Opinion
No. 05-06-00811-CV
Opinion Filed June 26, 2007.
On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 03-10611.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this insurance coverage case involving a well blowout, Tristar Exploration, Inc. appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Mid-Continent Casualty Co. In five issues, Tristar generally asserts summary judgment was improper because (1) various fact issues exist, (2) the policy contains conflicting provisions and is therefore ambiguous, and (3) there is no conclusive evidence to support alternative exclusions. We affirm.
Tristar initiated an operation that involved reentry of the Henck-A-Lease No. 1 well. In performing the operation, Tristar utilized a wellhead rated for 5000 pounds per square inch of working pressure. During the operation, the well pressure encountered exceeded the wellhead pressure, causing the assembly to fail. Wild Well Control was called in to bring the well under control.
Mid-Continent was Tristar's insurance carrier and declined coverage for reimbursement of expenses, costs, and/or damages in connection with the incident. Tristar sued Mid-Continent for breach of contract and fraud and sought a declaration that the incident was covered by the policy. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Mid-Continent's. Tristar appealed.
In its first issue, Tristar contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mid-Continent because Mid-Continent admitted that fact issues existed. Specifically, Tristar lists twelve "fact questions" that it asserts Mid-Continent admitted in its cross motion for summary judgment. Tristar argues, without citation to any legal authority, that these admissions preclude summary judgment in Mid-Continent's favor. Given Tristar's complete failure to analyze the law regarding admissions, we conclude this issue is inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Regardless, Tristar's complaint is without merit.
Mid-Continent filed a combined response to Tristar's motion for partial summary judgment and its own cross motion for summary judgment. In the document, Mid-Continent asserted that summary judgment for Tristar was improper because Tristar had not established certain issues as a matter of law or, alternatively, fact questions existed. "Assertions of fact, not pled in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions." Hughes Wood Prods. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 207 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Houston First Am. Savs. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1983)). Here, Mid-Continent's alternatively pleaded issues, raised to avoid summary judgment in Tristar's favor, do not constitute judicial admissions. We overrule the first issue.
In its second issue, Tristar asserts the insurance policy contains conflicting provisions on coverage and exclusion from coverage, rendering the policy ambiguous and requiring this Court to construe provisions in its favor. Again, we disagree.
We construe insurance policies according to the rules governing contract construction. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Id. If policy language has a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous, and we construe it as a matter of law. Id. An ambiguity does not arise merely because the parties offer conflicting interpretations of the policy language. Id. Instead, an ambiguity exists only if the contract is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Id.
Tristar argues the following provisions, and in particular the highlighted portions, conflict:
3.
Voluntary "Clean-up Costs" ReimbursementWe will reimburse you for other "clean-up costs" that you incur provided that:
* * *
(b)
the "clean-up costs" are incurred to curtail or prevent a "pollution incident" that poses an imminent and substantial danger of "bodily injury," "property damage" or environmental damage to which [the insuring agreement] applies[.]
* * *
V.
EXCLUSIONS
A.
Any cost or expense incurred by you or at your request or by or at the request of any "Co-owner of the Working Interest" in connection with controlling or bringing under control any oil, gas or water well.
"Clean-up costs" are defined as "expenses for the removal or neutralization of contaminants, irritants or pollutants."
Tristar does not dispute that Wild Well Control brought the well under control. Rather, it urges it is not possible to "envision the act of `curtailing or preventing' a `pollution incident' from an oil and gas well that would not involve controlling or bringing under control the well." Tristar argues that by reading the provisions literally, the exclusion "completely eviscerates the coverage provided by the Endorsement and renders the Endorsement meaningless." We disagree.
The provisions in question have certain and definite meanings and do not conflict. The pollution coverage provides that the insured will be reimbursed for expenses for removing or neutralizing contaminants, irritants, or pollutants to curtail or prevent a pollution incident (as defined by the policy) that poses an imminent and substantial danger of bodily injury, property damage, or environmental damage. This coverage, however, is limited by the well control exclusion clause, meaning those expenses connected to controlling or bringing under control any gas, oil, or water well are excluded. Nothing in the plain reading of these two provisions allows one to eviscerate the other, although the interpretation advanced by Tristar would impermissibly do so. Having considered the policy as a whole and these provisions in particular, we conclude the policy is not ambiguous. We overrule the second issue. Our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to address Tristar's remaining issues or Mid-Continent's cross issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.