever" in the Judge's handwriting.
In People v. Nancy C., 188 Misc2d 383, this Court pointed out that the "legislative interest behind Penal Law Section 215.50(3) is to punish in the name of the People one who intentionally disobeys a Court Order to vindicate the public's interest in the administration of justice generally (People v. Paperno, 98 Misc2d 99, 106)". Id. p. 387.
When the Judge who issued the Order to the Plaintiff directed him to "refrain from communication by mail" and to leave her alone engaging in "no communication what-so-ever," the Judge not only prohibited such conduct in general, but also, in particular, confronting the victim concerning the very issues which were involved in the criminal proceeding. Thus, while some of these issues might be the basis of a valid civil law suit, this Court finds the Plaintiff is prohibited by the Order of Protection from commencing it during the period in which it is in force.
It would be inappropriate for this Court to allow this proceeding to continue in light of the other Court's specific prohibition that the Plaintiff (in this case) refrain from any "communication what-so-ever." To do so would be enabling the Plaintiff to circumvent the Order's clear dictate which would be an offense "`against the dignity of the particular tribunal . . .
[whose] authority [would be] condemned, the administration of public justice assaulted, and its power despised'" as well as also being "`against the Public law'. . . . People Ex. rel. Sherwin v. Mead 92 NY 415, 420. (See also, People v. Leone, 44 N.Y.2d Id. P. 387)." This Court will not be a party to such conduct by allowing it to become a forum for the Plaintiff to avoid compliance with the other Court's order.
The Plaintiff is not without a remedy in that he could seek a modification of the Order of Protection from the Court which issued it to allow a civil action between the parties conducted in a manner approved by the Court. Once such approval had been granted then this Court could accept the Plaintiff's petition without conflict with the other Court's Order.
The Petition is dismissed without prejudice. This Decision shall serve as the Judgement and Order of the Court.